Risto Stefov - Articles, Translations & Collaborations

[George S.]

From the Once Classified Files - Part 11

Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia



August 9, 1943



The Foreign Service of the United States of America

No, 1106 (R-1013)

American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey



SUBJECT: Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia



THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON



Sir:



I have the honor to present below an article from the Bulgarian newspaper UTRO of August 3, 1943, which gives some account of the relations between Greeks and Bulgarians in the region west and northwest of Salonika, that is, in Greek Macedonia.

The Bulgarian population in this part of Macedonia is gathered mainly around the towns of Kastoria, Florina, Vodena, and Enidje Vardar.

Besides the Bulgarian population of these towns, which is largest in the town of Vodena, the Bulgarians live mainly in the outlying villages. The Bulgarians in this are represent old populations going back to the Middle Ages. This region was included within the limits of the territory assigned to Bulgaria by the Treaty of San Stefano. Accurate information as to the total Bulgarian population in this district is lacking. At the time of the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 the population of that part of Macedonia assigned to Greece was given as follows:



Turks 299,880

Bulgarians 297,735

Greeks 249,657

Kutso-Vlachs 39,480

Albanians 21,770

Gypsies 23,130

Jews 84,112



Total 1,015,812



(G.P. Genov, "Bulgaria and the Treaty of Neuilly, page 139)



This included the area as far east as the Mesta River. A considerable part of the Bulgarian populations was expelled from Eastern Macedonia after 1919. Also the Greek population was expelled from Asia Minor in 1923. The Turkish population was also exchanged. How many Bulgarians now live in that part of Macedonia referred to in the article is impossible of accurate estimation. One might guess 100,000.



The article presented below indicates that relations between The Bulgarian and Greek population in this region are bitterly hostile. The situation described represents the struggle between local nationalities characteristic of the Balkans in regions where nationalities are mixed. The relationship is that of mass feud. There in no question in such region of right being exclusively on the side of either party. The two parties are irreconcilable. No government in the Balkans will rule an equal hand in such a district. The only solution is absolute control by a foreign power or exchange of populations.



When this region became Greek after the second Balkan War, a situation confirmed following the First Balkan War, the Bulgarian minority was deprived of its schools, churches and other Bulgarian institutions. Bulgarian children were forced to go to Greek schools. All books and newspapers in the Bulgarian language were forbidden. As it was impossible to prevent the population from speaking their native language in the home the language was continued. This is a situation characteristic of those areas of the Balkans where a helpless minority has fallen under the rule of a neighboring government.



What will happen in this area when the war in the Balkans ends with the defeat of the Bulgarian army? The probability is that the Bulgarian population will either be forcibly expelled or massacred as occurred on a considerable scale in the summer of 1913. In Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace the Bulgarian population, which consists to a large extent of settlers who have come in during the last two years, will be able to escape by flight into Bulgaria, but the Bulgarian population in the region in Macedonia indicated below will not be able to escape into Bulgarian territory and therefore will probably in large measure be destroyed, because the local hatreds which have existed for centuries have been greatly aggravated during the last two years. The only way in which massacre on a large scale in the Balkans can be prevented is by the occupation by Allied forces of all the regions where the population is mixed.



To say that in this case the Bulgarians will deserve any fate meted out to them is beside the point, because the persons who will suffer are the peasants who had nothing whatever to do with the policies of the government in Sofia, which brought Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Axis. The idea of justice in such cases does not exist in the Balkans. It is rather a question of humanity on the part of those at a distance who, not being concerned in local passions, are able to take a more humane view of the whole situation.



The article is extremely interesting as testimony of an actual situation in one of the most remote parts of Macedonia. In free translation it reads as follows:



The Bulgarians from the Kastoria District are waging an Epic Struggle against Greek Bands



By K. Naumov



“Salonika is full of hundreds of touch and stubborn sons of Enidje Vardar and of the provinces of Vodena, Florina and Kastoria. They speak to you in a wonderfully pure Bulgarian language and in their breasts beats a steel Bulgarian spirit. I was talking to one of them who comes from the district of Kastoria.



“The whole district, where every peak, every mountain and every village is marked by bloody traces as the result of the struggles which Bulgarian Macedonia fought for freedom and national existence in the past has taken up arms to defend itself and are openly against Greek bands, who have taken the offensive and are openly against everything Bulgarian in the district of Kastoria and elsewhere. Some of these bands are communists under the leadership of some one by the name of Ksilanti, while most bands are Greek nationalists acting under the slogan ‘Great Greece’. The aim of both bands is to wipe out the Bulgarians, and they are using the most cruel and barbaric means. Separately the bands act as communists or nationalists, as was the case in Serbia.



But when it comes to attacking whole Bulgarian villages, they are then all Greeks and are inspired only by the bloodthirsty desire to destroy in the most merciless way Bulgarianism, which appears in these parts of the Balkans as the only stronghold of Bulgarianism, peace, order, tranquility and the ideas of New Europe.



“The Kastoria district already has its own militia to fight these bands. In the town of Kastoria itself there is a special ‘Bulgarian committee of the Axis.’ In every village of the Kastoria district this militia, armed more with a high spirit, a sound Bulgarian stubbornness and a steel spirit rather than with sufficient arms and military supplies, is creating a grand epic of legendary struggle. Bulgaria appears as the ideal country of the long desired freedom. The people compose and sing songs of liberty as once the whole of Bulgaria fought against the Phanariotes . Flying columns, recalling the bands of Benkovski and Kableshkov, watch over the life and safety of the whole Kastoria district, which has already made heavy sacrifices. The pretty and purely Bulgarian villages of Nestruni, Staricheni , Drenichevo, Gurche, Chuka, Ieleyoze, Breshani, Stensko, Radokoze and Slimnitsa have been burned down and destroyed by the raging Greek communist and nationalist bands which appear as ‘fifth columns’ of the Anglo-Americans. Many other villages also in the district of Kastoria, as Hrupishte and Embore, Gorenitsi and Chetiro as well as others have suffered. There is no village in the district of Kastoria which has not made heavy sacrifices for its freedom and its adherence to the Bulgarian nation. Greek bands enter Bulgarian villages at night, drag out the more aggressive and kill them. The population of the districts of Kastoria, Florina, Vodena and Enidje Vardar is united more and more around the Bulgarian tricolor with which the Kastoria militia defends its Bulgarian origin in the struggle against the Greek bands. The Bulgarian tricolor flies high in every place where the Bulgarian militia is, Bulgarian police has been organized in some villages. In the Kastoria militia hundreds of brave and bold Bulgarian girls are also carrying arms and are defending mothers, children and old people on an equal footing with the militiamen. Everything Greek has been for years boycotted and discarded. The children do not go to Greek schools. All Greek beginning books and textbooks have been burned or thrown into the Bistritsa River. If by any chance a Bulgarian book falls into their hands it is guarded as something holy. Old exarchate teachers, men and women, have organized courses for the Bulgarian language groups similar to those in the time of Paisii at Hilendar. The Greeks allow no food to these Bulgarians, not even salt. In spite of it all, the Bulgarians from the districts of Kastoria, Enidje Vardar, Florina and Vodena with their unbreakable and enthusiastic spirit, with the inerasable memories of the great epic of Gotse Delchev and the leader Chakalarov, are fighting and defending the great cause of justice and national existence with the idealism of the pre-liberation epoch”



Respectfully yours, Burton Y. Berry, American Consul General

To Department in original and hectograph







Bulgaro-Yugoslav Relations – Macedonian question



September 10, 1940





Draft telegram No. 455 to Belgrade and No. 333 to Sofia of 23rd August recording a conversation with the Bulgarian Minister on 21st August who said Bulgarian relations with Yugoslavia were excellent and that it was no longer possible for the Macedonian issue to be used as a means of estranging the two countries. Macedonian revolutionaries now relied on funds issuing from bodies in the United States of America whose aim was an independent Macedonia, the establishment of which would entail sacrifices alike by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece.



Belgrade telegram No. 655



This is a very useful telegram on a subject which has lost its former prominence. I think we can agree with both the Bulgarian Minister and with Mr. Campbell that the Macedonian question is of little importance in connexion with Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations.



At the same time there are indications that all three totalitarian powers are showing marked interest in the movement (see Sofia telegram No. 493 on 7075/613/7). Presumably the only possible German or Italian aim in encouraging Macedonian autonomy would be to include an autonomous Macedonia within Bulgarian borders, thus disintegrating Greece and Yugoslavia. In view of the close relations between the Axis and Bulgaria it may be possible that the instrument which they will use will not be either Ivan Mihailoff’s Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization or (naturally) the Communist Federalists who are mostly, I believe, organized in a Macedonian labour party which is backed very largely by American funds. At the moment I should imagine that most Macedonians belong to Mr. Campbell’s third category of discontented peasants who are anti-Yugoslav, anti-Greek, anti-Bulgarian, anti-German and anti everything except possibly anti-Rissian.



See also R 7515/G.





Canadian Embassy



Athens, February 16th, 1949



No. 111



Sir,



I have the honour to refer to my dispatch No. 50 of February 1st, 1949 concerning the activities in Canada of a pro-Bulgar and pro-Macedonian organization.



2. The British Embassy Security Authorities in Athens have forwarded to the Embassy a report entitled “A protest by the Macedonian People’ Union of Canada to the Yugoslav Government,” a copy of which is enclosed.



3. While this report has jest reached me, it was obtained by British Security Authorities in Greece from the Aliens directorate of the Greek Ministry of Public Order on December 14th, 1948.



4. The protest of the Macedonian People’s Union was addressed to the Legation of Yugoslavia in Ottawa. The Macedonian People’s Union is possible the same organization as the Macedonian0Canadian Peoples’ League mentioned in paragraph 2 of your dispatch under reference. The resolution is of particular interest in showing the Union’s anti-Tito and pro-Bulgarian sympathies.



I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can’t tell signature)



The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa.
taken from email from r stefov

[George S.]

From the Once Classified Files - Part 12

Canadian Embassy



Athens, January 3rd, 1949



No. 5



Sir,



I have the honour to report that on December 29th, 1948, the Greek daily ESTIA carried a short article entitled “Greek Communist Party co-operates with the Bulgarians.” The article reads as follows:



“Abundant and indisputable evidence has been received on the betrayal of the Greek Communist Party in an agreement with the Bulgarians on the basis of a complete and clear programme. This Party (the K.K.E.), systematically reinforced by rich Bulgarian immigrants in Canada and the United States, and by the Government of Sofia, had at its disposal plentiful funds which permitted the K.K.E to finance its agents in a generous way.



Any information which may be available relating to alleged activities by Bulgarians in Canada along the lines suggested by this article, would be appreciated.



I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can’t tell signature)



The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa.





Canadian Embassy



Moscow, February 9th, 1945



No. 86



Sir,



I have the honour to report that on February 7th, I called on Mr. Stanoje Simich, the Yugoslav Ambassador and had a long conversation with him. As you know Mr. Simich has been nominated in the agreement reached between Marshal Tito and Mr. Subasich last autumn to take over the position of Vice-Premier in the new Yugoslav government to be formed after Mr. Subasich returns to Yugoslavia with his colleagues to give effect to that agreement.



2. Mr. Simich is in the process of rehabilitating his Embassy. A new Counselor has just arrived to assist him. The all-time low was reached when Mr. Simich was in Belgrade last October and November and his wife and sister became the sole occupants of the Yugoslav Embassy. When he came to the Soviet Union in March, 1943, the staff of the Yugoslav Embassy consisted of Mr. Simich, his Councilor, Mr. Marinkovich and his Military Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Lozich. When Mr. Simich and Lieutenant Colonel Lozich broke in March, 1944, with the Yugoslav Government in Cairo and placed themselves at the disposal of Marshal Tito, Mr. Marinkovich withdrew from the Embassy and set up a separate establishment in the National Hotel. From here he conducted a somewhat comical and fruitless campaign to secure possession of the Yugoslav Embassy and to oust Mr. Simich. The Soviet Government took the stand than Mr. Simich had been properly accredited and until his credentials were withdrawn they would continue to recognize him as the Yugoslav Ambassador. When the Sabasich Government was formed in June Mr. Marinkovich left Moscow and disappeared from the scene. Earlier Lieutenant Colonel Lozich had left Moscow to join Marshal Tito’s forces since a military mission of ten officers representing the Marshal arrived in Moscow in April. For a long period, therefore, Mr. Simich was all alone in the Embassy, a situation which became ludicrous when Belgrade was liberated and he left to spend six weeks conferring with Marshal Tito. He returned on November 20th with Mr. Sabasich and participated in the conversation with the Yugoslav Prime Minister had with the Soviet leaders.



3. I always enjoy meeting the honest, outspoken and big-hearted Yugoslav Ambassador, who is such a typical Serb.



The breezy frankness of Mr. Simich reminds me of the early leaders of the Russian Revolution. It is somewhat embarrassing, however, for me to talk to him since most of the conversation consists of tirades against the western Allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States Governments. The former he persists in referring to as “your government”, a practice I have given up trying to correct. It is also futile trying to argue with Mr. Simich in defense of the western powers. He brushes aside my arguments with some good-natured remark and then immediately launches into a fresh attack from some other angle. Thus our conversation comes to resemble the firing of a rifle in reply to an outburst of machine-gun fire.



4. On this occasion also Mr. Simich was free with criticisms of British and United States policy and loud in his denunciations of “your government”, when I asked him how conditions where in Yugoslavia he immediately complained about the absence of relief. He said that it was ironical that in the parts of Yugoslavia nearest to the Soviet Union, where there were more plentiful supplies of locally-produced food, these supplies were being supplemented by the Soviet authorities, whereas in Dalmatia, just across the Adriatic from the Western Allies and producing little or no food of its own, people were dying of starvation and no relief was being furnished. I asked him if nothing was being done by UNDRA but he replied that they were not allied to UNDRA but to “your government” and to the United States Government. Relief was needed now and if later on its way offered by the Western Allies after they had commenced to stand on their own feet, they would have to declare “thank you, we do not need help now”. Marshal Tito had concluded an agreement with UNDRA but they were not yet able to furnish relief. I asked what was the cause and when he shrugged his shoulders I suggested shipping might be the difficulty. This brought forth a reference to the many Yugoslav ships being operated by the Allies, of which he thought some should be sparred to carry supplies to Yugoslavia, I then suggested internal transport and that was why they had asked for trucks. Surely, he said, out of the thousands of trucks being produced in the United States and Canada a few could be spared for Yugoslavia.



5. I suppose that Mr. Simich had little recent information on the subject of relief for Yugoslavia. This was confirmed later when I asked him about the negotiations with King Peter and he had to admit that he was receiving no telegrams from the Yugoslav Government in London, Hoping, therefore, to get a word of praise for what he kept referring to as “your government”, I asked him if it was not true that the United Kingdom had furnished supplies to Marshal Tito’s forces when they had been in most dire need of help. He replied by stating that when he had been in Yugoslavia he saw the Partisans dressed in Italian, Hungarian and German uniforms. The only members of the Partisan forces he had seen dressed in British Uniforms were a few staff officers who had just arrived from Italy. I then said that I had understood supplies had been dropped regularly by parachute to the Partisans. His retort to this was to mention that second hand boots and second hand socks had been dropped. Some of the boots had worn-out soles and some of the socks were full of holes. These had to be thrown away. Practically speaking, he said, the Partisan forces had been both armed and clothed with booty they had captured from the Italians and later from the Germans. It became evident to me that this Vice-Premier designate of the future Yugoslav Government will not be disposed to help the application of Mr. Churchill’s formula for fifty-fifty British and Soviet influence in Yugoslavia.



6. I asked the Ambassador about present military operations in his country but referred me to an article contributed by a Yugoslav staff officer to a recent number of the Soviet newspaper “Red Star”. He then added that the Yugoslav forces were not sufficiently numerous to surround the twenty German divisions trying to escape from Yugoslavia, so that they were doing was to harass the enemy as much as possible and to cut off and exterminate the tails of the German column bit by bit.



7. I asked Mr. Simich where he had stayed in his recent visit to Belgrade and he replied that he had put up at the Hotel Moskva, one of the few hotels in the city which had not been destroyed. He related that the most serious damage to the city had been caused by the day-light raids last Easter of the United States flying fortresses. Marshal Tito had given permission to the Allies for them to bomb military objectives, but the United States bombers had released their bombs from a great height with the result that great damage had been done to the city proper and many civilians had been killed or wounded. They resented the later statement issued by the United States Command that the bombing had been undertaken with the approval of Marshal Tito. At this stage Mr. Simich paid a compliment at least to “your government”. He said that a British bomber had come in, dove down and released its bomb on the foundations of a tall building in which many of the German officers were located. As a result the bomb killed all the German working in the building who had taken refuge in the cellar. That, Mr. Simich exclaimed, is bombing of a military objective.



8. We then got around discussing the conversations taking place in London for putting into effect the Tito-Subasich agreement. The Ambassador treated these conversations as of little consequence to Yugoslavia. The comedy being enacted in London, he said, will make no difference to the internal situation in Yugoslavia. It can only have an effect on external relations and may delay the provision of relief to Yugoslavia. If so, when this becomes reality by the people of Yugoslavia, the position of the King will be still more untenable. I said that the outcome of the conversations in London would have an important bearing on the future of Mr. Subasich. He replied to this by asking me what importance was the position of one man compared to the fate of a nation. It was at this stage that I noticed the only photograph in his room was one of Marshal Tito.



9. I asked Mr. Simich if there were not many Serbs anxious for the return of King Peter. He replied that this was a common misconception held abroad. Contrary to the view of most foreigners a larger proportion of Croats and Slovenes would vote for the retention of his crown by a Serbian king then would be the case with the Serbs themselves. This would be due to the greater strength of monarchist sentiment among adherents of the Roman Catholic than among those of the Greek Orthodox Church, the greatest capitalist influence in the industrial centers of Croatia and Slovenia and the reactionary influence of the Matchet peasant party in Croatia. He ventured to predict that not more than 10 per cent of the Serbs would vote for the return of the King to Yugoslavia whereas among the Croats and Slovenes the proportion might be 20 per cent.



10. Mr. Simich then became very eloquent about the revolution that had taken place in his country. He described it as a “new world” and said one had to be in Yugoslavia to appreciate the new enthusiasm of the people. The revolution had started in 1941 when Prince Paul’s understanding with the Nazis had been repudiated by the people, but it had found full expression in the Partisan movement inspired by Marshal Tito. It was not of such importance to men like himself who lives where drawing to a close, but it was a wonderful experience for young people like his daughter who had recently returned to Belgrade to work for the civil administration. They felt they were participating in the birth of a new era and could work with enthusiasm knowing they could be full of hope for the future.



11. I tried to bring Mr. Simich back to earth by asking him if there were not many Serbian nationalists dissatisfied with the new state of affairs and who grieved at the prospect of the loss of Serbian hegemony. He replied that this was true of a lot of old men abroad, but did not apply to those in the country who saw with their own eyes and experienced with their own feelings the strength of the movement and the enthusiasm of the mass of the people, particularly the younger generations. I then asked what the Serbs though about Nish having been liberated and later occupied by the Bulgarians. He said Serbs were practical people and realized that if the Bulgarians help them throw out the Germans it meant the sacrifice of less Serbian lives for their purpose.



12. Wanting to clear up a point concerning the Tito-Subasich agreement about which I was in doubt, I asked the Ambassador if the agreement provided for one or two Vice-Presidents (really Vice-Premiers). He replied that there was to be really one Vice-Premier, himself, but that a later amendment to the agreement envisaged the appointment of six other Vice-Presidents, who really would be ministers without portfolio, representing each of the six autonomous regions into which it was proposed to divide the new federated Yugoslavia.



