Kresna Uprising, San Stefano Treaty and Berlin Congress (1878)

[Svoliani]

186. The Macedonian Rebel Committee will also inform the government of the Principality of Bulgaria that the Macedonians will have no dealings with the Principality other than those of fraternal aid from our Slav brothers.

lele

[Soldier of Macedon]

Does your post have a point Russian linguist? Or are you spamming on decent thread here?

[Вардарец]

186. The Macedonian Rebel Committee will also inform the government of the Principality of Bulgaria that the Macedonians will have no dealings with the Principality other than those of fraternal aid from our Slav brothers.

lele

E sho lelekash?

The Bulgarians are only Slavic brothers, grouped together as the Serbs. I see no Bulgarians in the constitution

[Pelister]

E sho lelekash?

The Bulgarians are only Slavic brothers, grouped together as the Serbs. I see no Bulgarians in the constitution

It was noble of them to ask for help. Of course, the Bulgarians had other plans for them.

[Soldier of Macedon]

130 years from the Kresna Uprising

http://www.omoilindenpirin.org/news/2008/december03a_b.asp

На 12 октомври 2008 г. в гр. Кресна се проведе тържествено събрание в чест и спомен на Македонското (кресненско) въстание, от което се навършват 130 години. Присъстваха представители на ОМО „Илинден” - ПИРИН и гражданството от всички краища на Пиринска Македония, от София и от Шумен. Събранието бе отворено от съпредседателя на ОМО „Илинден” - ПИРИН Стойко Стойков, който благодари на всички отзовали се на поканата. Доклад за въстанието изнесе професор Георги Радулов. Рецитал произнесе Димитър Иванов от Шумен, а свои стихотворения и представяне на книгата си за Кресненското въстание направи Борис Сандански (роднина на Иван Сандански, който е участвал като знаменосец във въстанието - баща на войводата Яне Сандански). Същият рецитира свои стихотворения посветени на кресненските въстаници. Бе поднесен венец пред паметника на Димитър Беровски в центъра на града. С минута мълчание присъстващите почетоха паметта на загиналите.

Събранието бе проведено в общинската зала в гр. Kресна, което се тълкува като още един знак, за омекване на държавната политика поне що се отнася до провеждане на мирни събрания. За това партията води дългогодишна борба в Страсбург, която от края на миналата година започна да дава плодове.

ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛСТВО НА ОМО „ИЛИНДЕН” - ПИРИН
3 декември 2008 г.

The article is in relation to a gathering recently to commemorate 130 years since the Kresna Uprising commenced, casting the Macedonians into their first real taste of organised revolution and battle against the Turks. The political party of the Macedonians in Bulgaria, OMO Ilinden PIRIN, had organised a function in respect to the great event. The article also speaks of how Ivan Sandanski, the father of the legendary Macedonian fighter Jane Sandanski, was the flag-bearer for the army of the uprising.

The gathering was held in the city of Kresna.

[Jankovska]

Jane Sandanski has always been my top hero in our history. He was just so pure and had the same dreams and visions that we have today. his father was the flag bearer for the Kresna Vostanie and I recommend 'Makedonska Golgota' to every Macedonians. The book is just amazing, it;s a dream that we all still dream, free and united Macedonia

[Soldier of Macedon]

How can we get access to this book Jankovska, I have heard about it before. Can you tell us a little about it, who wrote it, the theme, etc?

[Sarafot]

How can we get access to this book Jankovska, I have heard about it before. Can you tell us a little about it, who wrote it, the theme, etc?

I bothed it in knižara in Ohrid last sumer for 800 denars,you can tray on Amzon?

[Soldier of Macedon]

Ако го имаш ај скенираи некои од по важните делои и клаи ги тука, можи така?

[Pelister]

I wish I was there.

They had the "sila" to do it.

Dedo Ilija got called back by the Russian command and so the uprising lost half of its able and bodied men.

Shortly after that, the Bulgarians assasinated the popular and fearsome Pirin vojvoda, karastoilov.

It could easily have gone the Macedonians way.

One thing they don't tell you about this is that it took the Turks 3 YEARS to bring the rebellion down.

So much we don't know about the Macedonians.

[Jankovska]

The book is by Vidoe Podgorec and I know it was quite difficult to find it, I've been searching for it for ages and I was lucky enough to get it from one of Vidoe's students. It's with malenka at the moment but when I get it I will try and see if I can scan few bits.

