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4.3. Interethnic educational situation after Ohrid
Ethnic segregation has grown since the armed conflict in 2001. And Macedonia’s education system is the most visible symbol of this development. It allows different ethnic groups to study separately and parallel systems of education in various languages have developed and are supported at each level. There has been very little movement in the direction of bi- or multi-lingual education. The term ‘bilingual education’ is not used in either the old constitution or in the OFA.
Taking advantage of opportunities offered by this system, different ethnic groups attend separate classes at preschool, primary and secondary school levels, where they are taught solely in their native tongue except for the obligatory Macedonian lessons. Since 2004 there has been a new third state university, which belongs to the Albanian community with courses in the Albanian language. Even in ethnically mixed schools, where all students study under the same roof, separation and lack of communication between different ethnic groups is the norm during breaks and extracurricular activities. Most schools schedule different “school shifts” for different ethnic groups to avoid conflict situations.
The commencing institutionalisation of segregated education by setting up separate school administrations in some cases, where they were once joint, is extremely dangerous. This means that teachers of different ethnic groups have little or no contact with each other. Ethnically split parents’ councils do not cooperate effectively. Above all, there is the assumption that the ministry is also ethnically split. In interviews it became clear that even at the ministerial level communication does not function well. In addition, there is a worrisome trend of insufficient learning of the state language. Some ethnic minorities groups show increasing resentment of having to study the language of the “other”, which is often perceived as “an act of weakness”.
Education-related conflicts emerged after the parliamentary elections in 2002. Several demonstrations were arranged, predominantly from the Secondary School Student Union of Macedonia, which have been influenced by the Slavic opposition party. Disputes over secondary level education emerged in Skopje, Bitola and Kumanovo. In 2003, numerous physical fights between students in Skopje forced the police to take special measures to prevent such incidents. School conflicts are highly politicised and they are radicalising the young generation. The provocative changing of names of schools, from former Slavic names to Albanian ones and the placing of controversial monuments, especially in the western part of the country, are increasing interethnic tensions. The fight between the ethnic groups for the national identity is to extending to the education sector and is distributed at the local level.
Ethnic segregation has grown since the armed conflict in 2001. And Macedonia’s education system is the most visible symbol of this development. It allows different ethnic groups to study separately and parallel systems of education in various languages have developed and are supported at each level. There has been very little movement in the direction of bi- or multi-lingual education. The term ‘bilingual education’ is not used in either the old constitution or in the OFA.
Taking advantage of opportunities offered by this system, different ethnic groups attend separate classes at preschool, primary and secondary school levels, where they are taught solely in their native tongue except for the obligatory Macedonian lessons. Since 2004 there has been a new third state university, which belongs to the Albanian community with courses in the Albanian language. Even in ethnically mixed schools, where all students study under the same roof, separation and lack of communication between different ethnic groups is the norm during breaks and extracurricular activities. Most schools schedule different “school shifts” for different ethnic groups to avoid conflict situations.
The commencing institutionalisation of segregated education by setting up separate school administrations in some cases, where they were once joint, is extremely dangerous. This means that teachers of different ethnic groups have little or no contact with each other. Ethnically split parents’ councils do not cooperate effectively. Above all, there is the assumption that the ministry is also ethnically split. In interviews it became clear that even at the ministerial level communication does not function well. In addition, there is a worrisome trend of insufficient learning of the state language. Some ethnic minorities groups show increasing resentment of having to study the language of the “other”, which is often perceived as “an act of weakness”.
Education-related conflicts emerged after the parliamentary elections in 2002. Several demonstrations were arranged, predominantly from the Secondary School Student Union of Macedonia, which have been influenced by the Slavic opposition party. Disputes over secondary level education emerged in Skopje, Bitola and Kumanovo. In 2003, numerous physical fights between students in Skopje forced the police to take special measures to prevent such incidents. School conflicts are highly politicised and they are radicalising the young generation. The provocative changing of names of schools, from former Slavic names to Albanian ones and the placing of controversial monuments, especially in the western part of the country, are increasing interethnic tensions. The fight between the ethnic groups for the national identity is to extending to the education sector and is distributed at the local level.