13. The Ambassador said that the six autonomous regions would be Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Voevodina would be an autonomous district within an autonomous Serbia. There was still a lot of discussion going on in Yugoslavia about these proposals and changes may have to be made, but the main principles had found general acceptance. Many of the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, were expressing reluctance to be separated from the other Serbs. The Dalmatians might wish to have an autonomous region of their own, separate from Croatia, but Mr. Simich did not think this to be probable. He agreed with me when I said that the formation of an autonomous Macedonia, to which would be ceded territory now Bulgarian but inhabited by Macedonians, might pave the way for Bulgaria joining the federation. He added, however, that this would depend largely upon the Bulgarian government towards the people of Yugoslavia, an observation which seemed to indicate some doubt in his mind about the permanence of Bulgarian-Yugoslav reconciliation. I then suggested that the question of the monarchy in Bulgaria might prove an obstacle, but he laughingly observed that the future of the Bulgarian monarchy was no brighter than that of the Karageorgievitch dynasty in Yugoslavia.



14. I am sending a copy of this dispatch to the Charge d’Affaires of the Canadian Legation to the Allied Governments in the United Kingdom.



I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (Sgd) L.D. Willgrass.



The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.





Canadian Embassy



Athens, August 28th, 1949

J. A. McCordick

No. 480



Sir,



I have the honour to refer to my dispatch No. 450 of July 20th concerning (unintelligible) relations with the northern neighbours and to report on recent developments in Greco-Yugoslav relations.



(all of page 1 is blurred and unintelligible)



…Macedonia. It might also be observed that the relation adopted by the meeting mentioned that Yugoslavia had “assisted 12,000 children from Greece and Macedonia” and invited all refugees from Aegean Macedonia to incorporate themselves as soon as possible into the economic and political life of the People’s Republic of Macedonia.



4. The decision taken by Marshal Tito to cease all aid to the Greek guerrillas was no doubt the only one he could safely take after the anti-Tito campaign which the KKE and the guerrilla radio had been carrying on. During the past month the guerrilla radio has intensified its campaign to the extent that in many broadcasts the anti-monarcho-fascists and anti-Anglo-American campaign has been relegated almost to second place as compared with the anti-Tito campaign. Scarcely a broadcast has taken place without the announcements that some particular of the Democratic Army has joined in the denunciation of Tito and especially of Keramintsieff and Gotseff, two of the Communist leaders who are said to be directing the Titoist movement in Greece and are, therefore, regarded by the KKE as arch-traitors to the movement.



An illustration of this type of broadcast might be given since it is representative of the campaign against these two “traitors.” “The Slav-Macedonian women fighters of the 18th Brigade of the Democratic Army condemn the Keramitsieff-Gotseff traitors” (guerrilla broadcast August 4th). It would appear, to judge from the guerrilla broadcast, that every platoon of the Democratic Army has sent its condemnation of the two traitors to Headquarters.



On August 9th the guerrilla broadcast announced that “representatives of the Democratic Government toured the front and told the fighters of Tito’s treason. Nothing can describe the fighters’ hatred for Keramintsieff and Gotseff.” In addition, the guerrilla radio, on August 3rd and 11th, broadcast two lengthy articled against Tito, the first of which was entitled “Tito’s Knife Attacks on the rear of the Democratic Popular Movement of Greece,” by N. Zachariades, the Secretary-General of the KKE. The article contained a lengthy denunciation of Tito’s treason, which was said to have began in 1944 and was intensified in 1947. The article also mentioned that Tito hated the Greek Popular Democratic Movement, and thrust a knife in its back and was fighting it with a vengeance. The second article, which was broadcast on August 11th, was entitled “Tito’s Treason and the Communist Party of Greece,” and was by P. Roussos, the “Foreign Minister of the Democratic Government.” Roussos’s article like that of Zachariades, was a series of charges explaining how Tito had undermined the Greek Democratic Movement from the very beginning. Of special significance is the charge that one of the ways in which this was done by propaganda for the annexation of Greek Macedonia to Yugoslav-Macedonia and the organization of a network of Titoist agents in Greek Macedonia.



5. The battle between the KKE and Tito has not, of course, been fought from only one side. On August 2nd, in a speech in Skopje, Marshal Tito claimed that the Cominform, which was attacking Yugoslavia, did not wish to help the Greek people in its heroic struggle but was seeking in a sinister and underhand way to strangle the Democratic Movement of Greece. The Cominform moreover did not do this on its own but through the leaders of the KKE itself. Marshal Tito, however, declared that the liberating struggle of the Greek people was deeply buried in his heart. This assertion, it is hardly necessary to add, did nothing to convince Greek public opinion that Tito had had a change of heart.



6. An interesting result of the Tito-Cominform dispute and the reverses suffered by the guerrillas in Greece has been the way in which Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria have tried to outdo each other in claiming that from the very beginning it was they who had contributed most to the Greek guerrilla movement. This, despite their past repeated denials of having provided any support to the Greek guerrillas. Thus, on July 25th for example, Radio Belgrade announced that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mr. Kardelj, had stated that it was public knowledge that Yugoslavia had given medical assistance to a great number of wounded Greek guerrillas as well as to Greek refugees and children. In Tito’s speech at Skopje on August 2nd (mentioned above) reference is also made to the support given by Yugoslavia to the guerrillas. Mr. Koulichewski, the Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of Macedonia, referred at the same meeting to the great moral and political support that Yugoslavia had given right from the start to Greek Democratic Movement, and pointed out that this assistance had had a decisive influence on the struggle against the monarcho-fascists.



7. With regards to the relations between the Greek Government and Yugoslavia, there have, of course, been a considerable number of Yugoslav accusations against the Greek Government during the past month. On July 29th it was announced that the Yugoslav Government had delivered a note to the Greek Government protesting against the bombing of the Yugoslav village of Kotsimir by a Greek aircraft. The note called for sanctions against those responsible for the alleged incident and demanded damages for the destruction which had been cause. The Yugoslav also protested because of a Greek military officer, on being notified of the incident, declined an invitation from the Yugoslav authorities to enter Yugoslav territory to ascertain on the spot the damage which the bombing had done to the village. The Greek authorities claimed that the Yugoslavs had been unable to put forward any proof whatever that the aircraft in question was actually Greek, and pointed out that the local Yugoslav authorities did not even allege to have established the markings of the plane. The Greeks pointed out that, on the contrary, the records of the Royal Hellenic Air Force showed conclusively that on the day of the alleged “incident” no Greek plane flew over the sector in question.



Whatever the merits of the case may be, the Greeks undoubtedly made a mistake in refusing to accept the Yugoslav invitation to inspect the damage to the village. UNSCOB has been trying repeatedly to obtain Yugoslav permission to investigate incidents on the Yugoslav side of the border and the Greek refusal to the Yugoslav invitation would appear unfortunate from a tactical point of view, especially since the Greeks would nit acknowledge responsibility for the bombing merely by visiting the village in question.



8. Perhaps more important, however, than these Yugoslav accusations against Greece was the re-affirmation, on August 7th, at the celebrations held in Skopje on the occasion of the anniversary of the foundation of the Federal Republic of Macedonia, that Yugoslavia would continue its policy of attempting to create a unified Macedonia under Yugoslav auspices. The declaration made by various Yugoslav leaders at these celebrations in Skopje, the guerrilla radio’s charge that Tito was operating a network of agents in Macedonia under Keramitsieff and Gotseff, the vehemence poured out by the KKE on these two Titoists, and the various reports received of Yugoslav agents crossing into Greek Macedonia – all appear to point to the conclusion the Tito is renewing his efforts to maintain leadership of the Macedonian Movement in Greek Macedonia.



9. On the other hand, a more hopeful sign occurred on August 17th, when the Yugoslav Charge d’Affaires in Athens called on Mr. Pipinellis, the Permanent Greek Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This was the first official call at the Foreign Office made by a member of the Yugoslav Legation in over two years. The object of the call was to discuss the bad treatment received by Yugoslav citizens in Greece. Mr. Pipinellis refrained from bringing up what was the obvious answer to this kind of approach, namely, the treatment of Greek children in Yugoslavia. Even if the subject matter of the call was not calculated to bring about a rapprochement between the two governments, the fact that the call was made may well be a step towards a more conciliatory attitude by Yugoslavia towards Greece. It is perhaps significant that while the closing of the Greco-Yugoslav frontier was made on the grounds of monarch-fascist provocations against Yugoslavia, the first official call of the Charge d’Affires should be to discuss the bad treatment received by Yugoslav citizens in Greece.



10. The conditions which the Greeks regard as prerequisites to any rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Greece remain the same. The first condition – a complete cessation of aid to the guerrillas – seems to have been fulfilled. No move whatsoever has been made to fulfill the second condition – the return of Greek children in Yugoslavia. With regard to the third condition – the abandonment of Yugoslav maneuvers to incorporate Greek Macedonia into Yugoslavia, the speeches made at Skopje and other evidence, seem to indicate that the Yugoslavs were taking exactly the opposite attitude and increasing their support of a greater Macedonian movement.



11. The Greeks have been watching with keen, if anxious, interest, the negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia with regards to Trieste. There is considerably anxiety in this country that if Greece is not consulted in this rapprochement between Italy and Yugoslavia, Greek interests are likely to suffer, since Yugoslav Imperialism will be concentrated southward against Greece. The Greeks feel it is essential that any agreement reached between the West and Yugoslavia should provide guarantees of Greece’s independence. If a piecemeal rapprochement is made with Yugoslavia, the Greeks feel they will be left in the lurch.



12.

(The rest of the report is missing).
From email from r stefov

[George S.]

Macedonian Struggle for Independence Part 41 - Macedonian involvement in pre-Worl

Macedonian Struggle for Independence



Part 41 - Macedonian involvement in pre-World War II



By Risto Stefov

[email protected]

May 2011



Prior to the start of World War II the situation in occupied Macedonia was Grim. After taking control of the Greek government, the dictator Metaxas suppressing all political opposition, outlawed all political parties and imprisoned leaders who would not pledge their loyalty to him. The media was also heavily censored. He then declared war on the Macedonian people by attacking their labour unions, leaders and declaring strikes illegal.



Being a military man himself, Metaxas dedicated much of the State's finances to modernizing the Greek army in both manpower and military hardware. In the sphere of education, he re-wrote the Greek history to support his own ideologies declaring that there were three great periods in history: classical, Byzantine and his own regime, which was then known as the "Regime of the Fourth of August". He created a National Youth Organization to bring children together from various social classes and provided military training for boys and domestic skills for girls. Even though the Metaxa regime was ideologically similar to that of Spain and Italy, the Greeks at the time were very loyal to Britain.



To maintain control of his kingdom, King George II of Greece turned Greece into a dictatorship. In 1936 General Metaxas, minister of war, was appointed to take charge of Greek affairs.



While there were some prospects for basic human rights for the Macedonian people in the Greek State in the early 1920's, those prospects died as Greece tightened its grip on the Macedonian population by implementing more oppressive and racist assimilation policies. On December 18, 1936 the Metaxa Government issued a legal act concerning, “Activities Against State Security” and by this act thousands of Macedonians were arrested, imprisoned and expelled from their homeland. Among other things, Metaxas on September 7, 1938, by legal act 2366, outlawed the Macedonian language and prohibited people from speaking it by imposing heavy fines and imprisonment.



In 1938 Australian author Bert Birtles in his book “Exiles in the Aegean” wrote, “In the name of ‘Hellenism’ these people (Macedonians) are being persecuted continually and arrested for the most fantastic reasons. Metaxa's way of inculcating the proper nationalist spirit among them has been to change all the native place-names into Greek and to forbid use of the native language. For displaying the slightest resistance to the edict-for this too is a danger to the security of the State-peasants and villagers have been exiled without trial.” (Page 112, John Shea, Macedonia and Greece The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation)



The situation was similar in Yugoslavia, especially after king Alexander declared himself dictator of Yugoslavia in 1929, suspended the constitution and subdivided his kingdom in such a way that the Serbs would be a majority in all districts. He also abolished trade unions and removed personal liberties. The Serbian occupied territory of Macedonia was referred to as "South Serbia" and the Macedonian language was forbidden from being spoken in public. Macedonia’s history was revised in favour of Serbia and people’s surnames were modified to sound Serbian. Place names too were changed and replaced with Serbian ones. Unlike the Metaxa regime however, in the late 1930’s, Yugoslav regimes began to relax their tight grip and allowed unofficial and limited use of the Macedonian dialects to be spoken in the streets of Macedonia and in plays and drama clubs.



In Bulgaria events followed a similar course as in Yugoslavia and Greece. A military coup was imposed in May 1934, the 1879 constitution was abolished and political organizations and trade unions were suppressed. In 1935 King Boris III, in a bloodless coup, overthrew the old dictatorship and replaced it with his own Royal one. Bulgarian governments since Bulgaria's inception in 1878 have officially and adamantly denied the existence of Macedonians arguing that all Macedonians are Bulgarians. Thousands of Macedonians, who over the years tried to express different views, were jailed or exiled.



The claim that Macedonians are Bulgarians was used to justify violent assimilation acts and to deny Macedonians their basic human rights. Ever since its inception in 1878, Bulgaria has been obsessed with possessing Macedonia and has caused immense suffering for the Macedonian people.



The downfall of the Tsarist Russian Imperial Empire, the break-up of the Habsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire and the demise of the Ottoman Empire removed three of the Great Powers from internal Balkan influence. While Britain played a less active role, France and Italy attempted to form competing alliances in the Balkans but did not have the military might to enforce them. The Balkan governments, on the other hand, for the first time had an opportunity to adjust their relations with each other and form alliances to protect their mutual interests. Unfortunately their hatred for one other and fear of losing Macedonia always broke up such alliances and again allowed outsiders to play a role in their internal affairs.



Germany's humiliating defeat in the World War I, coupled with her economic plight in the 1930's, gave rise to a new kind of German radicalism. Hitler exploited the situation and turned it to his own advantage. Hitler, in the short term, also gave the German people what they desired most, work and hope for a better future. Unfortunately, in the long term, he delivered disaster not only to the German people but also to many other nations, including Macedonia.



As a new-world order emerged from the World War I, new alliances began to form. On one side stood the Axis partners, initially consisting of Germany, Italy and Japan. As war broke out, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland and Thailand also joined. On the other side the Allied partners emerged consisting of Britain, the Soviet Union, the USA and China. As the war progressed more and more nations joined the allies, totaling about fifty before the war was over.



In September 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan signed a cooperation agreement. This basically identified their intentions with respect to each others' spheres of influence, defining their political, economic and defense strategies as well as their obligations to each other. The agreement came to be known as the “tripartite pact”.



After war broke out in the Balkans, the first to fall to the Axis powers was Albania. By an ultimatum delivered to Albanian king Zogu, on March 23, 1939, Italian troops landed in Albania and occupied its territory on April 7, encountering little resistance. Soon after consolidating control in Albania, on October 28th, 1940, Italy declared war on Greece. Greece, however, turned out to be tough to defeat and Metaxa's foresight in arming his state paid off.



Official history praises Greece and Greek soldiers for their bravery and fighting spirit but neglects to mention the contributions and sacrifices Macedonians made to keep Greece safe. Macedonians were the first to be dispatched to the front lines in Albania, taking the full brunt of the offensive as well as the winter cold. More Macedonian men suffered from gangrene than from Italian bullets and bombs. Unprepared for the frigid temperatures, many men lost their fingers, toes, limbs and even their lives to frostbite. Food too was in short supply. The brave Macedonian soldiers had to fight off starvation as well as the Italians. They did this to protect a country that refused and still refuses to recognize them.



All their sacrifices were in vain because six months later, on April 6th, 1941, the German army marched into Greece. Again the Macedonians fought bravely but they were no match for the well-trained, well-disciplined German army.



When the Germans reached Athens, the Greek government capitulated and the soldiers on the Albanian front were left on their own. Some were told to go to Epirus and regroup, expected to make the long trek on foot. Others were told nothing and were left to roam the countryside. Eventually they were all picked up by German patrols, disarmed and sent home. The returning soldiers were given a hero's welcome. Unfortunately for those who were wounded, lost fingers, toes and limbs to frostbite, there was no compensation or a thank you for their loss and pain.



The German invasion was a welcome relief for the soldiers from the Italian front, but at the same time it posed an uneasy uncertainty as to what was going to happen next. No one was certain how the new invaders were going to react. The Macedonian people, having ample prior experience with being occupied, were expecting the worst. As history would show however the new invaders were a mixed blessing for the Macedonian people.



After war broke out in Europe, Bulgaria allied itself with the axis powers and on March 1, 1941 joined the German led pact. The entry of German troops into Bulgaria put Yugoslavia in a difficult position. To avoid German wrath, on March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav Regent, Prince Paul, also joined the German led pact. This did not sit well with young King Peter who, with the help of the Yugoslav military, staged a coup and deposed the Regent. This meant that Hitler had to re-negotiate his relationship with Yugoslavia. Hitler was counting on Yugoslavia to allow him passage to attack Greece. The new situation angered Hitler and instead of negotiating he signed directive number 25 declaring Yugoslavia an enemy of Germany and ordered its destruction. Hitler wanted a swift strike so he withdrew troops from the Russian campaign to accomplish it.



It took Hitler's army 12 days to demolish Yugoslavia, a small diversion in his destructive career, but there are those who believe that this little diversion changed the course of history. To begin with it gave Russia just enough time to adequately prepare for an offensive, which ultimately led to Germany's defeat. Secondly, the violent nature of the attack created the right conditions for a Partisan uprising, which ultimately helped to establish the Republic of Macedonia. The battle for Yugoslavia and Greece was swift and effective. When it was over the Germans, as an ally to the axis powers, allowed Bulgaria to occupy the Serbian occupied part of Macedonia and the eastern region of Greek occupied Macedonia. Later, after the Italians left, Germany allowed Bulgaria to occupy western Macedonia as well.



Many Macedonians from the Serbian part of occupied Macedonia who had suffered under Serbian regimes welcomed the Bulgarian invaders as saviours and liberators. Their euphoria however was short-lived as the Bulgarians quickly began to oppress and forcibly “Bulgarize” the Macedonian population. If there had been any pro-Bulgarian sentiment before the invasion, it quickly evaporated after the occupation. Germany's violent entry into Yugoslavia, coupled with Bulgarian oppressive attitudes towards the Macedonian people, gave birth to an underground Macedonian resistance movement.



In Greek occupied Macedonia, after the Germans settled in, life for the Macedonian people took on an uneasy normalcy. The Greek police, who had supported the Metaxa regime before the occupation, now cooperated with the German military and again became active in Macedonia. To counter the Greek police and its oppressive tactics the Italians rearmed the old insurgents from the 1903 Ilinden Uprising and sent them to active duty. Many of the “old timers” were angered by Greece's oppressive laws and were spurred back into action by Bulgarian propaganda condemning Greece’s oppressive tactics. The Bulgarians were well aware of the unfavourable conditions the Greek Government had created in Greek occupied Macedonia and used the opportunity to create problems for the Greeks. Insurgent actions were limited at best and were restricted to the Italian zones of occupation, because the Germans would not tolerate armed actions in their zones.



The Partisan movement in Yugoslavia was more organized and more progressive than the one in Greece. Led by Tito, the Communist partisans in Yugoslavia organized a war of national liberation in which the Macedonians, led by General Tempo, fought on an equal footing. Macedonians formed their own section of resistance even before they were recognized and accepted by Tito. The first anti-fascist war of national liberation began in the Republic of Macedonia on October 11, 1941. October 11th is the “Second Ilinden” for the Macedonian people.