[Soldier of Macedon]

The book is by Vidoe Podgorec and I know it was quite difficult to find it, I've been searching for it for ages and I was lucky enough to get it from one of Vidoe's students. It's with malenka at the moment but when I get it I will try and see if I can scan few bits.

Excellent, please do.

One thing they don't tell you about this is that it took the Turks 3 YEARS to bring the rebellion down.

So much we don't know about the Macedonians.

Indeed Pelister, Macedonia during 1878-1881 is a turblent but interesting time, anything was possible, but something went wrong, we still hadn't fully learned the lesson of trusting no-one.

[Venom]

Wow! Three years! That is amazing!

[Pelister]

It is amazing.

I am amazed at just how strong Macedonian identity was - they all knew who they were.

There are also the famous uprising in Kicevo area in 1878, 1879, 1880 and 1881.

Over a period of about 50 years (from 1800 to 1900) the number of Macedonians who took up a gun and ran to the hills to fight for their homes numbered hundreds of thousands, and there was not a single village that wasn't involved.

What about the 11,000 Macedonians who went south in the war to create a New Greece? They joined the Albanians and Vlachs down there.

[George S.]

San Stefano Treaty and the Berlin Congress (1878)

San Stefano Treaty and the Macedonian Question

By Vanche Stoichev

Edited by Risto Stefov

[email protected]

September 2015



Most interesting about 19th century diplomatic and political practices, which have not changed to this day, is how the Great Powers treated the weak and smaller countries and the people in general, particularly the Balkan people… like they were some sort of “loot” or commodity to be divided among armed “thieves”.



Source: Military History of Macedonia, Skopje, 2004, pages 210 – 219.



Great Power policies towards the Eastern Crisis, including national liberation problems involving nations under Ottoman rule, including the Macedonian Question, were reopened after the 1875 Herzegovina uprising began.



Most important of all for resolving the Macedonian Question was the Reichstadt Treaty signed on July 8, 1876 between Russian Emperor Alexander II and Austrian-Hungarian Emperor Francis Joseph (Cf. I. V. Kozmenko, Sbornik dogovorimi Rosii i drugimi gosudarstvama 1856-1917 Moscow, 1952, pp. 193-273).



This Treaty divided the sphere of influence in the Balkans between these two Empires. The only reason these monarchies became involved in the resolution of the Eastern Question was to serve their own interests. Having that in mind, they agreed not to allow a large Slavic state to be created in the Balkans and any small states created would fall under their spheres of influence.



Based on this Treaty Bulgaria and Romania, under Russian influence, would be allowed to create independent principalities inside their natural borders. Bosnia, Rumelia and Albania, under Austrian-Hungarian influence, could become autonomous countries. Epirus and Thessaly (and Crete according to the Austrian version) could be annexed to Greece (Cf. Istoriya na diplomaciyata, Diplomaciya vo novo vreme (1871-1914). Volume II, Sofia, 1965, pp. 118-119).



The Reichstadt Treaty, which in effect sanctioned this unusual Balkan division based on spheres of influence, became the basis for future misunderstandings and the reason for many future political and military conflicts. According to the Russian version of this division, Bulgaria’s territory extended from the Danube to Stara Mountain and the term Rumelia referred to Thrace and Macedonia. According to the Austrian version Macedonia and Thrace as well as Bulgaria were included in autonomous Rumelia. There were no references made to a separate or independent Bulgaria in the Treaty. But, regardless of what was said in the Treaty, Austria-Hungary did not approve of the creation of a state which would extend from the Danube River to the Aegean Sea and from Lake Ohrid to the Black Sea, for two reasons:



First, according to the Reichstadt Treaty, Russia was not allowed to create a large Slavic state in the Balkans.



Second, even if such a state was created, it could only exist as an autonomous region within the Ottoman Empire and could not be independent as Russia was planning to do with San Stefano Bulgaria (Cf. Krste Bitovski. Kontinuitetot na makedonskite nacionalnoosloboditelni borbi vo XIX i pochetokot na XX vek. Skopje, 1998, p. 115).



After the Crimean war was concluded, three ideas began to crystallize in Russian policy regarding the Eastern Question (For more information on the Russian policy toward the Balkans and Macedonia see: Vlado Popovski, Lenina Zhila Makedonskoto prashanje vo dokunentite no Kominternata. Volume I, Skopje, 1999, pp. XXVII-XCV.)



The first idea was “Slavism” supported by people who, according to greater-state interests, supported the idea of a Slavic national liberation struggle led by Russia. The main front line supporter of this “idea” was the distinguished diplomat, Count Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatiev.