Summing up, the forward-looking OFA pacified the country but did not dispel the underlying problems in the complex conflict structure of Macedonian society. Although educational policy was always a major problem between the two largest ethnic communities in the RM, it is nearly untouched in the Agreement.
Today it is obvious that the implementation of the agreement increasingly divides the main ethnic groups. On the one hand, the Macedonian population is dissatisfied in spite of all the concessions. On the other hand, the Albanian community claims that the implementation is undermined by delays and lack of (political) will. In addition to this, their expectation that they would achieve an equal position in the state, in which they were considered to be a non-majority, has not been met.
The increasingly worrying politicisation of the education issue and the danger that separation along ethnic lines might continue has not been sufficiently addressed at the state level. The consequence of the physical separation is that children are growing up in territorial and educational isolation, in a deeply politicised environment. Prejudices and stereotypes become more entrenched and there is an increasing tendency for Albanians from predominantly Albanian areas not to speak the state language fluently. This will put members of minority groups “in a position of linguistic and professional ghettoisation”. Otherwise, there are hardly any ethnic Macedonians, who are able to speak Albanian. Seeing that after the implementation of the OFA and the new language rights mostly everything is bilingual, communication could become more difficult at all levels.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the decentralisation approach, one core element of the OFA and a non-negotiable process for further EU integration, will be able to de-escalate the ethnic tensions in the educational sector. Instead of passing sustainable laws, which guarantee the inter-ethnic balance, “it seems the decentralisation implementation is used as a mean for speeding EU accession, rather than as a goal in itself“. Political parties influenced the reforms implemented in the educational policy. The political party decision-making is superimposed on all other spheres of social life; this is directly linked with widespread corruption and nepotism. As long as the political elites are only protecting the interests of their own ethnic groups, the interethnic situation will not change for the better. On the contrary, the development of a national identity is prevented by the identity policy of the parties to the conflict, promoting differences at the local level; this, in turn, creates a culture of cronyism.
The new power-sharing system, attributed to the OFA, cannot function effectively in such an environment. Decentralisation seems to be a universal remedy for the EU. But it is not. The agreement creates specific new consequences without, however, providing structures for their solution. Decentralisation has been able to freeze neither interethnic segregation nor politicisation and these will continue to be transferred from the state to the local level.
Today it is obvious that the implementation of the agreement increasingly divides the main ethnic groups. On the one hand, the Macedonian population is dissatisfied in spite of all the concessions. On the other hand, the Albanian community claims that the implementation is undermined by delays and lack of (political) will. In addition to this, their expectation that they would achieve an equal position in the state, in which they were considered to be a non-majority, has not been met.
The increasingly worrying politicisation of the education issue and the danger that separation along ethnic lines might continue has not been sufficiently addressed at the state level. The consequence of the physical separation is that children are growing up in territorial and educational isolation, in a deeply politicised environment. Prejudices and stereotypes become more entrenched and there is an increasing tendency for Albanians from predominantly Albanian areas not to speak the state language fluently. This will put members of minority groups “in a position of linguistic and professional ghettoisation”. Otherwise, there are hardly any ethnic Macedonians, who are able to speak Albanian. Seeing that after the implementation of the OFA and the new language rights mostly everything is bilingual, communication could become more difficult at all levels.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the decentralisation approach, one core element of the OFA and a non-negotiable process for further EU integration, will be able to de-escalate the ethnic tensions in the educational sector. Instead of passing sustainable laws, which guarantee the inter-ethnic balance, “it seems the decentralisation implementation is used as a mean for speeding EU accession, rather than as a goal in itself“. Political parties influenced the reforms implemented in the educational policy. The political party decision-making is superimposed on all other spheres of social life; this is directly linked with widespread corruption and nepotism. As long as the political elites are only protecting the interests of their own ethnic groups, the interethnic situation will not change for the better. On the contrary, the development of a national identity is prevented by the identity policy of the parties to the conflict, promoting differences at the local level; this, in turn, creates a culture of cronyism.
The new power-sharing system, attributed to the OFA, cannot function effectively in such an environment. Decentralisation seems to be a universal remedy for the EU. But it is not. The agreement creates specific new consequences without, however, providing structures for their solution. Decentralisation has been able to freeze neither interethnic segregation nor politicisation and these will continue to be transferred from the state to the local level.
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