Since 1941 all Macedonians have celebrated October 11, 1941, “Macedonian Revolution Day”. The Macedonian people by their actions, loyalty and patriotism earned their place in the world. By hardship, determination and the spilling of blood the Macedonian people demonstrated their desire for freedom and the willingness to govern themselves. The Great Powers in 1829 (by the London Protocol) satisfied the Greeks by making Greece a country. Similarly in 1878 (by the congress of Berlin) Russia liberated the Bulgarians, making Bulgaria a country. Unlike the Greeks and Bulgarians, however, the brave people of Serbian occupied Macedonia had to fight by themselves, for themselves, to earn their place in the world among the free nations.



For just over a year the Macedonians of Serbian occupied Macedonia endured enough Bulgarian treachery to last them a lifetime. Then in April 1942 they rose up and demonstrated their displeasure. Macedonian Partisans took up arms against the Bulgarian army but were massacred in a bloody battle. Unarmed Macedonians then took to the streets to protest the massacre and they too were cut to pieces.



To escape persecution, many of the Macedonian Partisans in Yugoslavia fled into Greek occupied Macedonia. Some entered the Italian zones near the village Besfina and the rest penetrated the German zones in the region around the village Sveta Petka and quickly went underground. The Besfina force, before it had a chance to make contact with the local population, was spotted by the old insurgents who quickly sprang into action. Seeing uniformed men on the Besfina hillside startled the old timers and thinking that it was a Greek police invasion force, they appealed to the local Italian garrison and were given arms and permission to attack. When the insurgents began the offensive the Partisans backed off and sent representatives to negotiate. They went from village to village and spoke with the local chiefs. The strangers wore handsome uniforms and conducted themselves seriously, with charm and charisma. They spoke long and well about freedom, liberty and the treachery of the Bulgarian Fascists.



When the insurgents found out that the uniformed men were Macedonians just like themselves they accepted them with open arms, gave them (surrendered) their weapons and many voluntarily joined their forces.



The Partisans who landed in Sveta Petka, because of a German presence, had to work under cover but they too succeeded in recruiting volunteers from the local population. After the Partisan penetration, the Macedonian people in Greek occupied Macedonia learned much about the real Bulgarian intent and ceased to believe the Bulgarian propaganda. The old Ilinden guard was demobilized and replaced by a Partisan movement.



Partisan organizers took extraordinary measures to explain to the Macedonian people that they were fighting for the freedom and liberation of the Macedonian people from the tyranny of the oppressive states. The Macedonian involvement in this war, and later in the Greek Civil War, was not about "Communist ideologies" or about alliances or obligations to the Great Powers. It was simply the next stage in the long struggle for “liberation from oppression” and to fulfill a longing for freedom, re-unification and self-rule.



Unfortunately the Macedonian contribution in fighting against Fascism is not only under emphasized but also misinterpreted by historians. I will once again say that the Macedonian people, during World War II, rose on the democratic side and fought against fascism for the liberation of the states in which they lived. The Macedonian people, like many other people in the Balkans, fought to liberate their homeland and thus earn their place in the world. This cannot be ignored and must be recognized and recorded as such in history.



Word of a Macedonian Partisan movement in Greek occupied Macedonia spread like wildfire. People came out on the streets to freely speak their native Macedonian language, to sing songs and write Macedonian plays and poetry. The Partisans even set up Macedonian schools and taught children patriotic songs, poems and Macedonian history, using local Macedonian dialects. The younger generations, for the first time, saw written words in their beloved, sacred Macedonian language. The newfound freedom brought happiness to the lives of the oppressed Macedonian people who welcomed the Partisans into their villages as “our own children”. The newfound confidence and strength projected by the Macedonians terrified the Greeks, especially the ones collaborating with the enemy, so for a while they stayed away and were no longer a threat.



The Germans and Italians did not care one way or another about Macedonian affairs as long as there was no trouble for them. Macedonian interest in Partisan activities continued to climb, bringing new recruits and volunteers to the cause. Youth organizations were created with young men and women recruited to be the eyes and ears of the community and to help defend the villages. Many young volunteers of military age were recruited and trained to perform policing and civic duties in the newly formed organizations.



The organization “Macedonian People's Liberation Front” was formed and recruited fighters from the Kostur, Lerin and Voden regions. It even cooperated with Greek organizations with similar ideologies. Later there was talk about re-uniting Macedonia, possibly through a Balkan confederation. Britain unfortunately was against the idea and discouraged Greece from taking part in such matters. Bulgaria too could not agree and withdrew support. As usual the Bulgarians wanted to become rulers of Macedonia, which was unacceptable to the Macedonians.



There is a story told that about five hundred young Macedonian civilian men gathered in the village D'mbeni, eager to join the Partisan movement. Word of this reached the Greek Partisan leadership which appeared to be terrified at the prospect of such an all Macedonian strong force. There was nothing that the Greeks feared more than losing Greek occupied Macedonia. The Greeks by this time had formed their own Partisan movements (outside of Greek occupied Macedonia) and began to negotiate with the Macedonians about combining forces. For some time Greek Partisan representatives tempted the Macedonians to join them. When negotiations failed to achieve results, the Greeks tried ordering the Macedonians to surrender their arms. Macedonians were well aware of Greek treachery and refused. Instead they sealed the borders from Bigla to Korcha, rendering the region free and inaccessible to the Greeks. Initially the Macedonians acted alone but later they decided to join a wing of the Greek Popular Liberation Army.



In Serbian occupied Macedonia the pre-Second World War situation was becoming extremely difficult. There was unbearable exploitation of the people and deprivation of their human and national right. The Macedonian people were under constant pressure under the Serbian chauvinists and Macedonia was being transformed into a colony with its natural resources being exploited ruthlessly. The Macedonians under Serbian control were undervalued and disparaged the most.



But as the pressure to forcibly turn Macedonians into “Serbians” increased Macedonians were becoming more stubborn and began to pay more attention to their own national identity. They found themselves in a bad situation out of which they could see an escape through liberation. This is precisely why they greeted the April 18, 1941 Bulgarian invasion force with such enthusiasm. They also believed the Bulgarian propaganda which was telling them that the Bulgarians were there to liberate Macedonia from the 30 year long Serbian oppression.



But very soon after the Bulgarians established military, police and administrative authority in Serbian occupied Macedonia, the people began to see for themselves the true face of Bulgaria. The Bulgarians were not there to liberate the Macedonians, they were there to enslave them and turn them into Bulgarians. The many police stations and numerous police officers they employed did their duty by carrying out all forms of repressive measures against the Macedonian population.



The Bulgarians took inventory of all goods, including livestock and properties, owned by the villages and requisitioned most of them. Taxes were increased and imposed on livestock and prices were allowed to go up, introducing measures which pushed the Macedonian people into extreme poverty.



Unable to cope economically, many people began to organize for an armed uprising.



Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union and the August 14, 1941 Atlantic Treaty, which stipulated “all nations which would take part in the anti-fascist struggle will have their rights to self-determination recognized and they would be allowed to create their own independent states” further motivated the Macedonian people in all three parts of occupied Macedonia spurring them to join the anti-fascist movements.



Being occupied by one occupier or another was no motivation for the Macedonian people to go out and fight. The Macedonian people saw this conflict as any other in a series of conflicts in which they would find opportunity to fulfill an age old dream, liberate themselves and unite their country.



Unfortunately this time they were led by three different antagonistically opposing regimes thus robbing the Macedonian people of coming together under a single leadership and under a single Macedonian liberation front.



To be continued.
taken from email by r stefov

[George S.]

From the Once Classified Files - Part 13

Canadian Embassy



Athens, March 5th, 1947



No. 126



Sir,



I have the honour to enclose here with a copy of a letter of 3rd March from the First Secretary of the United Kingdom Embassy to Mr. George passing on for our information a report received from the United Kingdom Consul at Corfu in which he refers to the activities of an organization known as “ORIM” which was founded in 1903 for the independence of Macedonia and has its headquarters at 9 Dean Street, Toronto. This organization has apparently been sending money to prisoners of Bulgarian sympathies who collaborated either with Bulgarians or the Germans during the occupation.



2. Although the United Kingdom Embassy has no further information on the activities of “ORIM”, I think you may be interested in the report and may wish to make enquiries as to the present activities of this organization which is presumably sending money to other persons interested in the movement for an independent Macedonia with Slav and Communist affiliations.



I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can’t tell signature)



The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.





Canadian Embassy



Athens, April 3rd, 1947



No. 175



Sir,



I have the honour to transmit for your information, further to my dispatches Nos. 147 of 12th March and 126 of 5th March, a Gendarmerie (Special Security) report from Jannina, Epirus, dated 28th February regarding “anti national activities of a Slav organization in Canada” which contains further details of the ORIM activities.



2. I received the report from United Kingdom Consul at Corfu through the United Kingdom Embassy at Athens. The Consul, Mr. Kinsella, reports that the parcels referred to in the report were two Red Cross food parcels sent through the Consulate by the Embassy to Kyriakos Kotoris, a prisoner serving a life sentence in Corfu jail on a charge of collaboration with the Bulgarians during the occupation. At the request of Mr. Kotoris’ relatives in Canada I made enquiries through Mr. Kinsella and, on his strong recommendation, I sent two parcels for him. Mr. Kinsella had reported that conditions in the jail were appalling and that the inmates were in urgent need of food and clothing. In view of Kotoris’ Canadian connection and on humanitarian grounds regardless of politics, I made the gesture of sending him two food parcels as evidence that Canada recognizes misery wherever it exists. The parcels were sent to Mr. Kinsella who handed them to the director of the prison in the presence of Kotoris on 21st November, 1946.



3. I am not much impressed by this latest example of the seditious activities of “ORIM” which the over zealous Commander of the Gendarmerie in Jannina might easily have traced to the Canadian Embassy. Nevertheless it might well be true that ORIM’s organization in Canada is worth investigating.



I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can’t tell signature)



The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.







Canadian Embassy



Athens, July 29th, 1946



No. 515



Sir,



I have the honour to report that relations between Greece and Yugoslavia are becoming more and more strained, as disorders in the North of Greece continue, and the evidence of Yugoslav assistance to Greek armed bands is made public by Greek authorities. Matters have gone so far already that on July 26th, Mr. Cankar, Yugoslav Minister to Greece called on the Prime Minister, M. Tsaldaris and complained of the campaign which was being launched by the Royalist section of the Greek press against the Government of Marshal Tito. Mr. Cankar told me this morning that he had made it clear to the Prime Minister that, should this press compaign continue, he would return to his country, leaving his Legation to a Charge d’Affairs.



2. This formal protest, coming immediately before his Paris Conference, is all the more important because Yugoslavia is the only country immediately north of Greece with which Greece is in official relations. If diplomatic relations were, in fact, to be broken, Greece would have no tie with any Balkan State. The geographical location of Greece makes this important to her, not only for political but also for economic reasons. The same considerations must deter Yugoslavia from breaking off relations. For example, UNDRA shipments to Southern Yugoslavia have been delivered through Salonika on several occasions, by arrangement between the Yugoslav Legation and UNDRA Greece Mission. In fact the maintenance of relations is probably of more immediate economic value to Yugoslavia, which has no major port, than to Greece which has several.



3. Undoubtedly one of the chief grievances which Mr. Cankar and his Government feel is that the statements of responsible Greek officials have recently been made public conforming the somewhat wild speculations in which the Royalist Press has been indulging for several months regarding Yugoslav aid to the autonomist and communist partsans who are operating in Northern Greece. As reported in my dispatch No.439 of July 6th, 1946, the Governor of Macedonia, Mr. Dalipis, wrote an aggressive and forthright article which appeared in ELLINIKON VIMA, a leading Right Wing newspaper in Athens, on June 22nd, a, Delipis’s resignation was announced shortly afterwards, but it appears that not only did the Government refused to accept Mr. Delipis’s resignation, but a copy of his article was sent to all Greek Missions abroad. In Yugoslav eyes, this amounts to the Greek Government’s support of Mr. Dalipis’s views. There was no doubt in my mind that this is correct: the fact of Yugoslav resistance to Greek armed bands seems to have been well established from what I have said in my previous dispatches, I need hardly see that Mr. Cankar’s protest, made as if Yugoslavia was the injured party, strikes me as somewhat farcical.



4. The Greek Government is well aware of the importance of not breaking off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and I am sure every effort will be made to bend over backwards in the direction of official correctness to prevent a rapture. If a break should occur I believe it will be because the Yugoslavs, not the Greeks want it so. The present demarche is simply another form of pressure which is applied daily upon the Greek Government by the Governments of the neighbouring countries to the north. Although this is the first official indication of Greek-Yugoslav friction, the two countries have for many months been back to back, Yugoslavia looking to the hinterland of the Soviet dominion, while Greece, from her long coastline, looks out to sea, to the West.



5. Copies of this dispatch have been sent to the High Commissioner for Canada in London and the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and Paris.



I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can’t tell signature)



The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa.
From email from r stefov

[George S.]

From the once classified files 14

Canadian Legation - Washington



August 18, 1941



No. 2471



Sir,



I have the honour to enclose herewith five copies of a memorandum received from His Majesty’s Consul General at Chicago, concerning the Macedonian Community in the United States. It is considered that this memorandum may be of interest to the Department.



I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, Sir, Your most obedient, humble servant, (can’t make our signature) For the Minister.



The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.



MACEDONIANS



Community



The strength of the Macedonian Community in the U.S.A. and Canada is about 50,000, grouped for the most part in the industrial regions of Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. They are largely employed in factories at Toledo, O., Cincinnati, O., Akron, O., Cleveland, O., Dayton, O., Indianapolis, Ind., Detroit, Mich., Granite City, Ill., Duquesne, Pa., Ellwood City, Pa., Steelton, Pa., and Johnstown, Pa.



2. Organizations



(a) The Macedonian Political Organization (M.P.O.) correlates the activities of numerous regional groups or societies, the headquarters of which are at Indianapolis. They have been in existence for about twenty years.



(b) Macedonian American People’s League is an obscure group, thought to be communists in its political leanings. Its leader is said to be one S. Voydanoff.



(c) Unimportant Local Mutual aid societies complete the organization of the Macedonian Community.



3. Macedonian Political Organization



This is the most important group. Its network embraced branches in Canada. In Akron, O., and Toronto, Ontario., there are said to be strong elements and there are other active elements in Indianapolis, Ind., and Detroit, Mich. The Toronto branch is reported to have split into two parts last year because a number of members, believed to be in the majority, opposed the Central Organization at Indianapolis.



The leading officers and supporters of the M.P.O. are the following:-



Chris (Cristo) Anastasoff, or Atanasoff, of Bulgarian origin. He is a Vice-President of the organization. Reports variously place him as a doctor at Detroit and a member of the staff of Washington University in St. Louis, Mo.



Kiril Chaleff, of Bulgarian origin. Vice-President of the organization. Believed to be a saloon-keeper in Indianapolis.



Peter Aceff, or Atzeff, Indianapolis; of Bulgarian origin: Secretary of the M.P.O. Associate editor “Macedonian Tribune”.



Tashe Popcheff, Indianapolis; of Bulgarian origin; Treasurer of M.P.O.



Pop Nikoloff, Detroit, a priest, active in the M.P.O.



Kosta Popoff, McKeesport, Pa., of Bulgarian origin, a baker by trade; an active member of thr M.P.O.



Alexander Dimitroff, Detroit; a student? Active member.



Luben Dimitroff, Indianapolis. Editor of the “Macedonian Tribune”. (See below).



Christo Nazamoff, Associate Editor of the “Macedonian Tribune”.



Vancha Miehailov. See special note below.



4. Political orientation of the M.P.O.



The fundamental purpose of the M.P.O. is the establishment of a free Macedonia. In such terms they express themselves through their organ, the “Macedonian Tribune”. For the satisfaction of such and end they are linked with the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization in Europe. A direct branch of the M.P.O. is said to exist in Pittsburg, Pa., but financial help is said to have been given by the Revolutionary Organization to their political counterpart in America and in order that Macedonian independence at home may be achieved and the cultural lot of Macedonians abroad may be improved. While absolute independence is no doubt the ultimate goal, relative independence from Serbian and Greek control, even at the cost of German and Bulgarian “protection” has been welcomed, Macedonians in America are therefore pro-Nazi. Being chauvinists in temperament, an added reason for their Nazi inclinations is their dislike of the communists. The personal link between the M.P.O. may be Vancha Mikhailov. (See below).



5. Press



(1) Macedonian Tribune (Makedonska Tribuna), 20 S. West Street, Indianapolis, Ind. Weekly.



Editor – Luben Dimitroff.

Ass.Editor – Christo Mazamoff, Peter Aceff.

Subscription - $ 3.00 p.a., Organ of M.P.O.



(2) Naroden Glas, Granite City, Ill. While this is a Bulgarian Weekly, there is a Macedonian colony at Granite City and no doubt it caters too to this community. It may be noted that the Canadian Postal Regulations forbid the transmission of this paper in Canada.



6. Vancha Mikhailoff, or Mihaylof, or Ivan Michailoff



In 1940 Vanche Mihaylof, as one of the leaders of the M.P.O. was reporte to be in Albania and receiving the support of the Italians. He was also active in Bulgaria and Southern Serbia. It was Vancha Mikhailov who is alleged to have been implicated – from a distance – in the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia.











Canadian Legation

To the Allied Governments in the United Kingdom



February 16th, 1945

Berkeley Street, London, W.1.

No. 89



Sir,



Following my telegram dealing with Yugoslavia from the 22nd January, the King Peter requested the resignation of Dr. Subasic’s Government, I have the honour to give a consolidation of the information contained therein and to supplement it where possible with information obtained in my conversations with the British Ambassador, Mr. Skrine Stevenson, with Mr. Addis of the Foreign Office, with Mr. Cankar and with Mr. Rybar. I should add that as I know Mr. Addis as a personal friend, his information cannot be considered as entirely official in nature.



2. The manner in which King Peter precipitated the “crisis” on 22nd January although sudden cannot be said to be entirely unexpected. To understand the reasons behind the King’s move a brief review of events subsequent to Dr. Subasic’s assumption of leadership of the Royal Yugoslav Government may be useful. After King Peter issued his declaration on 1st June, 1944 calling upon all Yugoslavs to ignore their differences and to form a united front under the leadership of Dr. Subasic, it became apparent that the National Liberation Committee with Tito at its head would have to be recognized as the actual force within the country. This de facto recognition became more evident with the Tito-Subasic agreement of 16th June and the agreement arrived at when Tito and Subasic met for a second time on 17th August.



3. With the capture of Belgrade on the 20th October it became a matter of vital urgency from the point of view of the United Kingdom Government that the Royal Yugoslav Government could be formed within the country as soon as practicable. As reported in my dispatch No. 61 of 1st February, Dr. Subasic at this time was given more or less carte blanche to work out the terms of an agreement with Tito, but it had been previously agreed that he would refer the draft agreement to both King Peter and the United Kingdom Government before ratifying it. Unfortunately, for reasons best known to himself, he signed the agreement on the 1st November, thereby presenting King Peter and the United Kingdom Government with a fait accompli.



4. Following his trip to Moscow, Subasic returned to Belgrade on 4th December. On 7th December in concert with Marshal Tito he sighed two annexes to the agreement of 1st November. He then returned to London on 9th December; the United Kingdom Government decided to approve the agreement, but no intimation was received from King Peter of his intentions.



5. This, then, was the background to the King’s statement on 11th January, which he issued without previous consultations with either his own Government or the United Kingdom Government. Although it would seem that the King had a certain amount of justification in feeling that he should have been consulted more fully by Dr. Subasic, his precipitate action was obviously ill-advised and lost him whatever popularity he had with public opinion in the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as damaging his position vis-à-vis Marshal Tito. As reported in my telegram No. 35 of 26th January, his principle adviser seems to have been his mother-in-law, Princes Aspasia. It is still not certain who his other advisers may have been.