The second idea was that Russia should abstain from having an active Balkan policy that supported Balkan nation liberation struggles because such a policy in principle would be dangerous to the internal situation in Russia. A typical representative of that idea was Count Petar Shuvalov, Russia’s representative in London.



The third idea was that Russia should not be supporting the one-sided action it had been pursuing in the Balkans and should lead a cautious approach in politics in accordance with the collective actions of other countries. The main supporter of that idea was Duke Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Gorchakov (Cf. Istoriyata na diplomaciyata, Diplomaciyata v Novo vreme (1871-1914). Volume II, Sofia, 1965, pp. 92-93).



Prior to the April Uprising in Bulgaria and the Razlovtsi Uprising in Macedonia in 1876, priority in the Russian Balkans politics was given to Gorchakov’s idea, but after the uprisings the priority was changed to Ignatiev’s idea of “Slavism” which became more popular. It is interesting to note that several European politicians treated Macedonia as an independent political subject during the preparations for the Constantinople Conference. During the Eastern Crisis resolution proposals French Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Charles Delescluze, while talking to British Minister of Foreign Affairs Salisbury, on November 21, 1876, supported the idea of a collective occupation of the Balkan Peninsula. He said: “Austria-Hungary should occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia should occupy Bulgaria and Great Britain should occupy Macedonia” (Ct: Hristo Hristov. Osvobozhdenieto na B’lgariya i politikata na zapadnite drzhavi 1876 -1878. Sofia, 1976, p. 61).



This proposal was rejected and new solutions to the Eastern Crisis were ordered. The British government initiated the idea that Great Power ambassadors should submit a plan to the Ottoman government in Constantinople for the complete resolution of the Eastern Crisis. After working for a month, while the Constantinople Conference was still in session, on December 11, 1876 the following plan was submitted to the Sublime Port: Serbia and Montenegro would keep their borders identified at the beginning of the Serbian-Ottoman war, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Macedonia would be given autonomy. The Ottoman government rejected the proposal prompting Russia to break off diplomatic relations in January 1877. Given that Russia already had a treaty with Austria-Hungary, at the end of April it declared war on Ottoman Turkey (Cf. Kliment Dzhambazovski. Srbija i nocionalnooslobodilachki pokret makedonskog noroda u doba Berlinskog kongresa. Collection ‘Srbija u zavrshnoj fazi velike istochne krize (1876-1878)’, Volume 2, Belgrade, 1980, p. 159. Cf. Hristo Hristov. B’lgarskoto nocionalnoosvoboditelno dvizhenie v 1876 godina i Carigradaskata koneferenciya. ‘na BAN’, Volume 1/1966, pp.24-27).



The declaration of war was initiated by a Manifesto issued by Emperor Alexander II on April 24, 1877. Russia mobilized 310,000 soldiers for the war. Commander Nikolay, the Russian Emperor’s brother, was put in charge of 250,000 of them. Nikolay was able to pass expediently through Bessarabia and Romania but he found the Danube River impassable. The Danube River had risen during the month of May and would not allow the Russian army to easily cross to the Bulgarian side until June 22. During that time there were diplomatic negotiations underway but they did not prevent the war from starting (Cf. Vlado Popovski, Lenina Zhila. Op. cit, p. LXIV).



The fact that the Great Powers proposed autonomy for Macedonia during the Constantinople Conference and that Ottoman Turkey refused that proposal, was great motive for a large number of Macedonians to take part in the Russian-Ottoman war as volunteers. They hoped that Russia would conform to the 1876 Constantinople Conference Great Power plan and, after achieving a victory over Ottoman Turkey, Macedonia would become autonomous. The British government unfortunately believed that Russia threatened British interests by declaring war on Ottoman Turkey.



In response to this British Minister of Foreign Affairs Derby, on May 6, 1877, sent a diplomatic letter to the Russian government warning that Britain would not stand idle if Russia tried to block the Suez Canal, attacked or occupied Egypt, or occupied Constantinople, the Bosphorus or its Dardanelles naval route. In a reply, on June 8, 1877, the Russian government explained that the Suez Canal, Egypt, Baghdad, Basra and the Persian Gulf were of no interest to Russia. The only issues that Russia was interested in resolving with Britain were the issues of Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. As far as the war was concerned Russia was prepared, with Ottoman agreement, to resolve these issues in the following way:



Bulgaria to be given autonomy down to Stara Mountain. The region south of Stara Mountain (meaning Macedonia) to be administered through Great Power guarantees. Reforms to be carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia and Montenegro to be allowed to expand their territories. Bessarabia and Batum to be returned to Russia (Cf. Russian-British Relations during the Eastern Crisis. ‘Slavonic Review’, December 1926, No.227, 228, Turkey, No.15 (1877), No.1).