6. On 22nd January the King issued a second statement in which he told of proposals he had made to Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito. From the text of this statement it is clear that Marshal Tito said he would deal with King Peter only through the Yugoslav Prime Minister. The statement concluded by saying that he had lost confidence in Dr. Subasic and had consequently requested his resignation. During the following week, Subasic, backed by the United Kingdom Government, refused to accept the King’s request for his resignation and attempted in every way to make the King see reason.



7. On 28th January Tito made a statement to a Serbian women’s anti-fascist meeting in which he once more elucidates his views. The following day an official announcement was released to the press stating the King Peter and Dr. Subasic had reached agreement and that, following the terms of the Tito-Subasic agreement, a Regency Council would be formed and the Royal Yugoslav Government would proceed to Belgrade “as soon as possible” in order to form a coalition government with Marshal Tito’s National Liberation Committee.



8. It can be seen that throughout the whole painful process, starting with the first Tito-Subasic meeting in June 1944, it has been only through the patient efforts of the British Ambassador and the United Kingdom Government that eventual agreement was reached. In my last conversation with Mr. Stevenson he said that prior to June 1944 it had been a virtual certainty that civil war would break out in the country with all the grave results that such an unfortunate happening would have. Mr. Stevenson seemed of the opinion that the initial step towards agreement had been taken by Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin had med and agreed that their interests in Yugoslavia should be on a fifty-fifty basis. In this manner the Soviet Government had been able to place a restricting influence on Marshal Tito as, of course, had the United Kingdom Government through Brigadier Maclean. In a like manner, King Peter and Dr. Subasic had been made to realize the urgent necessity of establishing a unified Government in the country as soon as possible.



9. During the course of my conversation with Mr. Stevenson he made it quite clear that in his opinion the United States Government’s attitude towards the whole problem with Yugoslavia has been, to say the least, uncooperative. He understood that up until November 1944 the State Department had not wished to arouse United States public opinion prior to the Presidential elections and consequently had preferred to adopt a negative policy towards European affairs. He made it equally clear that following the Presidential campaign and the re-election of President Roosevelt, had the United States Government taken a firmer stand they could, his opinion, have brought about agreement in Yugoslav affairs far more rapidly. In my telegram No.49 of the 13th February I mentioned that Stevenson seemed to feel that the Crimea Conference had brought a change in the United States Government’s attitude towards their commitments in Europe and a realization that they must take full responsibility alongside the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. for carrying out of a concerted policy in the Balkans and Central Europe.



10. Mr. Stevenson seemed to be well pleased with the outcome of events but he foresees a difficult time ahead. He is under no illusions concerning the difficulties involved, and he believes that implementation of the terms of the Tito-Subasic agreement will be by far the hardest part of the problem.



11. In presenting the United Kingdom’s policy towards Yugoslavia he also amplified his Government’s policy towards the Balkans and Eastern Europe generally. He said that it is not impossible that, following a successful settlement of the Macedonian problem, some form of loosely-knit federation of Balkan States could be formed. He intimated that some form of federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would be welcomed by the United Kingdom Government, but only so long as it was related to some form of similar federation between all the Balkan States. From the manner in which he spoke I gathered that this is, in fact, the United Kingdom’s long-term policy with respect to the Balkan countries. He also said that it would not be a bad thing if some form of economic unity could be achieved between the Central European States (and here he specifically mentioned Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary) and a Federation of Balkan States.



12. In this respect it is interesting to note that the TIMES Diplomatic Correspondent, in an article appearing in the February 15th issue, gave an account of an interview he had with Dr. Subasic in the 14th February. Speaking in his future capacity as Foreign Minister in the United Yugoslav Government, Dr. Subasic said that in his view three questions dominated Yugoslav foreign policy: -



“(i) The general question of more effective security and of Yugoslav economic development in the Adriatic;



(ii) The rectification of the north-western frontiers unjustly traced after the 1914-18 war;



(iii) The realization by suitable stages of economic and political collaboration among the Balkan States for the insurance of peace and economic advancement in the Balkans.”



13. The article that quotes Dr. Subasic as saying “There are unmistakable signs that a final settlement of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations is in sight. That alone will do much to make broad agreement among the Balkan peoples easier.” The article concluded by saying that Dr. Subasic is well aware of the necessity of maintaining “the friendliest relations with Great Britain and the United States” and that “he noted with pleasure the welcome support given by the British, American and Russian peoples to the agreement concluded with Marshal Tito.”



14. Dr. Cankar, with whom I spoke immediately prior to his departure for Belgrade, said that it was his own opinion that the question of the Regency should have been settled before Dr. Subasic left London. He confirmed the information contained in my telegram No. 46, that the majority of the Cabinet were unwilling to leave London without first having complete agreement on the choice of members for the Regency Council. Their hand had been forced by the Crimea Conference communiqué which, as Dr. Cakar said, that either Dr. Subasic should have remained behind in order to settle the Regency question or the whole Government should have waited until a settlement had been reached. Dr. Cankar was not quite clear as to how it was now proposed to reach agreement on the Regency Council because, with the exception of Rybar, there is now nobody left in London who can act as a link between the Government in Belgrade and King Petar.



15. A copy of this dispatch has been sent to Moscow.



I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, John Starnes, Charge d’Affairs, a.i.



The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa



JS/LS





Canadian Embassy



Athens, March 12th, 1947



No. ???



Sir,



I have the honour to refer to my dispatch No. 126 of 5th March concerning the Slavic organization in Canada known as “ORIM” and quote below from a report dated 28th February from the High Commander of Gendarmerie in Ioannina, Epirus, to the Supreme Command of the Royal Greek Gendarmerie in Athens, a copy of which was forwarded to me by the British Police and Prisons Mission, Athens.



“According to a statement of a Macedonian convict in Kerkyra (Greek for Corfu) prison, there exists in TORONTO, Canada, a Slavonic organization “ORIM”. Bulgarians and Yugoslavs are members of it. This is an old organization ever assisting the Macedonian party and working for the autonomizing of Macedonia, and now is supporting the ceding of Greek Macedonia to Yugoslavia.



“Greek natives of Macedonia are also members of “ORIM”, who keep in touch with Macedonian detainees in Kerkyra by sending letters and also funds and parcels through the British Consulate at Kerkyra. It is evident that the funds and parcels are not remitted to them by their own relatives in Canada but by their organizations, because all the dispatch which is received in Kerkyra is written by one of the organization in Canada, an elementary school teacher, PALLIS, N.



“Investigation of the Prison Director in Kerkyra who has made it his business to check it up corroborates the above.



“Please inform the competent authorities for action, including Greek Consulate in Canada.”



2. The above quoted report defers only enough from the information attached to my dispatch under reference to arouse our further interest and to note the additional details given above.



I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (can’t tell signature)



The Right Honourable, The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

from email by r stefov

[George S.]

Making Sense of the Modern Greek Mentality

Making Sense of the Modern Greek Mentality

Making Sense of the Modern Greek Mentality

By Risto Stefov

[email protected]

May 22, 2010



As a Macedonian born in Greece I am well aware of Greece’s denials of the existence of the Macedonian identity and language, something that has existed since Greece occupied and annexed Macedonian lands in 1912, 1913. I have enough examples in my own experience alone, to fill a book. Greeks did not only deny our existence but did everything in their power to discourage us from wanting to be who we are, Macedonians. Macedonians have been beaten, fed castor oil, slapped around, fined and even jailed for speaking Macedonian, the only language they knew. Macedonians have been jailed in concentration camps and even killed for having the courage to say that they were Macedonian.



The only place we, the Macedonians from Greece, could openly speak Macedonian and declare that we are ethnic Macedonians, was in the Diaspora, away from Greece. There too we were challenged and are continued to be challenges by Greeks with the infamous words “then iparhi tetio prama” (such a thing does not exist)!



Following are two articles that speak about the “Greek attitude” towards the Macedonians;



Wikileaks: Pangalos on Macedonia

http://www.thepressproject.gr/cableg....php?id=109719

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000213 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, GR SUBJECT: CONTRARIAN FORMER FM PANGALOS ON MACEDONIA, EDUCATION REFORM, PASOK POLITICS Classified By: AMBASSADOR DANIEL SPECKHARD. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1. (C) In a cordial introductory meeting with Ambassador, former PASOK Foreign Minister (1996-1999) Theodoros Pangalos -- known during his tenure at the MFA for a sharp tongue and undiplomatic approach -- said he thought the name issue between Greece and Macedonia was "ridiculous" and a "disaster from the beginning." Now that the Republic of Macedonia had been created, he argued, the Macedonians should be allowed to use whatever name they wished. Indeed, Greece should be honored by Macedonia wanting to use the name.

As for Greek fears of irredentism, these too were "ridiculous" and stemmed from the Greek right’s memories of the civil war and fears of communist forces coming into Greece from the Slavic countries. As for the way out of the current impasse, Pangalos said the U.S. should not worry about Greece blaming the U.S. for not solving the problem (though he offered no reason to back up the assertion).

He said he thought the Nimetz proposal was a reasonable approach and noted that he had told FM Bakoyannis that PASOK would not "exploit the issue." PASOK would criticize the government for its handling but would not manipulate the substance of the issue to Greece’s detriment.

2. (C) On education reform, Pangalos took a similarly maverick view. In contrast to his party’s opposition to the ND government’s efforts to change Greek law to allow private higher educational institutions, Pangalos said everyone knew the current system of public universities in Greece was "b.s." and that private institutions should be recognized. He noted that even his leftist professor second wife (he has been married three times and said his personal life was a "disaster") refused to send their son to a Greek university, opting instead to send the boy to the UK. He said Greece was number three in the world (after India and China) in terms of the number of students it exported. But the Greek left -- including his own party -- had hitched itself to the policy of opposing private universities. Particularly guilty was the Synaspismos party, which had taken a demagogic approach to the issue and was just inflaming the situation.

3. (C) Finally, Pangalos offered an assessment of the current political situation in Greece and the PASOK party’s fortunes. He asked rhetorically why PASOK was doing so poorly even though, as opposition, its fortunes should be rising as the government increasingly got into trouble. Pangalos attributed PASOK´s slide, first, to changing economic conditions. Since joining the EU, Greece had seen rapid economic growth, which created and benefited the middle class, making them wary of changing political leadership. At the same time, the government -- beginning under PASOK PM Simitis -- had to limit deficit spending in line with EU rules. This hurt pensioners, new graduates, and others on the lower end of the economic ladder who were a natural PASOK constituency but were angered by what they perceived to be PASOK´s complicity in cutting government support. PASOK also suffered from poor leadership and poor leadership decisions. George Papandreou was honest and direct, but he was a poor communicator and not a leader. At the same time, PASOK was doing a bad job in pitching itself to voters, who perceived PASOK and ND as the same. From that perspective, Pangalos argued, Greek voters saw little reason to bother switching governments.

4. (C) COMMENT: Pangalos avoided the sharp language that characterized his statements as FM, but he was not shy in taking positions at variance with his party and, indeed, most of the Greek political establishment. Our conversations with Greeks indicate that a very small percentage would agree with Pangalos on the Macedonia name issue. The overwhelmingly more common position is one of opposition to compromise. And Pangalos is unlikely to voice in public the opinions he voiced with us.



SPECKHARD





Macedonian Name for the Macedonians Only



By J.S.G. Gandeto



Greeks have nothing to do with the name "Macedonia".



As a matter of fact, until the late nineteen eighties in Greece, the name "Macedonia" or "Macedonians" was avoided like the plague; To the Greeks Macedonia did not exist. There was no Macedonia and there were no Macedonians. They felt that the ethnic cleansing of the ethnic Macedonians living in Greece was successful; the repopulation of Macedonia with recently transplanted Christians from Asia Minor was completed and the eradication of anything Macedonian from the newly acquired territory of Macedonia was an accomplished fact. Gleefully, they must have concluded that this subject was dead and buried and there was no reason to dwell on this topic anymore.



I remember visiting a restaurant in Windsor, Canada in the late nineteen seventies, where we met a patron who was quite cordial and pleasant fellow at first, but as soon as we revealed our identity as Macedonians, this fellow abruptly became indignant; his facial expression changed and you could tell that he was brewing with anger inside and was visibly quite disturbed. He hurriedly got up, bolted towards the exit and as he was leaving the restaurant shouted: "there is no Macedonia; there are no Macedonians."



This illustrates that Greeks before the break up of Yugoslavia felt quite comfortably secured in the notion that Aegean Macedonia [Greek occupied Macedonia] was fully Hellenized and the file on "Macedonia" securely wrapped up and locked up inside their national archives. And as long as the other "Macedonia" (in the Yugoslav federation) was under the firm control of their 1912-13 partners in crime, the Serbs, they believed that they had nothing to fear about. The fact that one of the sixth constitutive republics of Yugoslavia was called "Macedonia" and her inhabitants called themselves Macedonians did not register any alarm in the Greek government. But as soon as the break up of Yugoslavia was imminent and the Greeks learned that Macedonia will become a separate country, they fetched an idea that the name "Macedonia" belongs to them and the real ethnic Macedonians cannot use it. Taking advantage of the difficulties and the precariousness of the position in which the Republic of Macedonia found itself, Greeks embarked on a campaign to prove to the world that the name "Macedonia" exclusively belongs to them since the ancient Macedonians, who conquered and enslaved Greece for centuries, became not just "Hellenes" but the champions of Hellenism overnight. The Republic of Macedonia, regrettably, did not put up a serious challenge to this Greek charade. Thus, Greeks, now emboldened by their initial success proceeded to push further. Desiring to destabilize the country to the point of disintegration, they imposed economic embargo hoping for administrative collapse of the country through economic strangulation. The fact that neither the ancient Greeks nor the ancient Macedonians ever considered each other as brethren was lost to them.



The fact that their own Greek 19th century historiographers rightly excluded the ancient Macedonians from the Hellenes and considered them as conquerors of Greece was dismissed in favor of the new political thinking that "Macedonians" and "Macedonia" were always Greek. Whence, we must ask ourselves the following: (a) why this sudden and highly speculative shift in Greek thinking (b) what is the reasoning behind such a highly unusual, politically unethical, conventionally immoral and historically unprecedented Greek request of the Republic of Macedonia to change its name and (c) do they think that the writings of the ancient chroniclers can be cooked and manipulated like they cooked and manipulated their financial disclosures to the EU?



Why all of a sudden were Greeks awakened with a desire to be called "Macedonians"? Why, indeed? Why go against their previously held 19th century position where they viewed the ancient Macedonians as people of a different nationality quite separate from the Hellenes? Why disrespect their own "Greek sons" who felt that Macedonians were a separate ethnic group of people who conquered Greece and did not share in the richness of the Hellenic nation? Why dismiss the works of their earlier Greek nation builders and historiographers like Paparrigopoulos, Gregorios Paljuritis, lambros Antonijadis, Koubourlis, Politis, Oimaras? Why go against the proclamation of their first Greek President Yannis Kapodistria who called for a sovereign and independent Macedonian State? Why instead of "occupied territory" as King Georgios I called the Aegean Macedonia (which the Greeks received from the west as a gift, as payment for their services as bulwark against the "communists' advances" from the east), today they claim that Macedonia was always Greek?



For many people this issue about the name is a trivial and unimportant thing deserving neither time nor attention. For us, though, the ethnic Macedonians, it is of a pivotal importance. It is of pivotal importance because the name issue is just the tip of the iceberg. Underneath its apparent, innocuous name change demanded by the Greeks, lurk hosts of venomous implications with calamitous consequences for all Macedonians. The Greek plan envisions and hopes to accomplish the following objectives: (1) eradication of our existence as people, (2) obliteration of our identity as Macedonians and (3) annihilation of anything Macedonian, including, most importantly, our Macedonian language. This is a well planned, methodically prepared and systematically executed Greek plan of action employed since 1913. With the acquisition of Macedonia, after the Balkan Wars, the Greek government embarked on Hellenizing the newly acquired territory. Willy-nilly, the population of ethnic Macedonians had to conform to the envisioned Greek doctrine -"they must be made Greeks" and so the brutal policy of forced assimilation began in earnest, sparing neither the rod nor the hand. This in effect is but a continuation of that policy.



The Greek "good neighborly behavior", preached by today's Greek politicians, is nothing short of a poisonous libation offered through and supported by the actions of the naive European bureaucrats and corrupt, forked-tongued politicians.



Let it be known that Greeks' objective is not the change of the Macedonian name.



The name is just the staging ground for their sinister attack on the ethnic Macedonians. It is the attack on (a) the Republic of Macedonia because of its citizens who claim and identify themselves as ethnic Macedonians and (b) it is an attack on the ethnic Macedonians who currently live in Greece. These people, these ethic Macedonians who endured decades of persecution, state sponsored assimilation and persistent, degrading humiliation in the hands of the Greek authorities, have recently awakened and started to assert their identity as ethnic Macedonians. This is the crux of the matter. This is what Greece fears the most.



But Greece will not be in this position if not supported by some European nations. Some of these nations who support Greece in this irrational demand about the name of the Republic of Macedonia (there are 129 nations in the world who have no problem calling Macedonia by its constitutional name), have done it because of economic advantage. Greece has obliged to buy huge amounts of French weaponry and expensive German-built submarines for exchange of their support. Too bad that the forged financial reports on Greek economy got entangled in a web of perennial lies and fabrications and did not pass the test. Greece's late engagement with communist China did not raise an eyebrow in the west either. Fact is that the massive financial help and political support Greece has received from the western countries in the past one hundred or so years, was, strictly speaking, because of her stand against the communists. The hypocrisy of these western European bureaucrats is overwhelming: they criticize other countries about human rights violations but remain conspicuously silent on Greece.



What puzzles me the most, though, are their constant deflections of the truth: instead of saying that Macedonia's accession into the European Union is delayed because of the Greek veto, they say that Macedonia's entry into the union hinges on the name problem. We have no problem with the name; 129 other nation in the world, among which are Canada, USA, China, Russia, India, just to name a few, have no such problem. Do the math; how many billions of people have no such problem? The problem is not the name of Republic of Macedonia but the Greek veto. Stop hiding behind your finger. Stop being a dull, unimaginative and recalcitrant pencil pusher. If you represent Europe and claim that you uphold all the conventions on human rights issues, then, stand up and be counted.



Do not be a hypocrite. Do not close your eyes on countries that implement bigoted policies and exhibit racist behavior. Nothing diminishes your integrity more than a hypocritical stand on important human rights issues. A wise man once said: pray not to be stronger than your brother but to fight the demons within you. Yes, the demons within us. That's the gist of the problem.



I couldn’t agree with you more Joe and thank you for allowing me to use segments of your book in my articles.



So, after all that is said and done, should we still be “negotiating” our country’s name with the Greeks?



J.S.G. Gandeto’s book “The Theft of a King Who Stole Alexander” is available through;

http://www.outskirtspress.com/thetheftofaking

This is a book that every Macedonian needs to own and must read. Since I purchased it I could not put it down.



J.S.G. Gandeto was born in Lubojno, Macedonia. Educated at Ss Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. He immigrated to United States and continued his studies at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan and Nova South-Eastern University in Fourth Lauderdale, Florida where he received his post graduate degrees. He recently completed his 29th year as an educator and has since retired and is continuing to pursue his passion in writing. In 2002 he published his first book Ancient Macedonians - Differences between Ancient Macedonians and the Ancient Greeks. In 2005 he published the romantic novels One Golden Ray upon the Rock and in 2007, The Wolves of Trappers Bluff.



In the Macedonian Language he has published the following novels: Spasa's Light in 2004, Saraf in 2009 and Rosamarina's Grave in 2010. Book of poems Muabeti in 2003, poemata Ko Jagne in 2005 and Majka -Egejka in 2009. Currently, he is preparing for publication his latest novel Folded Impressions.

[George S.]