When Russia was proposing an administration for the “Christian countries south of Stara Mountain”, meaning Macedonia, it was looking for autonomy for Macedonia, the kind the Russian government had in mind which would fit the goals of the 1876 Razlovtsi Uprising, which was a first attempt at liberating all the Christian countries in the Balkans, along with the 1875 Herzegovina Uprising.



The British government did not respond to the Russian reply but initiated negotiations with Austria-Hungary to carry out mutual actions against Russia if Russia threatened their interests. The Russian forces finally crossed the Danube River on June 27, 1877, after which General Gurko’s forward detachments bravely continued to head south. In response to this, on June 30, 1877, the British dispatched their fleet to the Dardanelles but only for a short time because Osman Pasha took Pleven and Silleyman Pasha destroyed the incoming Russian forces at Stara Zagora and on July 31, 1877 the rest of the Russian troops were forced to retreat back to the Shipchanski Passage. After an unsuccessful attempt to end the war by peaceful means, Russian forces then began to bomb Pleven and on August 10, 1877 occupied it. The winter was spent fighting a severe but successful campaign over Stara Mountain in which many Macedonian volunteers were engaged. Negotiations between the Russians and the Ottomans were conducted in Odrin where the Russian army had established its Main Headquarters. Count Ignatiev, assisted by Nelidov, was authorized to negotiate for the Russian side, while Safet Pasha assisted by Sadulah was authorized by the Sultan to negotiate for the Ottoman side.



Negotiations were conducted under unusual conditions with Russia dictating terms while the Russian army was marching towards the Marmara Sea and occupying the city of San Stefano. When the Russian army reached a position about 13 kilometres away from Constantinople, the Russians relocated their main command in Odrin. While Russian-Ottoman peace negotiations were ongoing, Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jovan Ristich sent Russian command in Odrin and St. Petersburg a geographic map of Kosovo vilayet outlining the border of Old Serbia.



Attached to the map was a letter signed by Duke Milan Obrenovich, requesting that the Kosovo vilayet be given to Serbia because it was Serbian territory. The borders of “Old Serbia” on that map, however, were much different from those traditionally encompassing “Old Serbia”, and covered the territory up to the River Bistritsa in the south, including the cities Lerin, Voden and Ber, all the way to Bistritsa’s flow into the Aegean Sea. The border then followed along the coast past Solun to the flow of the Struma River and into the Aegean Sea. From there it followed along the river valley, encompassing Radomir, Dragoman, the Glinski Pass and then over Stara Mountain all the way to Belogradchik (Cf. Iovan Ristich. Diplomatska istorija Srbye za vreme Srpskih ratova za aslobodenje i nezavisnost 1875 -1878. Volume II, Belgrade, 1896-1898, pp. 112-113). These new borders of Old Serbia, drawn on this map, were actually an expression of Serbian historical and political ideas and territorial claims which were of disadvantage to Macedonia.



As a result of the Russian military successes during this Russian-Ottoman war (1877-1878) A. I. Nelidov, Russian Forces Director of Diplomatic Affairs, stationed at Main Command in the Balkans, prepared a 13 item proposal containing peace terms in which, included among other things, was the creation of an autonomous Bulgarian principality, with borders and territory of about the same size as the one specified at the Constantinople Conference.



Count N. P. Ignatiev also prepared a proposal for the peace treaty, in which he specified the principles for creating a Greater Bulgaria. This proposal was reviewed by the Russian government on January 12, 1878 and accepted with some minor changes. But when Ignatiev arrived in Odrin he was given additional information by Duke Gorchakov; that the accepted proposal would be signed only if it was referred to simply as “a preliminary protocol” and the borders specified for Bulgaria, at that moment, could only be viewed as ‘temporary and incidental, to be determined later” (Cf. Ignatiev. Sanstefano, Zapiski grofa N.P. Ignatieva. St. Petersburg, 1915, pp. 86-87). Gorchakov was well-aware of the fact that this artificial and unrealistic political creation was doomed to fail.