From the Once Classified Files - Part 16

Central Intelligence Group



Washington D.C.

June13, 1947

Country: Greece/Canada

Subject: Letters from Macedonian Autonomists in Canada

Date of Info: 3 April i947

Evaluation: F-6



1. The letters in paragraphs 2 and 3 below were written by George Grouios (or Grouev), a resident of Canada. He went to Canada from his native village, Alonia, near Florina, in Northwestern Greece. He is Secretary General of the Slavo-Macedonian Organization in Canada, which is seeking the federation of Greek Macedonia with Yugoslavia. An important point brought out in one letter is the fact that during the spring of 1947 a considerable number of Slavo-Macedonians are preparing to go from Canada to fight as Comitaji (mountain bandits) against Greece.



2. The following letter is written to Nikolaos Tsetos, a resident of Alonia:



“Dear Cousin Nikolaos,



Many greetings from me, your cousin George Grouios. Also give my greetings to Vasiliki and to all the rest. I am well so far. I am going to America (i .e., U.S.A. ) , and I decided to take this opportunity to write you a few words. I am indeed very well, but I am distressed because I hear much that is not good news. They are now writing news even worse than before, namely that there are many Comitaji. In the spring, Nikolaos, the situation will be far worse. They are preparing to go there from America and from Canada by the thousands to fight as Comitaji against your mangey-bald old nanny-goat (meaning Greece), and until we get what belongs to us you will not have liberty there. Tell my godfather Panos Tantsef: “Be a little better to my boy, or Panos, you will have the same experience as Antonis Standisis” (the President of the village of Alonia who was carried off by the bandits, and his fate is still unknown). Cousin Nikolaos, don't think that the world is asleep. Everything which happens there happens because of our men. Therefore tell my boy to snap out of it, because there will be nobody to protect him. Tell the same thing to Panos Tantsef. I tell you that letters come here from Monastir, and they write us who is harming our people. Give many greetings to all who ask about me… I am expecting much news from you and for you to write me what everybody in the village is doing.



With fraternal greetings Yours cousin, G. Grouios”



3. Elias Lalos, also a resident of Alonia, is the recipient of another letter written by Grouios:



“Dear Elias Lalos,



I received your letter some time ago, but… we learned from the newspapers that the Andartes have taken Antonis Standis, but we do not know how far this is true. I am anxiously awaiting your answer on this point. Liberty will not be slow in coming; everything that the People demand will come about. You there know nothing of what is going on. We know. Thousands of telegrams are sent from here to the Peace Conference demanding that Macedonia remain independent with Salonia as its capital, and this will happen in a short time. Pay attention to my words. This only you need to know: you and the others demand the just rights of our people. You are Macedonians and not Greeks. Demand just this by telegrams from there.



Yours friend, George Grouios”



4. Although the letters are not dated, probably written in February or March 1947.





Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty’s Consul in Skopje



March 27, 1949



……..The Yugoslav communist Party's entire Macedonian policy is based on the assumption that they can carry in the teeth of fierce opposition from most Bulgars and some Serbs their thesis of a distinct Macedonian language and national tradition. The Party is therefore particularly committed to support advanced research in the little explored subjects of Macedonian national history and philology. Such studies have, of course, had little chance until recently of getting very far, owing to ferocious opposition from Greeks, Bulgars or Serbs, and as a result there are really no trained specialists in this field. The discovery that at Skopje University very few students are showing any interest in Slavonic Philology or the Macedonian language, and that during the recent end-of-term examinations they showed themselves much keener on the Serbian language and Yugoslav literature, is therefore a good deal more significant than might appeal at first sight. One or two other minor incidents that I have observed would appear to suggest that some Macedonians, at least in Skopje, may prefer to read in Serbian, rather than Macedonian, when they get the chance. Add to this the fact that a large number of the students here are showing very little interest in their compulsory Russian studies, or at any rate are scoring deplorably bad marks at Russian in their examinations, and it will be seen that Crvenkovski has a lot to think about in his new post.



The apparent lack of interest among certain sections of the intelligentsia in the "Macedonian National Tradition", so essential to party ideology here, is no doubt also reflected in the “indiscipline” and “passivity” of the Macedonian writers and poets referred to earlier in this dispatch. It is a fact that, to judge from Dimitar Nitrev's speech, various brands of “decadence” (meaning, apparently, a failure to express oneself unequivocally as on the side of the Yugoslav Communist Party or, at the very least, to be interested in individual, rather than in mass emotions, and thus, by implication, "apolitical") is a far commoner offence here, and certainly very much graver, than any inadequacy in form or style.



Some clue to the degree to which the “Macedonian National Tradition” has captured people’s imaginations here may also be afforded by the long series of free public lectures given in Skopje recently by Dimitar Vlahov. At the beginning of the series, when Vlahov was speaking on the early history of the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement, his audiences were quite large -perhaps 500 or more -but a very high proportion of them appeared to be elderly people such as may have had some personal experience of the period he was describing. As the series progressed, however, not even Vlahov's considerable reputation, as the “Grand Old Man” of the Macedonian movement was able to compensate for the impossible dullness of his lectures. When I looked in one minute before he was due to begin the lecture entitled "The successes of the Macedonian People’s Republic" there were precisely three people sitting there, and another half-dozen or so huddled around the stove at the back of the hall -although in fairness it should be said that Vlahov tended to begin his lectures later than the advertised time, and it has been a habit for people to return.



If as these events appear to suggest, the (not very numerous) intellectuals here are not over-impressed by the new Macedonian Idea, what then is their attitude? Some (I should say not very many) are plainly pro-Bulgarian on principle. Most of the students and young people, although probably more interested in their technical studies than in their Macedonian traditions, are, I should say, supporters to a greater or less degree of the present Yugoslav Government in the same way as are most other young Yugoslavs. As Macedonians, they are likely to be far less worried by any submergence of "Western Values" than are their fellow students, say, in Zagreb and Ljubljana. At the same time the Yugoslav Communist Party, by putting an end to the almost colonial policy in Macedonia of successive pre-war Belgrade governments, has at one stroke eliminated the greatest single curse of Vardar Macedonia, and released a good deal of latent energy hitherto suppressed. The Party can also claim, convincingly, that Yugoslavia has done a lot more to liquidate the economic backwardness of Vardar Macedonia in the last three years than Bulgaria is ever likely to do for Pirin. Finally, the Bulgarian Occupation was not a particularly pleasant affair, and the memory of it probably still works as a fairly effective discouragement to pro-Bulgarian sympathies.



On the other hand, there is evidently fairly widespread support for a Macedonian autonomist movement - largely, I should say, among older people, though certainly also in certain sections of the youth. As a spokesman of the Yugoslav security service said at the Macedonian Party Congress what opposition groups there have been have consisted "almost entirely of Mihailovists". It is a commonly held view that the Mihailovists, or IMRO, are really only advocating autonomy as a prelude for incorporation in Bulgaria when the time is ripe. The fact that they seem quite happy to talk the Bulgarian language lends credence to this view, and certainly one of the main tenets of Yugoslav propaganda is that the policies of the Bulgarian Communist Party and of the Mihailovists is virtually indistinguishable. I am inclined to believe, however, that this is an over - simplification, and that there is a body of opinion which seeks a united, independent Macedonia as an ultimate object in itself - quite possibly within some larger federation, perhaps, as is alleged here, under Anglo-American protection, but probably not under the protection of the Kremlin. Evidence in support of this view comes from Lazo Mojsov’s book, mentioned earlier in this dispatch. Mojsov gives, for the first time, more details of the "Skopje intellectuals" who had been mentioned earlier as criticizing the Manifesto put out by the partisan Headquarters for Macedonia at the end of 1943. These, critics, who appear to have been supporters of the Partisans, were apparently professional politicians with no very great regular following, but their views are interesting none the less. They argued that there could be no final settlement of the Macedonian question within Yugoslavia, as the very name of Yugoslavia was for Macedonians a symbol of slavery; that the future of Vardar Macedonia could not be decided without reference to the other two parts of Macedonia as well; that the first aim of the Macedonian Partisans must be clearly stated as being a United Macedonia, and a joint Macedonian military command must therefore be established with a view to placing the Macedonian Question fairly and squarely “in the diplomatic arena”. Other criticisms put forward by these people were that the Partisan Headquarters were “not competent” to issue any “Manifesto” in the name of the Macedonian People; that they, the “intellectual leaders”, should be consulted more frequently and entrusted with diplomatic missions, etc.; that there was no need publicly to criticize Ckatrov and other "fascists", as they were completely discredited anyway; that for General Mijalce (or Mise) Apostolski to sign himself "Mihajlo""smelt of Serbdom" , and so on.



Various extracts from Tito’s letters quoted by Mojsov make it clear that he was worried by autonomist tendencies on the fringes of the Partisan movement in Macedonia. No doubt they were a good deal harder to deal with than plain “Greater Bulgarianism”. It seems clear that Metodi Andonov- Cento, the Macedonian nationalist politician who eventually became President of the Presidium of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Macedonia, must have been one of these “autonomists”. He must also have been a figure of some standing in Macedonia, otherwise he would scarcely have been given the appointment. This may also explain why the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has proved so eager to sing Andonov's praises since their hands were freed by the Cominform Resolution. Andonov, of course, tried to escape to Greece with the object of laying, proposals for an independent Macedonia before the Paris Peace Conference, and since that attempt (as on several occasions before the war) he has been inside a Yugoslav gaol.



Lazo Mojsov, of course, argues (or rather states categorically again and again -it cannot be called argument) that these Macedonian autonomists were really “tools of Bulgarian Chauvinism”. If that were so, then it would of course be easier for Mojsov to discredit them in the eyes of the public. But his “arguments” are not convincing, and clearly beg the question. There seems to be no doubt that IMRO, if it plaid its cards carefully, could count on the support of most politically conscious anti-communists among the Macedonian intelligentsia, in addition to the more-or- less fascist following it has always had -in present circumstances there would appear to be no other alternative to communism, whether Titoist or Stalinesque. It is certainly a fact that autonomist bands were active in both Vardar and Aegean Macedonia during the war, and at least in Vardar Macedonia for a considerable time after the war, until they were dispersed by Yugoslav security troops. It is scarcely likely that the ideas for which they stood in 1945 have been so easily disposed of.



But IMRO has often been described with some justice as mainly an affair of the bourgeois intelligentsia, with little mass support. The same is probably true today, and autonomist tendencies are likely to be limited to certain groups of Macedonian intellectuals (not a very numerous body, in any case). The state of opinion among workers and peasants is altogether a different matter. My impression is that the Macedonian workers' main feeling is one of dissatisfaction with living conditions as they are at present -they are certainly very bad -and that they are a good deal more interested in their standard of life than in ideological or national disputes. Town workers here suffer more than those elsewhere as a result of the inevitable, but none the less frightening inefficiency of Management in their People's Republic, which can be observed at its worst in the State commercial network. As a result, housewives here have had to put up with a good deal more in the way of queuing and shortages than elsewhere, and the free market-prices of essential food are painfully higher than they are only a few kilometers away in Serbia (particularly in Kosmet).



"It was better than when the Bulgarians were here” is a typical comment, but it is not a political judgment; in fact, most people know well enough the rations in the Bulgarian People’s Republic are appreciably worst than they are here. “Yes, we suppose things will get better – but WHEN?” probably best expresses the resigned attitude of most town worker.



While housewives struggle to make ends meet, many of their husbands have to work in extremely bad conditions, and workers are constantly leaving their jobs in the (slender) hope of finding something better. This again seems to be very largely due to inefficiency and thoughtlessness, resulting once more, to some extent, from Macedonian inexperience in management and administration. In the once British-owned chrome mines at Radusa, to take one fairly typical example, workers have been standing all day in several inches of water although it is said that gum-boots are in fact available if someone will only do something about it. One thing is certain, and that is that in general (although a few branches do manage to assist their members to some extent, as for instance in getting them extra rations and firewood) the Trade Unions are of almost no help at all in improving working conditions. It is scarcely likely that the scandals revealed in the recent purge of the Trade Union leadership will do much to increase their reputation.



Nevertheless, there are, signs that the living conditions of ordinary workers will improve this year, and I should say that most of them would give their more-or-less willing support to the present authorities unless somebody else can offer them, convincingly, a standard of life dramatically better than the one they suffer at present. It seems very unlikely that advocates of union with Bulgaria could hope to make such an offer. Whether Macedonian autonomists could make their proposals more attractive with an offer of Anglo-American spam and circuses is another matter. I should be inclined to think it extremely doubtful. Probably, apart from other factors, very few of the thousands of Greek Macedonian refugees here are likely to be good propagandists for Anglo-American support.



Opinion among the peasants (the great majority of Macedonians, of course) is a different matter again. As I have reported on an earlier occasion, many (if not most) of the country districts of Vardar Macedonia are so backward that it is difficult to conceive of any but a few individuals having any sort of coherent political opinion at all. But Bulgarian (and perhaps more particularly Albanian) occupation was certainly no pleasant business for the Macedonian peasants, and I should say that by the end of the war the Partisans were regarded genuinely as liberators in many country districts where the peasants neither knew nor cared anything about communism. Macedonia possesses an unusually high proportion of really poor peasants, and many (particularly among the Albanians in the south-west, it appears) were either without land or hopelessly in debt. For these people -a very numerous class -the Agrarian Reform came as a godsend, and subsequent resistance to the idea of Producer Cooperatives was far less than in districts with a higher proportion of richer peasants.



The Macedonian Communist Party, compared with the parties in the rest of Yugoslavia, had comparatively little influence in the towns, where the Bulgarians were naturally able to develop far more effective anti-communist (or at any rate anti-Yugoslav -communist) propaganda than German or Italian occupiers elsewhere. The Macedonian Partisans, therefore, were based almost exclusively on the villages, and it seems clear that the Macedonian Communist Party is well aware of the source of most of its strongest and most effective potential support nowadays. The Party appears to consist of a not very large group of intellectuals who in earlier days might have been Macedonian nationalists, a group (again, I should say, not large) of Macedonian workers who for one reason or another were less influenced by anti-Serb opinion than their fellows, plus the usual admixture of flamboyant “1941 Partisans” and warriors, together with an unusually high proportion of time-servers with rather murky records. The latter, although they do no occupy the highest positions, are obviously the most unstable element in present circumstances. The Party is both young and (except as regards Partisan warfare) very inexperienced. As pressure on it becomes stronger (and the leaders are obviously very nervous about the possible effects of Bulgarian propaganda, especially since it increased in vehemence at the beginning of the year), the Party is trying to consolidate its position in the most promising (and, in Macedonia, the most decisive) sector; namely, in the villages.



In my opinion, the Party is likely to be successful in its policy, given time. There is to be ideological work on a very big scale where pre-conceived political notions are few; the party's wartime record is mostly in its favour; loyal peasants of the more influential kind are to be admitted as members of the Party with little or no regard to the purity of their Marxist-Leninist ideology (if indeed they understand it at all). In this way, the Party will build up a firm basis of influential villagers committed to its support. Many of them will undoubtedly be (already are) opportunists and yes- men, but the policy in general is likely to be effective.



The main weapon in this drive for increased support in the countryside is of course the extension of the Producer Cooperatives. On this issue (as I have suggested earlier in this dispatch) Kolisevski, who, as a worker born and bred, probably takes a less novel view of the social category from which a communist party should draw its main support, appears to have been over-ruled. There is no doubt that Macedonia, compared with the rest of Yugoslavia, offers very favourable conditions for the establishment of Producer Cooperatives with the minimum of peasant opposition. It is, after all, the home of "pecalbarstvo" -the system under which the men of a village unable to support its inhabitants would go abroad to earn their living, and send their savings home. In the case of the mountain village of Galicnik, near Debar (and others too) the entire male population used to go abroad to work as crafts men or yoghurt makers, and returned once a year in July for about a fortnight (or every other year, if they had been to America). The month of July was thus filled with celebrations and weddings, and the newlywed husbands would look forward to seeing their three-months-old children the following July. Such a way of life was extremely picturesque for foreign visitors, but not very satisfactory for the villagers themselves. Now, Galicnik has a very large and flourishing cooperative engaged in stock-breeding and carpet-making. It has libraries, electric light, a cinema. I am told by a man who has just spent a few months there teaching the carpet makers the secret of wool-dyeing that the women and young people are delighted with the new arrangements, although some of the older men who had got used to the idea of going "on pecalba" every year are still inclined to hanker after foreign parts. The case of Galicnik, of course, is so startling that it can scarcely be called typical. I believe, for example, that government loans to this particular cooperative have been unusually large. Nevertheless, it does serve to illustrate the fact that the cooperative idea is likely to become increasingly popular in the very large number of poor, backward and barren villages of Macedonia.



It is therefore clear that if "the population of Bulgaria is to be increased from 7 million to 10 million" (as has apparently been said in Sofia), it will not be as the result of a popular rising in Vardar Macedonia in the foreseeable future. Propagandists here have not much difficulty in disposing of Greater Bulgarian Chauvinism. They can point to the fact that there is not likely to be any autonomy for Macedonians inside Bulgaria -and some sort of autonomy would certainly be demanded even by Macedonians who might not press their claim to a language of their own distinct from Bulgarian. The "Kolisevski clique" can even make a convincing enough counter-claim for the inclusion of Pirin in the Macedonian people's Republic. Neskovic, at the Macedonian party Congress, strongly denied that Yugoslavia had ever claimed Pirin except as part of a general settlement in an eventual South Slav Federation. This seems, if not an actual misstatement, to be at least misleading. Mojsov's book makes it quite clear that at one stage the union of Pirin and Vardar Macedonia within Yugoslavia and without regard to an ultimate South Slav Federation was agreed to in principle by the Bulgarian Communist Party, though without enthusiasm. They are scarcely likely to have agreed to this unless the Yugoslavs had been pressing them very strongly (and unless, one might perhaps add, they had had instructions from Moscow in this sense).



Mojsov and his fellow publicists will have a far harder task, though, to counter proposals for some sort of Macedonian autonomy with no special Yugoslav association. The Bulgarian Party appears, wisely enough, to have given up the attempt to persuade Macedonians that they are really Bulgars, or that they would be happier as citizens of the Bulgarian People's Republic. Nor can they convincingly propose Pirin as a basis for some sort of autonomous Macedonia. But if they are still thinking in terms of an autonomy based on Aegean Macedonia, then they touch the Yugoslav Communist party in general, and Lazo Mojsov in particular, on a very weak spot indeed. Publicists here have surely been thinking of this possibility when driving home the not entirely convincing argument that all Macedonian autonomists without exception are the dupes or agents of Sofia. As I have indicated the autonomists can in no sense be described as the agents of Sofia; whether they will in due course become their dupes will depend on the skill and subtlety of the Bulgarian propaganda machine. Less convincing still is Skopje’s secondary argument that, pending a form of South Slav Federation acceptable to the Yugoslav Communist Party, a united Macedonia not; based on the People's Republic within the framework of Federal Yugoslavia is "unthinkable". At this point Mojsov completely abandons reasoned statement in favour of a mystical wrath and categorical assertion. He claims that those Macedonians (i.e. the Yugoslav Macedonians) who fought for and won their national independence within Yugoslavia have a natural right to lead the way to Macedonian unity, and that since Yugoslavia is in itself a federation of South Slav peoples, the incorporation of the rest of Macedonia in it, along with the Macedonian People's Republic, is an obvious next step. Vardar, says Mojsov, is in any case the natural heart of a united Macedonia, gliding calmly over what I believe to be a fact -namely, the existence of a fairly general feeling in Aegean Macedonia that the people of Vardar are backward and uncouth. Perhaps as a natural reaction on the part of the latter there is, I believe, a slight tendency here (certainly in other parts of Yugoslavia) to regard Aegean Macedonians as slackers.



Mojsov's assertion that Vardar is the natural heart and head of any united Macedonia is not likely to go unchallenged. His language at this stage of his “argument” is cautious and in rather general terms. He probably realizes he is skating on very thin ice which may expose him to the charge of Belgrade Chauvinism. Reading most of the Yugoslav Communist Party's Macedonian propaganda one might be excused for supposing the Macedonians quite entitled, if they so wish, to form a united Macedonia of their own. But this is just what Mojsov will not countenance, and he only just manages not to say in so many words that South Slav Federation is of less importance than the need to keep the Macedonian people's Republic firmly attached to Yugoslavia, and to add the rest of Macedonia to it as soon as the opportunity arises. It is difficult to see what else a Yugoslav publicist could say, given the post- Cominform situation in the Balkans, but this is certainly the weakest part of Mojsov's (and therefore of the Yugoslav Communist party's) case as far as Macedonians are concerned.



In the light of recent developments, it looks as if the first shots in what must surely develop into a high powered Macedonian propaganda campaign were in fact fired by Mito Hadzi Vasilev in his article in "Nova Makedonija" on 24 February (i.e. some days before Mosa Pijade opened up with his big guns on 6 March).Vasilev revealed, rather innocently, in a single brief sentence adduced in support of his charge of Bulgarian hypocrisy, that Mr. Visinsky's reference in Paris to the “Macedonian and Albanian minorities” in Greece had been reported by Tass and Pravda as "Bulgarian and Albanian" minorities. Since when, asked Vasilev curtly, had Tass been a mouthpiece for Bulgarian Chauvinism? - and in the rest of a nine-column article made no further reference to Soviet Policy or to Greece. He charged the Bulgarian Government with encouraging talk in Pirin (he did not say Aegean) Macedonia of a "free Macedonia not in Yugoslavia but in a South Slav Federation", and hinted darkly at the possible significance of the alleged Bulgarian claim that "Bulgaria's population will soon be increased from 7 m. to 10 m." If the Bulgarian leaders did not realize they were making a big mistake and mend their ways, said Vasilev, “invincible Life will teach them a cruel lesson to-day or to-morrow”. I do not know whether this is in fact the article which is said to have been quoted indirectly by The Times on 21 March (I have not yet seen the Times report but if so, then Vasilev certainly got no nearer to anything that could be called a threat of war than this prophecy about "invincible Life".



It may not be irrelevant to conclude this general review of the position in Macedonia by mentioning a conversation I had last December with an officer of the Yugoslav Army Engineers in Djevdjelija. He was a Bosnian, from a remote village in Krajina. I asked him whether there were many Macedonians in his unit on the frontier, and how he liked service in Macedonia. “Macedonians?”, he replied, “of course not – we’re mostly Bosnians and Montenegrins – you can’t expect a Macedonian to be any good at fighting. Wild people too - just savages – take the girls, they just run away when you chaps appear – as for dancing…… Give me Zagreb any day”.
from an email from R.Stefov

[Pelister]

Thousands of telegrams are sent from here to the Peace Conference demanding that Macedonia remain independent with Salonia as its capital, and this will happen in a short time. Pay attention to my words. This only you need to know: you and the others demand the just rights of our people. You are Macedonians and not Greeks.

This is an excellent source of information.

I would guess that the literally thousands of letters and petitions written by Macedonians and sent to the Western institutions of this world, asking for their basic human rights, asking for autonomy ...etc, over the last century, are now buried in secret files.

The League of Nations, for example, deliberately 'blocked' Macedonian letters, petitions and grievances from ever reaching the Council, because if the issue had ever got to the council, the Macedonians would have been on the public record.

On another note - the words "we only have to demand that we are Macedonians, and not Greeks" could not be more true.

[indigen]

Central Intelligence Group



Washington D.C.

June13, 1947

Country: Greece/Canada

Subject: Letters from Macedonian Autonomists in Canada

Date of Info: 3 April i947

Evaluation: F-6



1. The letters in paragraphs 2 and 3 below were written by George Grouios (or Grouev), a resident of Canada. He went to Canada from his native village, Alonia, near Florina, in Northwestern Greece. He is Secretary General of the Slavo-Macedonian Organization in Canada, which is seeking the federation of Greek Macedonia with Yugoslavia. An important point brought out in one letter is the fact that during the spring of 1947 a considerable number of Slavo-Macedonians are preparing to go from Canada to fight as Comitaji (mountain bandits) against Greece.



2. The following letter is written to Nikolaos Tsetos, a resident of Alonia:



“Dear Cousin Nikolaos,



Many greetings from me, your cousin George Grouios. Also give my greetings to Vasiliki and to all the rest. I am well so far. I am going to America (i .e., U.S.A. ) , and I decided to take this opportunity to write you a few words. I am indeed very well, but I am distressed because I hear much that is not good news. They are now writing news even worse than before, namely that there are many Comitaji. In the spring, Nikolaos, the situation will be far worse. They are preparing to go there from America and from Canada by the thousands to fight as Comitaji against your mangey-bald old nanny-goat (meaning Greece), and until we get what belongs to us you will not have liberty there. Tell my godfather Panos Tantsef: “Be a little better to my boy, or Panos, you will have the same experience as Antonis Standisis” (the President of the village of Alonia who was carried off by the bandits, and his fate is still unknown). Cousin Nikolaos, don't think that the world is asleep. Everything which happens there happens because of our men. Therefore tell my boy to snap out of it, because there will be nobody to protect him. Tell the same thing to Panos Tantsef. I tell you that letters come here from Monastir, and they write us who is harming our people. Give many greetings to all who ask about me… I am expecting much news from you and for you to write me what everybody in the village is doing.



With fraternal greetings Yours cousin, G. Grouios”



3. Elias Lalos, also a resident of Alonia, is the recipient of another letter written by Grouios:



“Dear Elias Lalos,



I received your letter some time ago, but… we learned from the newspapers that the Andartes have taken Antonis Standis, but we do not know how far this is true. I am anxiously awaiting your answer on this point. Liberty will not be slow in coming; everything that the People demand will come about. You there know nothing of what is going on. We know. Thousands of telegrams are sent from here to the Peace Conference demanding that Macedonia remain independent with Salonia as its capital, and this will happen in a short time. Pay attention to my words. This only you need to know: you and the others demand the just rights of our people. You are Macedonians and not Greeks. Demand just this by telegrams from there.



Yours friend, George Grouios”



4. Although the letters are not dated, probably written in February or March 1947.





Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty’s Consul in Skopje



March 27, 1949



……..The Yugoslav communist Party's entire Macedonian policy is based on the assumption that they can carry in the teeth of fierce opposition from most Bulgars and some Serbs their thesis of a distinct Macedonian language and national tradition. The Party is therefore particularly committed to support advanced research in the little explored subjects of Macedonian national history and philology. Such studies have, of course, had little chance until recently of getting very far, owing to ferocious opposition from Greeks, Bulgars or Serbs, and as a result there are really no trained specialists in this field. The discovery that at Skopje University very few students are showing any interest in Slavonic Philology or the Macedonian language, and that during the recent end-of-term examinations they showed themselves much keener on the Serbian language and Yugoslav literature, is therefore a good deal more significant than might appeal at first sight. One or two other minor incidents that I have observed would appear to suggest that some Macedonians, at least in Skopje, may prefer to read in Serbian, rather than Macedonian, when they get the chance. Add to this the fact that a large number of the students here are showing very little interest in their compulsory Russian studies, or at any rate are scoring deplorably bad marks at Russian in their examinations, and it will be seen that Crvenkovski has a lot to think about in his new post.



The apparent lack of interest among certain sections of the intelligentsia in the "Macedonian National Tradition", so essential to party ideology here, is no doubt also reflected in the “indiscipline” and “passivity” of the Macedonian writers and poets referred to earlier in this dispatch. It is a fact that, to judge from Dimitar Nitrev's speech, various brands of “decadence” (meaning, apparently, a failure to express oneself unequivocally as on the side of the Yugoslav Communist Party or, at the very least, to be interested in individual, rather than in mass emotions, and thus, by implication, "apolitical") is a far commoner offence here, and certainly very much graver, than any inadequacy in form or style.



Some clue to the degree to which the “Macedonian National Tradition” has captured people’s imaginations here may also be afforded by the long series of free public lectures given in Skopje recently by Dimitar Vlahov. At the beginning of the series, when Vlahov was speaking on the early history of the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement, his audiences were quite large -perhaps 500 or more -but a very high proportion of them appeared to be elderly people such as may have had some personal experience of the period he was describing. As the series progressed, however, not even Vlahov's considerable reputation, as the “Grand Old Man” of the Macedonian movement was able to compensate for the impossible dullness of his lectures. When I looked in one minute before he was due to begin the lecture entitled "The successes of the Macedonian People’s Republic" there were precisely three people sitting there, and another half-dozen or so huddled around the stove at the back of the hall -although in fairness it should be said that Vlahov tended to begin his lectures later than the advertised time, and it has been a habit for people to return.



If as these events appear to suggest, the (not very numerous) intellectuals here are not over-impressed by the new Macedonian Idea, what then is their attitude? Some (I should say not very many) are plainly pro-Bulgarian on principle. Most of the students and young people, although probably more interested in their technical studies than in their Macedonian traditions, are, I should say, supporters to a greater or less degree of the present Yugoslav Government in the same way as are most other young Yugoslavs. As Macedonians, they are likely to be far less worried by any submergence of "Western Values" than are their fellow students, say, in Zagreb and Ljubljana. At the same time the Yugoslav Communist Party, by putting an end to the almost colonial policy in Macedonia of successive pre-war Belgrade governments, has at one stroke eliminated the greatest single curse of Vardar Macedonia, and released a good deal of latent energy hitherto suppressed. The Party can also claim, convincingly, that Yugoslavia has done a lot more to liquidate the economic backwardness of Vardar Macedonia in the last three years than Bulgaria is ever likely to do for Pirin. Finally, the Bulgarian Occupation was not a particularly pleasant affair, and the memory of it probably still works as a fairly effective discouragement to pro-Bulgarian sympathies.



On the other hand, there is evidently fairly widespread support for a Macedonian autonomist movement - largely, I should say, among older people, though certainly also in certain sections of the youth. As a spokesman of the Yugoslav security service said at the Macedonian Party Congress what opposition groups there have been have consisted "almost entirely of Mihailovists". It is a commonly held view that the Mihailovists, or IMRO, are really only advocating autonomy as a prelude for incorporation in Bulgaria when the time is ripe. The fact that they seem quite happy to talk the Bulgarian language lends credence to this view, and certainly one of the main tenets of Yugoslav propaganda is that the policies of the Bulgarian Communist Party and of the Mihailovists is virtually indistinguishable. I am inclined to believe, however, that this is an over - simplification, and that there is a body of opinion which seeks a united, independent Macedonia as an ultimate object in itself - quite possibly within some larger federation, perhaps, as is alleged here, under Anglo-American protection, but probably not under the protection of the Kremlin. Evidence in support of this view comes from Lazo Mojsov’s book, mentioned earlier in this dispatch. Mojsov gives, for the first time, more details of the "Skopje intellectuals" who had been mentioned earlier as criticizing the Manifesto put out by the partisan Headquarters for Macedonia at the end of 1943. These, critics, who appear to have been supporters of the Partisans, were apparently professional politicians with no very great regular following, but their views are interesting none the less. They argued that there could be no final settlement of the Macedonian question within Yugoslavia, as the very name of Yugoslavia was for Macedonians a symbol of slavery; that the future of Vardar Macedonia could not be decided without reference to the other two parts of Macedonia as well; that the first aim of the Macedonian Partisans must be clearly stated as being a United Macedonia, and a joint Macedonian military command must therefore be established with a view to placing the Macedonian Question fairly and squarely “in the diplomatic arena”. Other criticisms put forward by these people were that the Partisan Headquarters were “not competent” to issue any “Manifesto” in the name of the Macedonian People; that they, the “intellectual leaders”, should be consulted more frequently and entrusted with diplomatic missions, etc.; that there was no need publicly to criticize Ckatrov and other "fascists", as they were completely discredited anyway; that for General Mijalce (or Mise) Apostolski to sign himself "Mihajlo""smelt of Serbdom" , and so on.



Various extracts from Tito’s letters quoted by Mojsov make it clear that he was worried by autonomist tendencies on the fringes of the Partisan movement in Macedonia. No doubt they were a good deal harder to deal with than plain “Greater Bulgarianism”. It seems clear that Metodi Andonov- Cento, the Macedonian nationalist politician who eventually became President of the Presidium of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Macedonia, must have been one of these “autonomists”. He must also have been a figure of some standing in Macedonia, otherwise he would scarcely have been given the appointment. This may also explain why the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has proved so eager to sing Andonov's praises since their hands were freed by the Cominform Resolution. Andonov, of course, tried to escape to Greece with the object of laying, proposals for an independent Macedonia before the Paris Peace Conference, and since that attempt (as on several occasions before the war) he has been inside a Yugoslav gaol.



Lazo Mojsov, of course, argues (or rather states categorically again and again -it cannot be called argument) that these Macedonian autonomists were really “tools of Bulgarian Chauvinism”. If that were so, then it would of course be easier for Mojsov to discredit them in the eyes of the public. But his “arguments” are not convincing, and clearly beg the question. There seems to be no doubt that IMRO, if it plaid its cards carefully, could count on the support of most politically conscious anti-communists among the Macedonian intelligentsia, in addition to the more-or- less fascist following it has always had -in present circumstances there would appear to be no other alternative to communism, whether Titoist or Stalinesque. It is certainly a fact that autonomist bands were active in both Vardar and Aegean Macedonia during the war, and at least in Vardar Macedonia for a considerable time after the war, until they were dispersed by Yugoslav security troops. It is scarcely likely that the ideas for which they stood in 1945 have been so easily disposed of.



But IMRO has often been described with some justice as mainly an affair of the bourgeois intelligentsia, with little mass support. The same is probably true today, and autonomist tendencies are likely to be limited to certain groups of Macedonian intellectuals (not a very numerous body, in any case). The state of opinion among workers and peasants is altogether a different matter. My impression is that the Macedonian workers' main feeling is one of dissatisfaction with living conditions as they are at present -they are certainly very bad -and that they are a good deal more interested in their standard of life than in ideological or national disputes. Town workers here suffer more than those elsewhere as a result of the inevitable, but none the less frightening inefficiency of Management in their People's Republic, which can be observed at its worst in the State commercial network. As a result, housewives here have had to put up with a good deal more in the way of queuing and shortages than elsewhere, and the free market-prices of essential food are painfully higher than they are only a few kilometers away in Serbia (particularly in Kosmet).



"It was better than when the Bulgarians were here” is a typical comment, but it is not a political judgment; in fact, most people know well enough the rations in the Bulgarian People’s Republic are appreciably worst than they are here. “Yes, we suppose things will get better – but WHEN?” probably best expresses the resigned attitude of most town worker.



While housewives struggle to make ends meet, many of their husbands have to work in extremely bad conditions, and workers are constantly leaving their jobs in the (slender) hope of finding something better. This again seems to be very largely due to inefficiency and thoughtlessness, resulting once more, to some extent, from Macedonian inexperience in management and administration. In the once British-owned chrome mines at Radusa, to take one fairly typical example, workers have been standing all day in several inches of water although it is said that gum-boots are in fact available if someone will only do something about it. One thing is certain, and that is that in general (although a few branches do manage to assist their members to some extent, as for instance in getting them extra rations and firewood) the Trade Unions are of almost no help at all in improving working conditions. It is scarcely likely that the scandals revealed in the recent purge of the Trade Union leadership will do much to increase their reputation.



Nevertheless, there are, signs that the living conditions of ordinary workers will improve this year, and I should say that most of them would give their more-or-less willing support to the present authorities unless somebody else can offer them, convincingly, a standard of life dramatically better than the one they suffer at present. It seems very unlikely that advocates of union with Bulgaria could hope to make such an offer. Whether Macedonian autonomists could make their proposals more attractive with an offer of Anglo-American spam and circuses is another matter. I should be inclined to think it extremely doubtful. Probably, apart from other factors, very few of the thousands of Greek Macedonian refugees here are likely to be good propagandists for Anglo-American support.



Opinion among the peasants (the great majority of Macedonians, of course) is a different matter again. As I have reported on an earlier occasion, many (if not most) of the country districts of Vardar Macedonia are so backward that it is difficult to conceive of any but a few individuals having any sort of coherent political opinion at all. But Bulgarian (and perhaps more particularly Albanian) occupation was certainly no pleasant business for the Macedonian peasants, and I should say that by the end of the war the Partisans were regarded genuinely as liberators in many country districts where the peasants neither knew nor cared anything about communism. Macedonia possesses an unusually high proportion of really poor peasants, and many (particularly among the Albanians in the south-west, it appears) were either without land or hopelessly in debt. For these people -a very numerous class -the Agrarian Reform came as a godsend, and subsequent resistance to the idea of Producer Cooperatives was far less than in districts with a higher proportion of richer peasants.



The Macedonian Communist Party, compared with the parties in the rest of Yugoslavia, had comparatively little influence in the towns, where the Bulgarians were naturally able to develop far more effective anti-communist (or at any rate anti-Yugoslav -communist) propaganda than German or Italian occupiers elsewhere. The Macedonian Partisans, therefore, were based almost exclusively on the villages, and it seems clear that the Macedonian Communist Party is well aware of the source of most of its strongest and most effective potential support nowadays. The Party appears to consist of a not very large group of intellectuals who in earlier days might have been Macedonian nationalists, a group (again, I should say, not large) of Macedonian workers who for one reason or another were less influenced by anti-Serb opinion than their fellows, plus the usual admixture of flamboyant “1941 Partisans” and warriors, together with an unusually high proportion of time-servers with rather murky records. The latter, although they do no occupy the highest positions, are obviously the most unstable element in present circumstances. The Party is both young and (except as regards Partisan warfare) very inexperienced. As pressure on it becomes stronger (and the leaders are obviously very nervous about the possible effects of Bulgarian propaganda, especially since it increased in vehemence at the beginning of the year), the Party is trying to consolidate its position in the most promising (and, in Macedonia, the most decisive) sector; namely, in the villages.



In my opinion, the Party is likely to be successful in its policy, given time. There is to be ideological work on a very big scale where pre-conceived political notions are few; the party's wartime record is mostly in its favour; loyal peasants of the more influential kind are to be admitted as members of the Party with little or no regard to the purity of their Marxist-Leninist ideology (if indeed they understand it at all). In this way, the Party will build up a firm basis of influential villagers committed to its support. Many of them will undoubtedly be (already are) opportunists and yes- men, but the policy in general is likely to be effective.



The main weapon in this drive for increased support in the countryside is of course the extension of the Producer Cooperatives. On this issue (as I have suggested earlier in this dispatch) Kolisevski, who, as a worker born and bred, probably takes a less novel view of the social category from which a communist party should draw its main support, appears to have been over-ruled. There is no doubt that Macedonia, compared with the rest of Yugoslavia, offers very favourable conditions for the establishment of Producer Cooperatives with the minimum of peasant opposition. It is, after all, the home of "pecalbarstvo" -the system under which the men of a village unable to support its inhabitants would go abroad to earn their living, and send their savings home. In the case of the mountain village of Galicnik, near Debar (and others too) the entire male population used to go abroad to work as crafts men or yoghurt makers, and returned once a year in July for about a fortnight (or every other year, if they had been to America). The month of July was thus filled with celebrations and weddings, and the newlywed husbands would look forward to seeing their three-months-old children the following July. Such a way of life was extremely picturesque for foreign visitors, but not very satisfactory for the villagers themselves. Now, Galicnik has a very large and flourishing cooperative engaged in stock-breeding and carpet-making. It has libraries, electric light, a cinema. I am told by a man who has just spent a few months there teaching the carpet makers the secret of wool-dyeing that the women and young people are delighted with the new arrangements, although some of the older men who had got used to the idea of going "on pecalba" every year are still inclined to hanker after foreign parts. The case of Galicnik, of course, is so startling that it can scarcely be called typical. I believe, for example, that government loans to this particular cooperative have been unusually large. Nevertheless, it does serve to illustrate the fact that the cooperative idea is likely to become increasingly popular in the very large number of poor, backward and barren villages of Macedonia.