According to what Ignatiev had written, when the truce was signed in Odrin on January 31, 1878, Macedonia was not included in the proposed borders of what was to be an autonomous Bulgarian state. For that and other reasons, the Russian forces did not occupy the region north of Gorna Dzhumaia. In a letter sent to Gorchakov, on February 15, 1878, Count Ignatiev wrote: “Without any doubt, we (Russians - V.S.) need to request independence for Macedonia from the Ottomans” (Cf. Hristo Hristov. Osvobzhdenieto na B’lgariya i politikata na zapadnite drzhavi 1876 -1878. Sofia, 1976, p. 147. Cf. Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot tureckogo iga. Volume II, Moscow, 1964, p. 487. Cf. Dokumenti za bor'bata na makedonskiot narod za samostojnost i za nacionalna drzhava. Op. cit., Volume I, p. 233).



But even though this was discussed during the signing of the San Stefano Preliminary Treaty, and was against the rules for creating a large Slavic state, Ignatiev decided to include almost the entire Macedonian territory within the borders of autonomous Bulgaria. However, this could not be realized because the Russian army never did enter, occupy and separate Macedonia from Ottoman Turkey. This Treaty was revoked in three months.



Russian-Ottoman negotiations appeared to have reached a crisis point on February 28, 1878. Austria-Hungary had already requested a revision of the Treaty, and Serbia and Montenegro asked for permission to expand their own borders. The Macedonian representatives, among whom included Vezenkov and Ilio Maleshevski, requested autonomy for Macedonia and not unification with Bulgaria. Britain did not support the San Stefano Treaty either and sent its fleet to the Marmara Sea. The Ottomans made requests to the other Great Powers to not allow extension of the Bulgarian borders to the Aegean Sea. Given what was happening all around them, Count Ignatiev and Nelidov demonstratively, on February 28, 1878 around 11 p.m., left the negotiations, went to Main Russian command and requested termination of the truce and occupation of the Bosphorus and Constantinople.



Russian Command energetically refused their request. The following day Ignatiev and Nelidov sent an ultimatum to the Ottoman delegation, telling the Ottomans that the Russians had made all the compromises they could make and that there was nothing else that could be done with regards to Bulgarian and Serbian issues. So, in order to show that the Russians were serious and were prepared to act by military means, the Chief Commander ordered the Russian army to demonstrate preparations for an attack. After this manoeuver, the Ottoman delegation accepted the conditions set out by Russia and continued the negotiations. The Preliminary San Stefano Treaty was signed in the evening of March 3, 1878.



According to this treaty, Bulgaria became a tribunal principality and the following localities fell within its borders: Vranje, Kumanovo, Kachanik, Tetovo, Gostivar, Galichnik, Debar, Struga, Lake Ohrid and Korche, Kavala, Ksanti, Kardzhali, Lozengrad and Luleburgas, Mal Samokov. Solun and Chalcidice Peninsula were excluded (Cf. Ignatiev. Sanstefano grofa N.P. Ignafieva. Op. cit, pp. 217-219).



The Russian army did not enter Macedonia after the Preliminary San Stefano Treaty was signed but Greater Bulgaria was created anyway, mostly under threat of war and political pressure. The region specified was over 190,000 square kilometres and housed over five million inhabitants extending over most of the central Balkans. It was a disproportionately large and dominating state (Cf. Vlado Popovski, Lenina Zila Op. cit, p. LXVII). Nobody believed that such an artificial creation would survive, especially not without Russian support.



The Macedonian people, the Macedonian volunteer freedom fighting units and their leaders, particularly their most distinguished leaders who participated in the Russian-Ottoman war, were disappointed in the Russian government and the way it treated the Macedonian Question. Even though the Russian army was located in the vicinity of Kiustendil and in Gorna Dzhumaia, that is, immediately next to the Macedonian border, it refused calls for help from the Macedonian insurgents fighting the Ottomans in the Pianets and the Kumanovo-Kriva Palanka Uprisings. Macedonian fighters participated in the Russian-Ottoman war to liberate the Macedonian people and to create a Macedonian state. They did not participate to create a Greater Bulgaria or to unify Macedonia with Bulgaria. If Macedonia was part of Greater Bulgaria, in accordance with the preliminary Treaty, then why did the Russian army refuse to enter Macedonia? What is more interesting is that, although the Russian government had determined the natural borders for Bulgaria to be from the Danube River to the Stara Mountain which did not include Macedonia in its protocols and memoranda, Count Ignatiev still insisted on creating a Greater Bulgaria which was to include the territory from the Danube to the Aegean Sea. This, of course, was a disadvantage for Macedonia.