It is therefore clear that if "the population of Bulgaria is to be increased from 7 million to 10 million" (as has apparently been said in Sofia), it will not be as the result of a popular rising in Vardar Macedonia in the foreseeable future. Propagandists here have not much difficulty in disposing of Greater Bulgarian Chauvinism. They can point to the fact that there is not likely to be any autonomy for Macedonians inside Bulgaria -and some sort of autonomy would certainly be demanded even by Macedonians who might not press their claim to a language of their own distinct from Bulgarian. The "Kolisevski clique" can even make a convincing enough counter-claim for the inclusion of Pirin in the Macedonian people's Republic. Neskovic, at the Macedonian party Congress, strongly denied that Yugoslavia had ever claimed Pirin except as part of a general settlement in an eventual South Slav Federation. This seems, if not an actual misstatement, to be at least misleading. Mojsov's book makes it quite clear that at one stage the union of Pirin and Vardar Macedonia within Yugoslavia and without regard to an ultimate South Slav Federation was agreed to in principle by the Bulgarian Communist Party, though without enthusiasm. They are scarcely likely to have agreed to this unless the Yugoslavs had been pressing them very strongly (and unless, one might perhaps add, they had had instructions from Moscow in this sense).



Mojsov and his fellow publicists will have a far harder task, though, to counter proposals for some sort of Macedonian autonomy with no special Yugoslav association. The Bulgarian Party appears, wisely enough, to have given up the attempt to persuade Macedonians that they are really Bulgars, or that they would be happier as citizens of the Bulgarian People's Republic. Nor can they convincingly propose Pirin as a basis for some sort of autonomous Macedonia. But if they are still thinking in terms of an autonomy based on Aegean Macedonia, then they touch the Yugoslav Communist party in general, and Lazo Mojsov in particular, on a very weak spot indeed. Publicists here have surely been thinking of this possibility when driving home the not entirely convincing argument that all Macedonian autonomists without exception are the dupes or agents of Sofia. As I have indicated the autonomists can in no sense be described as the agents of Sofia; whether they will in due course become their dupes will depend on the skill and subtlety of the Bulgarian propaganda machine. Less convincing still is Skopje’s secondary argument that, pending a form of South Slav Federation acceptable to the Yugoslav Communist Party, a united Macedonia not; based on the People's Republic within the framework of Federal Yugoslavia is "unthinkable". At this point Mojsov completely abandons reasoned statement in favour of a mystical wrath and categorical assertion. He claims that those Macedonians (i.e. the Yugoslav Macedonians) who fought for and won their national independence within Yugoslavia have a natural right to lead the way to Macedonian unity, and that since Yugoslavia is in itself a federation of South Slav peoples, the incorporation of the rest of Macedonia in it, along with the Macedonian People's Republic, is an obvious next step. Vardar, says Mojsov, is in any case the natural heart of a united Macedonia, gliding calmly over what I believe to be a fact -namely, the existence of a fairly general feeling in Aegean Macedonia that the people of Vardar are backward and uncouth. Perhaps as a natural reaction on the part of the latter there is, I believe, a slight tendency here (certainly in other parts of Yugoslavia) to regard Aegean Macedonians as slackers.



Mojsov's assertion that Vardar is the natural heart and head of any united Macedonia is not likely to go unchallenged. His language at this stage of his “argument” is cautious and in rather general terms. He probably realizes he is skating on very thin ice which may expose him to the charge of Belgrade Chauvinism. Reading most of the Yugoslav Communist Party's Macedonian propaganda one might be excused for supposing the Macedonians quite entitled, if they so wish, to form a united Macedonia of their own. But this is just what Mojsov will not countenance, and he only just manages not to say in so many words that South Slav Federation is of less importance than the need to keep the Macedonian people's Republic firmly attached to Yugoslavia, and to add the rest of Macedonia to it as soon as the opportunity arises. It is difficult to see what else a Yugoslav publicist could say, given the post- Cominform situation in the Balkans, but this is certainly the weakest part of Mojsov's (and therefore of the Yugoslav Communist party's) case as far as Macedonians are concerned.



In the light of recent developments, it looks as if the first shots in what must surely develop into a high powered Macedonian propaganda campaign were in fact fired by Mito Hadzi Vasilev in his article in "Nova Makedonija" on 24 February (i.e. some days before Mosa Pijade opened up with his big guns on 6 March).Vasilev revealed, rather innocently, in a single brief sentence adduced in support of his charge of Bulgarian hypocrisy, that Mr. Visinsky's reference in Paris to the “Macedonian and Albanian minorities” in Greece had been reported by Tass and Pravda as "Bulgarian and Albanian" minorities. Since when, asked Vasilev curtly, had Tass been a mouthpiece for Bulgarian Chauvinism? - and in the rest of a nine-column article made no further reference to Soviet Policy or to Greece. He charged the Bulgarian Government with encouraging talk in Pirin (he did not say Aegean) Macedonia of a "free Macedonia not in Yugoslavia but in a South Slav Federation", and hinted darkly at the possible significance of the alleged Bulgarian claim that "Bulgaria's population will soon be increased from 7 m. to 10 m." If the Bulgarian leaders did not realize they were making a big mistake and mend their ways, said Vasilev, “invincible Life will teach them a cruel lesson to-day or to-morrow”. I do not know whether this is in fact the article which is said to have been quoted indirectly by The Times on 21 March (I have not yet seen the Times report but if so, then Vasilev certainly got no nearer to anything that could be called a threat of war than this prophecy about "invincible Life".



It may not be irrelevant to conclude this general review of the position in Macedonia by mentioning a conversation I had last December with an officer of the Yugoslav Army Engineers in Djevdjelija. He was a Bosnian, from a remote village in Krajina. I asked him whether there were many Macedonians in his unit on the frontier, and how he liked service in Macedonia. “Macedonians?”, he replied, “of course not – we’re mostly Bosnians and Montenegrins – you can’t expect a Macedonian to be any good at fighting. Wild people too - just savages – take the girls, they just run away when you chaps appear – as for dancing…… Give me Zagreb any day”.
from an email from R.Stefov

George, can you ask Chris (Risto) if he can provide scan images of the source documents because, IMHO, these typed versions can not be of any real academic or journalistic use to anyone?

[George S.]

Macedonian Struggle for Independence - Part 42 - Conclusion

Macedonian Struggle for Independence



Part 42 - Conclusion



By Risto Stefov

[email protected]

June 2011



I would like to conclude this book at this point in history as there is much too much that unfolded in Macedonia during the Second World War and beyond to place it all in one book. Summarizing it also will not do it justice so I will leave it for someone else to carry forward. I do however want to mention, for those who are interested, that I have written another book entitled “The Macedonians in Greece 1939 – 1949” which analyzes events that partake in what we Macedonians from Greece call “the terrible years”. Here is part of the book’s introduction as a preview of what the book is about:



Very little has been written about the Macedonians in Greece and their involvement in World War II and in the Greek Civil War. Macedonians who live in Greece to this day are afraid to speak of their terrible ordeals for fear of repercussions from the Greek authorities or because it is simply too painful for them to remember. To this day it is taboo in Greece to speak of the Greek Civil War.



The Macedonians in Greece it seems have been ignored by all sides. Yugoslavia has ignored them because it did not want to ruin its good relations with Greece. Greece on the other hand, to this day claims that Macedonians simply do not exist and wants no part of them. Bulgaria, even though it has a large Macedonian immigrant population from Greece, has yet to recognize the Macedonian people as a distinct ethnic group. So in reality no one really cares about the Macedonians in Greece and as a result very little to nothing has been written about them. “Indeed, the Macedonians in Greece are hardly ever mentioned in scholarly literature and have been virtually forgotten as a people and as a national minority.” (Andrew Rossos)



This is most unfortunate not only because the Macedonian contribution to the struggle against Fascism and Nazism has been completely omitted, but because the Macedonian people themselves living in Greece despite their contributions, have been completely ignored as if they didn’t exist.



In the chapters of the book “The Macedonians in Greece 1939 – 1949” I we will make an attempt to tell the Macedonian side of the story as it unfolded from a Macedonian point of view.



The story begins with an overview of events starting with Macedonia’s invasion, occupation and partition by Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria in 1912, 1913 to events leading up to the start of World War II.



A more detailed approach will then be taken to explain the Macedonian involvement in World War II and in the Greek Civil War.



This is not a story about battles fought and strategies applied but rather a story about the human factor and about struggles for equality and human rights. It is a story that will reveal, perhaps for the first time to English speakers, of how the Macedonians in Greece were treated by Greek authorities and by the Great Powers during the war years from 1939 to 1949.



Greece has accused the Macedonian people living in Greece of being autonomists, separatists, communists and even of being foreign agents. But as we will see, none of these accusations are true; the only things Macedonians are guilty of are struggling for equality and human rights.



In spite of all assurances made by the Macedonian leadership during World War II and during the Greek Civil War that it had no intention of leading an autonomist or separatist movement, the Greek leadership always remained suspicious and used every opportunity to stifle the Macedonian struggle.



Since the Macedonian people are of one ethnic group and recognize themselves as one ethnic Macedonian identity regardless of where they live, the term “Macedonians” will refer to all Macedonian people worldwide. References like “Macedonians in Greece” or “Macedonians in Canada” will mean “ethnic Macedonians living in Greece” or “ethnic Macedonians living in Canada”.



It is also important to emphasize at this point that the Macedonians living in Canada, Australia, the USA and other places outside of Macedonia are Macedonian migrants who over the years immigrated to those places, whereas the Macedonian people living in Macedonia are indigenous to Macedonia and have lived in Macedonia for many millennia. The Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian and Albanian people, who now live in Macedonia, are colonists who immigrated to Macedonia or were placed there by their respective states over the years, mostly after Macedonia’s occupation in 1912.



I decided to use “Greek occupied Macedonia” and “Bulgarian occupied Macedonia” to refer to those regions in order to bring attention to the plight of the Macedonian people living there. Even though Macedonians are indigenous to Macedonia and feel they are its original landowners and caretakers, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania by act of war occupied, partitioned and annexed Macedonia for themselves in 1912, 1913. Besides losing their lands, these Macedonians, especially those living in Greece and Bulgaria, since then have been economically deprived and culturally oppressed. They have been stripped of the right to call themselves Macedonian, practice their Macedonian culture and speak their Macedonian language. Since 1912 many have also been evicted from their homes, stripped from their lands, forcibly assimilated into foreign nations, tortured, jailed, murdered and denied their ethnic identity, language and culture simply because they are Macedonian. It is also evident that Macedonians have been denied economic opportunities like well paid jobs, positions of authority in government, positions in educational institutions, high positions in the military, etc. The reasons for this are obvious. By denying the Macedonians their ethnic identity Greece and Bulgaria can claim that Macedonians don’t exist and if Macedonians don’t exist there will be no claims laid to the lands they acquired illegally by war. Above that, both Bulgaria and Greece have adopted parts of the Macedonian heritage and thus have claimed parts of Macedonia’s history as their own. To acknowledge the existence of a Macedonian identity would then mean admission of cultural theft. Therefore from a Macedonian point of view to call those regions of Macedonia “occupied” is more than justifiable.



Yet, in spite of all this, the Macedonian people in Greece fought against Fascism and Nazism in World War II in order to help preserve Greece. They did this because they wanted to live in peace as equals to the Greeks, a concept the Greek mind cannot accept to this day.



Be it in World War II or in the Greek Civil War, the Macedonian people, proportionally speaking, bore the brunt of the wars. The heaviest battles during the Greek Civil War including the decisive ones, took part in Western Greek occupied Macedonia in the area bordering Yugoslavia and Albania. Greek occupied Macedonia served as a base for the political and military operations of the “democratic movement” and as the headquarters of both the Communist Party of Greece and its military wing the Democratic Army of Greece. Greek occupied Macedonia was also of strategic importance to the CPG because its allies Yugoslavia, Albania and Soviet Russia were located to the north and access to them could only be gained through the cooperation of the Macedonian people in Greece. “As one participant and close observer put it: ‘[They] were turned into military workshops for the DSE (DAG), where everyone, young and old, male and female, served the needs of the DSE (DAG).’” (Andrew Rossos)



Besides civilian cooperation, a proportionally large number of fighters had also joined the ranks of the left. “Reliable statistics do not exist, but Macedonians seem to have constituted only around a twentieth of the total population of about seven million. Their estimated representation in the DSE (DAG) ranged from more than a quarter in April 1947 to more than two-thirds in mid-1949. Risto Kirjazovski maintains that they numbered 5,250 out of 20,000 in April 1947; and Lieutenant Colonel Pando Vajnas claimed that in January 1948 there were about 11,000 Macedonian partisans in the DSE (DAG). According to C. M. Woodhouse, ‘they numbered 11,000 out of 25,000 in 1948, but 14,000 out of less than 20,000 by mid-1949.’” (Andrew Rossos)



Even though there was a proportionally large Macedonian contribution to both World War II and to the Greek Civil War there is very little to none attributed to the Macedonian people and to their sacrifices.



Besides addressing the Macedonian contribution, in the chapters that follow in the book “The Macedonians in Greece 1939 – 1949”, I will also address the violence and scare tactics the Greek State employed to counter the Macedonian struggle and the atrocities it committed in the process.



In doing research for this book I encountered the term “Slavo-Macedonians” used by authors, mostly by Greeks, to refer to ethnic Macedonians. The use of this term implies that there is more than one “variety” of Macedonian but outside of “Slavo-Macedonians” no “other type” of Macedonian was identified. So for the purpose of this write-up, as mentioned earlier, the term “Macedonians” will be used to refer to the ethnic Macedonians no matter where they live. Further, we Macedonians consider the term “Slavo-Macedonian” to be derogatory to the Macedonian people who self-identify as “Macedonians”. The term “Slavo-Macedonians” is intentionally employed by Greek authors to isolate and segregate Macedonians making them feel inferior, like foreigners on their own ancestral lands. The development of the modern Macedonian nation is no different than the development of any other modern nation but we don’t see the same authors use terms like “Slavo-Greek”, “Slavo-Bulgarian”, “Slavo-Serbian”, “Slavo-Albanian”, etc., to refer to other ethnicities even though elements of what make up the modern Macedonian nation are present in the Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian and Albanian nations.



Therefore we justifiably feel that the use of the term “Slavo-Macedonians” is intentional and unnecessary and we recommend that it not be used in any context to refer to ethnic Macedonians.



And since I began the introduction of the book “Macedonian Struggle for Independence” with a quote of one of my favourite authors I would also like to also end it with one;



“At the end of my book (“Macedonia Yesterday and Today”) devoted to Macedonia, I (Giorgio Nurigiani) should like to express once again my great affection for its gallant sons who are fighting today for a brighter and happier future. Their progress is manifest; what I was able to see in their towns and villages gave me sincere pleasure. One of my most cherished dreams has been realized: to see for myself the life and cultural rise of this reawakening people, which is today making heroic efforts to further its spiritual and material progress and strengthen its national consciousness.



There may be some people who will criticize me for not having spoken in my book about certain historical, ethnographical rights which Macedonia's present-day neighbours could put forward as claims. I consider it superfluous to raise this question now when we have before our eyes a Macedonian State, firm and immovable in its sacred title-deed:



Macedonia for the Macedonians!



Only through reconciliation and co-operation will it be possible to strengthen the foundations of a true and lasting peace, so indispensable today for nations both great and small. I have never in my life felt hatred for any people, and I have always believed that the most irreconcilable differences, potential causes of bloody human conflicts, can be solved only by justice, prudence and honest dealing between man and man, inspired by love, which alone brings human spirits together in brotherly concord.



My feelings towards the Macedonian people have always been disinterested and they will remain so in the future. I have never been interested in the political aspirations and claims of certain statesmen who adapt themselves to the interests of the moment. But I have always had faith in what is eternal in the heart of a people:



Its national consciousness!



During my last stay in Macedonia I was able to see it as it really is: kind, hospitable, free from any adventitious fanaticism, devoting all its energies to its creative development. Whether it will be able to justify all these efforts and sacrifices for its future existence will depend entirely on its heroic sons, conscious of their nationhood and always ready to die for their freedom and independence.” (Giorgio Nurigiani, “Macedonia Yesterday and Today”, pages 171 and 172)



The End.
from an email by R stefov.

[George S.]

From the Once Classified Files - Part 17

Department of National Health and Welfare

War Charities Division



Ottawa, April 23rd, 1947



Secretary of State For External Affairs, Ottawa



Attention Mr. Scott Reid



Dear Sir:



Your letter of April 11th to my Deputy Minister concerning Macedonian and Bulgarian activities in Toronto has been directed to me for reply.



Following your information received in November, 1946, one Mr. Pepcoff, 24 Sydenham street, Toronto, was informed by registered letter that we were aware of appeals for Macedonian relief were being conducted and that $ 15,000 had been collected for the purchase of supplies. We pointed out that the raising of funds for objects connected with the War could not be carried on without benefit of registration and that if they could not affiliate themselves with the registered organization in Toronto, which contributed to Yugoslav relief, they were to discontinue raising monies forthwith.



As no reply was received, on December 4th a request for an investigation was dispatched to the Commissioner of the R.CM.P. A copy of this letter is enclosed.



I have taken advantage of your letter to write the Commissioner and call his attention to the possible connection between the last named group and the individuals we heard about last Full. I am asking the Commissioner what progress might nave been made with regard to the investigation requested by the Department last December. As soon as word has been received from the constabulary I shall lost no time in getting in touch with you.



Yours sincerely,

Leon Trebert,

Registrar,

War Charities Act.



LT/MH





Draft Minute to Mr. Laffan







The following is a resume of the points I made when discussing with you your paper on Macedonia.



Paragraph 12



Were the Bulgarian Tsars Slavisized Turks or Tartars?



Paragraph 24



Two points seemed to me to require elaboration. The first was that there were really three Macedonian groups: (1) those agitating for complete independence; (2) those agitating for the inclusion of all Macedonia within Bulgaria; and (3) those willing for some form of compromise. The second point was about the Protoguerrovists. It is necessary to bring them into the picture because they link on to and explain Tito' Macedonian policy. Protogueroff split from Mihailoff because he was willing to co-operate with Agrarians and Serbs. His party moreover was subsidized by the Yugoslav Government.



Paragraph 28



Can we find out whether Petrich is now linked with the Greek railway system?



Paragraph 35



So long as Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are at loggerheads, Yugoslavia will require Greek and Turkish support to keep the Bulgars down. .Their interest in the acquisition of Salonika would therefore from the purely strategic point of view be problematical, because it would not merely weaken Greece in itself, but, by depriving the Turks and Greeks of a common frontier, weaken the whole defensive system on which any form of Balkan entente directed against Bulgaria would have to be founded. Naturally if Yugoslavia and Bulgaria came to terms, the position would be different. The main Serbian interest in Salonika (see paragraphs 35 and 37) is at present historical or connected with prestige.



Serbian and (see paragraph 42) Bulgarian economic interest in Salonika is at the moment somewhat indeterminate. If the trade of these countries is mainly to be with Europe, or with Russia, the economic importance of Salonika to either will be very small. How far this country or America will take Yugoslav or Bulgarian produce after the war is very doubtful.