British Minister of Foreign Affairs Derby, in his discussion with Shuvalov in June 1877, regarding the issues associated with creating a Greater Bulgaria, informed the Russian envoy that Britain could only agree to the creation of Bulgaria if the Bulgarian territory extended from the Danube River to the Balkan Mountains. Derby categorically refused all requests to include any other country south of the Stara Mountain border. Salisbuly, Derby’s successor, expressed the same attitude, which remained unchanged until the end of the war. After the Preliminary San Stefano Treaty was signed, all political groups in Britain pleaded against the creation of a Greater Bulgaria (Cf. Doyno Dojnov. Kresnensko-razlashkoto vostanie 1878-1879. Sofia, 1979, p. 186).



While world diplomacy was working hard to change the Preliminary San Stefano Treaty, Russian military and diplomatic representatives were discussing the necessity of occupying the entire territory that the Treaty encompassed. Count Ignatiev was especially eager so he requested that Ottoman representative Safet Pasha order the Ottomans to “evacuate all regions that were included in the Bulgarian Principality and to begin treating it like a new country”.



Count Ignatiev worked very hard to include Macedonia in Bulgaria under the idea of freeing all Slavic speakers from Ottoman rule, which he voiced in a report to Gorchakov dated March 3, 1878, in which he insisted on initiating a process to determine the new country’s borders immediately after the Sultan ratified the Treaty. He recommended that an army corps, commanded by Skobelev, be sent to occupy the territories as defined by the Treaty and proposed that Duke Imeretinski be appointed Chief Border Commissar. Ignatiev insisted that Macedonia be occupied by the Russian military which would not only signify formal execution of the San Stefano Treaty, but would also have “radical impact on the future and the destiny of the Macedonian Bulgarians” (Cf. Doyno Doynov. Kresnensko-razlashkoto vostanie 1878-1879. Sofia, 1979, p. 188).



Regardless of the fact that the creation of San Stefano Bulgaria was problematic and the entire European community, including the Macedonian people, was against this Russian venture, Ignatiev was of the opinion that a military occupation and the establishment of Russian rule in Macedonia would have historic significance.



In a confidential letter written to Gorchakov on February 15, 1878, Ignatiev said that a Russian force would be put together to penetrate the demarcation line in the Dzhumaia vicinity that would occupy this part of the border with Macedonia. Ignatiev also wrote that it was necessary for Ottoman Turkey to grant the other part of Macedonia autonomy (Cf. Dokumenti za borbata na makedonskiod narod za samostojna i za nacionalna drzhava. Op. cit, Volume I, p. 233.)



Outside of the plan to create a Greater Bulgaria, Count Ignatiev had a special plan prepared for the occupation of Macedonia. Besides Russian government, military and political involvement and the penetration of Russian military forces into Macedonia, Ignatiev wanted to involve the local Macedonian population and grant it its century-long wish to liberate itself. Encompassed in all this was the need for writing requests, collecting signatures, sending petitions with statistical data to the Russian government, to the military command and to the diplomatic representatives of the Great Powers. In doing this the entire Macedonian population became involved with one goal in mind; to tell the world that Macedonians live in Macedonia and want to liberate themselves from Ottoman rule.



This Macedonian goal did not include annexing Macedonia to Bulgaria, it was strictly about being liberated from the Ottomans and gaining independence for Macedonia. Unfortunately the Pan-Slavic committee in Moscow was more interested in creating a large Slavic country in the Balkans than what the Macedonian people wanted, and so Ignatiev was asked to direct his efforts towards realizing the Russian and Slavic interests in the Balkans. Realizing these interests was unfortunately done by negating the Macedonian nationality and by turning Macedonians into Bulgarians. No country was satisfied with the San Stefano Treaty except for Russia, which benefited the most from a shrinking Ottoman Empire. By aiding this project Russia also broke the Reichstadt Treaty, which in fact forbade the creation of a large Slavic state in the Balkans. The creation of Greater Bulgaria greatly upset Austria-Hungary because it killed its ambitions to reach Solun.



At the same time Britain did not want to give up access to the Bosphorus and to the Dardanelles and so it began negotiations with Austria-Hungary to prepare for war. The Vienna government, however, offered Russia two alternatives: “war” or a “European Congress”. German chancellor Otto von Bismarck was in support of Austria-Hungary and Great Britain. After some pressure put on Russia by Austria-Hungary and Britain, the Russian government accepted the idea of “revising the San Stefano Treaty”. Duke Gorchakov, the man who ordered the Russian delegation to sign the revised treaty, wrote: “The San Stefano Treaty caused great problems for us, we now have to retreat from it and it will not be easy or without victims.”



A similar sentiment was expressed by Count Shuvalov in a letter written to Gyula Andrassy, Austrian-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he wrote: “The San Stefano Treaty is misfortune for us and not for Austria. This was the biggest mistake we could have made. At the end, we will be forced to retreat in front of the eyes of entire Europe (Cf. Krste Bitovski. Kontinuitetot na makedonskite nacionalnoosloboditelni borbi vo XlX i pochetokot na XX vek Op. cit, p. 130).



One of the excuses made by Count Ignatiev, in regards to making a mistake when he signed the Preliminary San Stefano Treaty, was that he was not aware of the Reichstadt Treaty signed by Austria and Russia, which forbade the creation of a large Slavic state in the Balkans. Count Ignatiev was assigned the task to negotiate the revision of the San Stefano Treaty with Austria-Hungary because he was its creator and its signatory. After Ignatiev arrived in Vienna, Andrassy accused him of ignoring the previous Agreement and asked him why Rumelia was not mentioned in the San Stefano Treaty since it was intended to become a separate state according to Supplemental Convention. Ignatiev explained that the term Rumelia, even though there was no convention dilemma, basically referred to Macedonia (Cf. Krste Bitovski. Kontinuitetot na makedonskite nacionalnoosloboditelni borbi vo XlX i pochetokot na XX vek Op. cit, p. 130).



During the negotiations (between Andrassy and Ignatiev) the Austrian-Hungarian representative offered several variants to resolve the Macedonian Question. He drew the borders on a map of the Balkan Peninsula so that the western Bulgarian border followed the Struma River. The area from Mitrovitsa to Solun, actually the Vardar Valley, was to remain temporarily under Ottoman rule but within the Austrian-Hungarian political and economic sphere of influence (Cf. Ignatiev. Po Sanstefano, Zapiski grofa Ignatieva. Op. cit, pp. 39-57. Cf . Doyno Doynov. Kresnesko – razloshkoto vostanie 1878-1879. Op. cit, p. 193).



Andrassy called that area Macedonia. During the Treaty negotiations between Andrassy and Ignatiev, while attempting to differentiate Macedonia from Bulgaria, German representative von Schweinitz, on April 4, 1878, submitted a proposal to von Billow, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, that read as follows: “Take parts from Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia and create one state - one Macedonia within the natural borders of that area, then make General Rodich, Commander of the south Austrian-Hungarian army, its Duke” (Cf. Die Grosse. Politik oder Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914. Bd. II, Berlin, 1922, No. 380, pp. 261 -262).



On April 15, 1878 von Billow presented his proposal to Austria-Hungary and to Germany, that is to the German Emperor Wilhelm I. The proposal contained Austrian-Hungarian terms for a Treaty with Russia. The details of this proposal spelled out Austrian-Hungarian aspirations for occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian aspirations for occupying Vranje and Leskovac and Russian aspirations for occupying Bessarabia. Bulgaria remained a single state with its western border extending from the Gulf of Orfano towards Vranje. The area west of that line was to be called Macedonia and would be given autonomy independent from the Bulgarian Principality. Solun was to be part of that Autonomous Macedonian State (Cf. Dokumenti za borbata na makedonskiot narod za samostojnost i za nacionalna drzhava. Op. cit, Volume I. p.235, document No. 173).



Should Russia refuse to give up its idea of Bulgaria gaining access to the Aegean Sea, Austria-Hungary had another proposal for Russia. In this proposal Austria-Hungary called for a Bulgarian eastern border to extend from Lozengrad, which in the west was to include Macedonia but only to the Vardar River. West of that, instead of Albania, there would be an autonomous region, to include Solun, created under Austrian-Hungarian influence and named Macedonia Cf. Doyno Doynov. Kresnensko -razloshkoto vostanie 1878- 1879. Op. cit, p. 194).



When it became very clear to Russia that it could not save San Stefano Bulgaria, its envoys began to talk politics. One of the phrases that came out was: “If San Stefano Bulgaria fell apart, the Slavic people would be denationalized under Greek influence…” To avoid this, Gorchakov proposed that two Bulgarian states be created instead of San Stefano Bulgaria: Eastern and Western Bulgaria. The areas west of the Struma River, including Prizren and Prishtina, would belong to the western Bulgarian state. This region would be given autonomy under Austrian-Hungarian influence. That way, according to Gorchakov, the Slavic identity would be preserved. This was similar to the Austrian-Hungarian proposal put forth by Minister Andrassy; i.e. a province called Macedonia would be created instead of a Western Bulgarian Principality. Unfortunately Russian representative Novikov was against dividing the so-called “Slavic” speaking population (Cf. Die Grasse Politik oder Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914. Op. cit, No. 404, pp. 300-302; No. 405, p. 303).