Paragraphs 38, 39 and 49



Salonika for the Greeks is as important strategically and economically as it is ethnically. The town and its hinterland are the richest of the Greek provinces and as we know from the present war, Salonika is essential to the defense of Greece.



Paragraph 47



A greater Yugoslavia, including Bulgaria especially under Russian influence, would almost certainly be, objectionable to us.

Though in pre-war days the Russians may have favoured the idea of a Balkan federation, we can now say quite definitely that they regard it askance.





Editor Krapched Explains why Bulgaria Can Not Accept Anglo-American Demands for the Evacuation of Recent Armed Territories



February 14, 1944



No. 2434 (R-2260)

American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey



SUBJECT: Editor Krapched Explains why Bulgaria Can Not Accept Anglo-American Demands for the Evacuation of Recent Armed Territories



Sir:



I have the honor to present below an editorial from the Bulgarian newspaper ZORA of February 6, 1944, in which the Editor, Mr. Krapchev, explains why Bulgaria can not accept the demands made by the Anglo-Americans for the evacuation of the recently annexed territories. The reason he gives is that actually these demands are based on the perpetuation of the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly, a treaty which Bulgarians have always regarded as unjust and intolerable.



Mr. Krapchev reviews some of the circumstances connected with the Treaty of Neuilly as he interprets them. He regards the Treaty of Neuilly, and the other treaties signed at Paris in 1919, as the primary cause of the present war. He points out that these treaties were imposed by force upon the conquered, and that without the participation of Russia. He adds that similar conditions were imposed upon the Soviet Union. In their demand that Bulgaria evacuate Macedonia and Thrace the Anglo- Americans merely indicate that their first demand with respect to Bulgaria is the restoration of the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly.



The second condition which they lay down is equally impossible, the writer says, for it demands that Bulgaria make war upon Germany.



These demands can not be accepted by Bulgaria because they would restore an intolerable situation and, even if accepted, would not be the final demands, for they would be followed by others just as the terms of the Armistice of Salonika, which were not altogether intolerable, were followed by other harsher demands at Paris. All Bulgarians, the writer says, remember conditions in Bulgaria following the Treaty of Neuilly between 1919 and the beginning of the Second World War, a period in which Bulgaria' s neighbors did not cease to interfere in her affairs, as far as they were able, and to terrorize her.



In commenting on this editorial one is obliged to point out that Mr. Krapchev vails--as he fails in all his editorials-- to refer to the fact that Bulgaria of her own free will and without provocation declared war upon the United States and Great Britain in December 1941. This was a wholly wanton act, although doubtless performed at the urgency and insistence of Germany, but still performed by the Bulgarian government acting as a sovereign power. At that time there was no hostility felt by Americans against Bulgaria, although Bulgaria had given great offense by providing bases for the German army from which the latter attacked Greece and Yugoslavia. Hence Mr. Krapchev should make clear to his countrymen why it is that the Anglo-Americans demand that Bulgaria evacuate the territories she has occupied in connection with this war. Mr. Krapchev is quite right when he states that many British and American writers and leaders in the past supported the rightness of Bulgaria's demands to Macedonia and to an outlet on the Aegean Sea in Thrace. Every person informed on Macedonian affairs knows that Bulgarians predominate by a large majority in the population of that part of Macedonia included in Yugoslavia in accordance with the terms of the treaties of Bucharest and Neuilly. Everyone also knows that the application of the term "South Serbia" to Macedonia and "South Serbians" to the Macedonians is only political camouflage and has no more actual justification than to call the Irish "West Anglians".



By declaring war on the United States and Great Britain Bulgaria put herself in a blind alley from which there appears to be no exit except by giving up the territories annexed after Apri1, 1941. Nobody believes that this would be an act of justice, for war does not create justice, but rather promotes injustice of every kind. "He that taketh up the sword shall perish by the sword", whether right or wrong.



Mr. Krapchev's final assumption that the demand to evacuate Macedonia and Thrace, plus the demand to make war on Germany, would be followed by other demands is probably true, but Mr. Krapchev and other Bulgarians who advocated the seizure of these territories following Bulgaria's alliance with the Axis should have thought of all this before they have committed themselves and their country to such a policy.



The editorial in free translation reads as follows:



THEY WISH TO PERPETUATE INJUSTICES



By Danail Krapchev



"When one knows what the Anglo-Americans demand of Bulgaria first of all--because this demand is number 1 --he understands that as far as she is concerned they are going back to the Treaty of Neuilly, to the treaties of Paris of 1919. And these ill-omened treaties-acknowledged as such not only by the conquered but also by eminent English and Americans-- brought on the Second .World War. Even the aged Lloyd George withdrew from the unwelcome work in which he, together with the late Clemenceau, took an active part and predicted, though rather late, the Second World War. The late American President Wilson, who went to the Paris Conference with a definite program, as is known from the memoir of his helper Lansing, the second American delegate to the Conference, considered himself betrayed and died tragically of regret in his native land. The tragedy of his predecessor is best known to President Roosevelt who was then his Minister.



Besides we must recall that the Paris treaties were imposed on the conquered at the" end of the First World War without Russia's participation. And not only this: they were imposed on the Soviet Union as well.



It is these ominous treaties of peace, signed with the knife at the throats of the conquered, that the Anglo-Americans wish to perpetuate, to become the corner stone of human history.



Otherwise what does the Anglo-American invitation to Bulgaria mean when they ask her to evacuate the Bulgarian lands liberated in 1941, what does it mean if not the perpetuation of the injustices committed toward her at Neuilly? The demand is that we should evacuate the newly liberated Bulgarian lands--and this is the first demand-- lands which were taken away from us by force after the First World War, but also those which were taken away from us by force during the war between the Balkan allies (1913) by our former allies.



The Anglo-Americans wish to make the injustices committed toward the Bulgarian nation in the course of history, in the course of centuries, permanent, even including those injustices against which the English protested at that time. Even those treaties which do not beat the signature of the Americans, as in the case with regard to Western Thrace. This of course is demand number one, after which the other numbers follow. The second of these is to make war on Germany. Other demands will follow later, as was the case after the First World War, when at the Armistice of Salonika somewhat more tolerable conditions were imposed, but later at Neuilly they were made ten times more severe. These conditions affected even the oldest territories, as the Western Frontiers. They also affected the army, while preparations and restitutions were imposed upon us. Nothing was left of Bulgarian sovereignty. Our neighbors continually and un-interruptedly made Bulgaria's conditions worse up to the eve of the Second World War. Bulgaria was constantly terrorized and humiliated, while the Bulgarian nation was torn and enslaved.



Only he who has a short memory has forgotten the not distant past, which the Anglo-Americans desire to perpetuate."



Respectfully yours, Burton Y. Berry, American Consul General

To Department in original and hectograph

FHB; SA. File No.891
From email from R Stefov

[George S.]

From the Once Classified Files - Part 18

External Affairs – Ottawa



Athens, April 27, 1948



No. 87. Following for D.M.I. from Military Attaché, Begins:



M.A. 28. Civil war period 12th to 26th April.



1. Rebel activity still widespread. Looting, sabotage, recruiting raids continue, especially Poloponnese. Few major rebel incidents, mainly Peloponnese. First phase G.N.A. general offensive commenced April 15th in Roumeli area.

Operation given code word “dawn”.



2. Minor rebel activity confined to sabotage of road-rail communications, especially Peloponnese, shelling communication Northern Greece, looting and recruiting raids all areas, especially Peloponnese. Rebel units Voulgara area, X88, reported moving northwest, probable due to operation “dawn”. Being pursued by G.N.A. commando units. April 11th, strong rebel band attacked Kalavrita, c.9760, killed or captured entire garrison of two N.D.C. companies. G.N.A. drove rebels out of town and clashes continue in Mount Aroania area, D. 04.



3. G.N.A. operations in Khaicsidiki are peninsula east of Salonica and in Papadhes area, K. 9817, resulted in considerable rebel casualties and kept them on the move. April 13th, G.N.A. clashes with band of 500 strong in Mount Khasia area, S. 96, and captured 134 rebels. G.N.A. generally taking more offensive attitude. April 15th, operation “dawn” commenced with three divisions. Embassy cable No. 79 of April 16th refers. April 25th, G.N.A. units closing ring had reached general line X.9317.





Fleece No. 212



February 6, 1945





For Foreign Secretary from Foreign Office



Please refer to paragraph 9 of FLEECE 89 reporting the Soviet Government’s view on Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation.



2. Tito has been careful not to give us a hint of negotiations for Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance and mutual understanding, and in reply to our representations has confined himself to an assurance that federation is not an immediate probability. There have, however, been so many recent signs of friendship between the two countries that this development, however unwelcome, does not come as a surprise.



3. It seems to us here that most of the disadvantages seen in respect of a federation apply to a lesser degree to a pact is intended to be the first step towards a federation. If a pact were concluded, Bulgaria would escape from much of the treatment which she deserves of a defeated enemy and the reactions on the position of Greece would be unfavourable. We think that we should take the line that an enemy state under an armistice regime is debarred from entering into special treaty relations with another state, especially with which she is still technically in a state of war, except with the explicit permission of the victorious powers with whom it concluded the armistice; and that we should insist on full reparation being made to Greece before Bulgaria may conclude the projected alliance.



4. It would be a great help if you could arrange for this subject of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations to be discussed at the present meeting. You will remember that the U.S. Government have not yet given their views in reply to our request.



Circulation:



The King

War Cabinet

Secretary of State for Dominions

Lord Privy Seal

Secretary of State for air

Minister of Production

Minister of Information

Foreign Office

Mr. Pack

Defense Office







Foreign Office - January 1945



My telegram No. 4886 to Moscow.



In the light of Belgrade telegrams Nos. 47 and 88 and your telegram No. 108, you will see from my telegram No. 85 to Belgrade that we have now instructed Brigadier Maclean to make to Tito a communication on the lines foreshadowed in paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference. You should also immediately inform the Bulgarian Government of the views of H.M.G. on the following lines:



While H.M.G would welcome a confederation between all the Balkan States, both Allied and enemy and including possibly Turkey, they could not approve an exclusive union of federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Moreover while H.M.G are prepared to agree to the creation of a Macedonian State in the future federal Yugoslavia they would be strongly opposed to the creation of a Greater Macedonian State involving claims on Greek territory. They therefore look with disfavour on the activities of Macedonian propagandists in Bulgaria which the Bulgarian Government appear to have condoned and they do not recognize the right of the Bulgarian Government to transfer without the consent of the United Nations any part of Bulgarian territory to the Yugoslav federal State of Macedonia.





My telegram No.10823 of 28th December:



His Majesty's Government's view on Macedonian question and Yugoslav Bulgarian federation.



Tito, who has not yet been notified of views of His Majesty's Government, has expressed himself in conversation with Maclean as opposed to a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation at the present time. Question arose over a report which had reached Tito that General Velebit his representative in London had informed the press that Albania and Bulgaria would join the new Yugoslav Federal State. After reference to London Maclean informed Tito on 8th January that there appeared to be no truth in the report. Tito expressed relief and went on to say that, although he did not exclude the possibility of an eventual extension of Yugoslav federation at some period in the future, there was no question of either Bulgaria or Albania entering into any federal union with Yugoslavia at present. In case of Bulgaria in particular Tito was not ready for such a step. As he had pointed out to a Bulgarian delegation who had visited him the day before with polite messages the Bulgarians had, on several occasions in the past, sworn eternal friendship to the Serbs but this had not prevented them from turning on them and massacring them at first opportunity. It would take the Serbs some time to forget the behaviour of Bulgaria in three wars.



At the same time there was no point in perpetuating such enmity, and, if good relations could be achieved, it would be to everyone's advantage.



2. This assurance taken with the assurance in regards to Greek Macedonia reported in telegraph 2 of my telegram under reference indicates that at any rate for the present Tito’s views on these questions are substantially in conformity with those of His Majesty’s Government.



3, I am anxious that to avoid the risk of subsequent misunderstandings our views should be communicated formally to Tito, the Yugoslav Government in London and the Bulgarian Government as soon as possible. On the other hand I should not like to do so before being assured that these views are not materially at variance with those of the United States Government and Soviet Government. I suggest therefore that you should communicate the gist of the foregoing paragraph to the State Department and inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that we propose to notify Tito, the Yugoslav Government and the Bulgarian Government of the views of His Majesty’s Government on 18th January (repeat 18th January) unless we hear before then that the United States and Soviet Governments see objection to this procedure.
From an email from r stefov

[indigen]

Hi George,
All these posts of "classified files" are quite valuable and should, IMO be placed into one SINGLE topic thread.

Secondly, have you asked Chris (Risto) about providing scan images of the original source as these posts on their own, IMO, are not suitable for academic use.

So pocit,
I.

[George S.]

HI Indigen,
Good idea i will ask admin about putting them on one thread,
& i'll find out if the originals can be made available for academic use.

[George S.]

From the Once Classified Files - Part 19

Free European Movements

Dropping of Leaflets



April 13, 1951



Dispatch No 357



From The Charge d’Affairs a.i., Belgrade, Yugoslavia



To The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada



On the night of March 22, or 23 leaflets were dropped in this country by an identified aircraft. I am enclosing two samples of the leaflets, one in Bulgarian and the other in Albanian. Several thousands of the Bulgarian leaflets were dropped along the line Nis-Topola-Zagreb and the Albanian leaflets near the Albanian border. I am enclosing a translation of the Bulgarian leaflet but have not yet been able to obtain a translation of the Albanian one.



2. You will note that the Bulgarian leaflet refers to Radio Geryanin “the voice of the BROTHERHOOD FOR BULGARIAN FREEDOM”. It is, of course, obvious that both lots of leaflets were not intended to be dropped in this country.



3. The day after they were dropped, Mr. Mates asked Sir Charles Peake to call on him, and Mates gave it as his opinion that the leaflets had been dropped by Italian aircraft. There is, however, no proof of Mates’ statement and I am inclined to think that Mates may be blaming the Italians mainly because he cannot think of anyone better to blame.



4. In some respects the leaflets bear a resemblance to leaflets prepared by the American O.S.S during the war and it is not uninteresting that the U.S. Ambassador has said that he is not in a position to state definitely that they were not fact prepared in the United States. I gather from this remark that he is not kept informed of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other agency which may be conducting propaganda of this kind, and is, therefore, unable to make a definite statement.



5. Whoever is responsible for dropping the leaflets, however, their propaganda efforts appear to be, to say the least, premature and I should be interested to know whether you are able to throw any light on their origin.



6. On the evening of March 30 I dined with Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong at the British Embassy and took the opportunity of asking him to what extent the U.S. Government was supporting so-called free national movements outside Yugoslavia. I gathered from his remarks that the State Department has at least given tacit approval to some of these so-called free movements, although he added that, as is usual with such movements, there is a great deal of internal squabbling. I was, however, interested to see from the New York Times of February 12 that a declaration by the Yugoslav National Committee in the United States had been signed by most of the prominent Yugoslavs there, including Fotitch and Machek. From the reports in the Times it would appear that Machet has buried the hatchet at least temporarily with some of his political opponents outside this country.



7. While our high Commissioner in London has already sent me some information on the European Movement and the National Committee for Free Europe in the United States (Canada House dispatch No. 2369 of October 4, 1950), I should be interested to receive as much information as you may have available on Yugoslav political movements outside this country, support which is being given to them by either the U.S. or U.K. Governments. In the same connection I should be interested in similar information concerning such movements of Hungarians, Roumanians, Bulgarians and Albanians.



8. In my opinion it would be unfortunate if any or all of the Western powers support a free movement of Yugoslavs outside this country in the present circumstances. The Yugoslav authorities are suspicious enough of the ultimate motives of the Western powers and if we wish to get anywhere with them on the kind of strategic problems raised in my Dispatch No. 304 of March 31, 1951, it would be undesirable for any of the Western governments to give support to an outside political movement at this time. In any case, I doubt whether any of the individuals involved in the Yugoslav movement in the United States would be acceptable to the bulk of the population in the country. It seems to me much more desirable to support the present Yugoslav regime insofar as this is necessary to meet current defense plans and to avoid deterioration of the economic situation in this country to the point where the regime would be threatened. Quite apart from these considerations, while it is still too soon to say how far party doctrine may be modified in the long run, there is at least some hope modification may take place on a permanent footing. It would, in my opinion, be preferable to attempt gradually to bring about such modifications rather than make an effort to overthrow the regime through support given to a political movement of émigrés, whose return to Yugoslavia could hardly result in anything but internal strife.



(Can’t make out signature)

Charge d’Affairs a.i.





Memorandum for Defense Liaison



A.F. Broadbridge /dg

April 27, 1951



Attention Mr. McCrdick



I refer to dispatch 357 of April 13 from the Legation in Belgrade concerning Free European Movement: Dropping of Leaflets.



You will, no doubt, be interested in the translation of the Bulgarian leaflet which apparently were dropped inadvertently upon Yugoslav territory.



Mr. Crean also comments on the free national movement outside Yugoslavia and in paragraph 8, he gives his opinion that it would be unfortunate if any or all of the Western powers supported a free movement of Yugoslavia at this time. I do not think we would wish to dispute this point. However, he does not ask for information on Yugoslav movements outside the country and before I make a reply, I should be grateful for any comments you might wish to make on this matter.



European Division.



A.F. Broadbridge





From Belgrade to Foreign office



January 16th, 1945



Brigadier Maclean

No. 61



The Anti-Fascist Assembly for National Liberation of Macedonia asks that the following message be conveyed to the Prime Minister.



“The delegates of Anti-Fascist Assembly for National Liberation of Macedonia who have met together for their second session in Skopje, capital of Federal Macedonia, wish to salute you and people of Great Britain for the contribution which you and the British people have made towards the defeat of the common foe of all freedom loving people – German fascism.



By manifesting today their firm attachment to the cause of the new federal Yugoslavia, the Macedonian people show once again their desire and readiness to live as a free and equal people in democratic federal Yugoslavia.



In the name of the Macedonian people we pledge ourselves to strive with ever increasing effort to take part in the onward march of the armies of the freedom loving people towards Berlin the lair of the Fascist beast.”



[Copies sent to Prime Minister.]



O.T.P.





From Foreign Office to Moscow



March 17th, 1945



No. 1323



IMPORTANT



Your telegram No.781A [of March 13th: Yugoslav- Bulgarian relations].



Principle object of our representations is to avert the danger of joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian pressure on Greece to surrender western Thrace. Sa1onika has been traditionally coveted both by Yugoslavia and by Bulgaria and this division of interest has made it easier in the past for Greece to resist pressure from either side. Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact would remove this safeguard and enable claim for Salonika to be put forward as a general Slav interest. If the pact included, as seems possible, an undertaking by Bulgaria to cede territory to the Yugoslav Macedonian State, there would be an added danger of a strongly backed demand for the satisfaction of traditional Macedonian aspirations at the expense of Greece. These dangers would be intensified by actual federation; and it must also be borne in mind that a pact would be likely to be a first step towards eventual federation.



2. We are also concerned to see that Greece’s reparation claims on Bulgaria are satisfied. Consequence of Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact would probably be that priority would be given to Yugoslavia’s claims over those of Greece. This is indeed already happening and the tendency would be increased by the conclusion of a formal pact. It will be an incentive to Bulgaria to give satisfaction to Greece if the Great Powers make it clear that Bulgaria cannot be granted any favours or be allowed to progress on the way to rehabilitation, until she shows a genuine willingness to carry out all the Armistice terms including the payment of reparation to Greece and the restitution of Greek properly.



3. Lastly the position in the Balkans is still far too confused to make it desirable that any adjustment of the relations between the Balkan States should be made at this stage. Pacts and treaties, especially those of an exclusive nature, should wait until conditions are more settled and the balance of relations between the Balkan States is more stable.

from email from r stefov