It would appear that there were always two extreme poles present in the Austrian-Russian negotiations. Russian politics, it seems, severely opposed the creation of any kind of autonomy or a state named Macedonia. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, was against the creation of two Bulgarian countries, which it felt would always strive to unite. And so negotiations stalled. Russia, in an attempt to find a way out, turned to Britain for assistance but found out that Britain was completely against Austrian penetration into the Balkans. Britain even strove to prevent Russia from influencing the Balkans. Britain wanted the status quo, for the Ottoman Empire to exist that way it was and for Greek influence to increase.



All this opposition weakened Russia’s position and shrank the proposed Bulgarian state both from the west and the north. Russian-British negotiations continued and the revised San Stefano Treaty was signed on May 30, 1878. It was based on the London Memorandum. Among other things, the Memorandum foresaw the division of Bulgaria into two parts – a northern Bulgaria, extending from the Danube to Stara Mountain, a Bulgaria within its natural borders which would be given political autonomy and a southern Bulgaria, extending down to the border with Macedonia, which would be given administrative autonomy under the authority of the Sultan.



According to Salisbury, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, the entire region of Macedonia was to remain under Ottoman rule. Austria-Hungary accepted the British position as a basis for revising the San Stefano Treaty. On June 6, 1878 a declaration between Austria- Hungary and Britain was signed in Vienna, which determined the destiny of the Preliminary San Stefano Treaty as well as Macedonia’s destiny. After this the powers began preparations for the Berlin Congress.



Some time later, many of the people involved in these negotiations concluded that the Preliminary San Stefano Treaty was nothing more than an artificial, Russian imperialistic creation which turned out to be one of the worst mistakes Russian diplomacy ever made. Russian Emperor Alexander II, who actually created San Stefano Bulgaria and became “the Emperor liberator of the Bulgarians”, later said that he was protecting Russian interests and not the “ethnic affiliations of the people”, of which he had no real picture at the time. It was fortunate that “the validity of that treaty” as the Emperor said, “lasted only four months and had never been implemented” (Cf. Jean Wolf. La Macedoine dechiree. Paris, 1984, p. 52).



On another occasion Emperor Alexander II said: “With this Treaty we tried to create a nation without clearly expressing its national orientation and its general political goals. We tried to create a nation without a solid national foundation without founded ideas for national liberty and turned it into a nation with a large percentage of chauvinists. The Treaty planted a virus into the people with the idea of a Greater Bulgaria. Those who did not follow Levski, who did not do anything to liberate him, who helped the Ottomans to try and hang him, who did not follow the cheta of the genius Botev, who gave written statements of being satisfied with the Sultan and Ottoman rule, who did not require liberty, those were the ones who accepted the ideas of chauvinism in a very short time. Chauvinist aspirations should have been covered by the silk of scientific interest. If emotional expressions were sufficient for internal consumption, scientific arguments were required for the external world. Scientists with titles will further fill that gap. The lack of Bulgarian national orientation will partly be compensated by the victory of the Bulgarian army over the Serbian army in the war in 1885 at Slivnitsa. Following this road Bulgarian chauvinism will reach the level of Serbian and Greek chauvinism and become the same kind of threat to the Macedonian people” (Cf. G. Radule, Istoryia na Makedonyia (Apologiya na makedonizma). Sofia, 1997, p. 242).



At the end of the 19th century, when VMRO activities were most intensive, just before the Ilinden uprising in 1900, issue number 315 of the newspaper Peterburskie vedomosti (St. Petersburg News) wrote: “The San Stefano Treaty was a great Russian mistake because it turned Macedonia into a Bulgarian country. Macedonia may be Slavic but it is not Bulgarian…” (Cf. Kosta Georgiev. Filetizam ili proklyatie. O. cit, p. 157.)



Regardless of the Berlin Congress Resolution, there were those who affirmed the Preliminary San Stefano Treaty and used it as a basis for official greater-Bulgarian politics, which surfaced in the Balkans many times, especially in times of crises. Similar “greater-state” programs were affirmed by all of Macedonia’s neighbours, which have resulted in tensions and even wars with great suffering on the part of the Macedonian people.