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Only 2 are owned by Prosvige....greeks?

Hi stranger welcome to the house of pain .. hahahaha. You do an excellent job (supporter) and should be proud.

Oh, when Risto and Lucy operated the restaurant they always had something called "Macedonian" on the menu. Do Chinese own that location now?

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YouTube - Zoran Vanev - Anita

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AEGEAN MACEDONIA NAMES & TOPONYMS

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YouTube - Прес на Илија Димовски (17.03.2011)

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YouTube - Neli ti Rekov - Zapri Dozdu

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British Embassy - ATHENS

March 3rd, 1947

Dear James,

The following is an extract from a letter dated 10th February which we have received from our Consul at Corfu :

“Recently I visited the prison of Corfu where six hundred prisoners are incarcerated, having most been sentenced by the special Collaboration Courts before the coming into force of the Emergency Measures Act of June 1945.

The capacity of the prison is one hundred and thirty prisoners and of the present inmates three hundred and thirty-three are communists and eight-five were convicted of normal crime.

By interrogation it was ascertained that while in Salonika Prison, prisoners awaiting transportation to Corfu sent a list of their names to “ORIM” an organization founded in 1903 for the independence of Macedonia, address:- Secretary Nicholaos Papa, Anastasio Rallis (a school teacher) 9 Dean Street, Toronto, Canada, One hundred cheques of twenty dollars each have since been received by various prisoners from this source which were dispatched from Toronto in the name if individuals and not of the organization, although the accompanying letters are all written in the same handwriting.

This organization is alleged to have assisted one hundred and thirty-two families from the village of Vasiliyadis near Kastoria, to immigrate to Canada and pre-war distributed funds via Bulgaria . It is said that the procedure in 1932-1933 was for Macedonians in Greece to immigrate to Canada via Istanbul and Sofia whence they continued their journey provided with Bulgarian passports.”

We have no evidence here to support or deny this story of the activities of “ORIM”, but we think you may like to know about it and look into it.

We should very much like to know the outcome of any enquiries you may make, meanwhile we also will attempt to find more.

Yours ever, (signed) John Tahourdin.

J. George, Esq.,
Canadian Embassy, Athens

British Embassy Belgrade

April 15, 1947

I was greatly interested to read what Frank Roberts had to say in his letter of the 3rd of February to you about his conversation with Quaroni, and I have now had an opportunity to think about your letter N. 2364/389/38 of the 26th February on the same subject.

2. I must own to a certain diffidence in expressing my views on a question of the kind that after being in this country for comparatively so short a time, and, to adapt a saying of Pascal, I don’t as yet know enough to write you a short letter, and I must ask you to bear with a long one.

3. In the first place, Yugoslavia to my mind represents an entirely different picture from that displayed by any other European country except Russia . Here Communism hiding under the cloak of the National Liberation Movement, has won an outright victory and reigns unchallenged. Before, therefore, attempting to answer Quaroni’s question, it is perhaps worth while taking a brief glance at the past, to see how the present situation in Yugoslavia came about.

4. When, in 1941, Tito began to organize the armed rising, which took place in June of that year, although in all probability he was acting in complete independence of Moscow, yet he must have been confident of eventual Russian support since he had been trained in Moscow where he seems to have been regarded as an excellent organizer and an able and far sighted man. Little was known of him in his own country, except by his fellow communists, nor had he made - for himself a reputation as a military leader, for, contrary to popular belief, he was never in Spain at the time of the Civil war, during which he sat at Besancon organizing a depot for recruits and supplies. But when his hour struck he quickly proved himself to be a commander of genius, with a remarkable power of injecting enthusiasm and a sense of unity into all manner of diverse elements, and welding them into a Movement of National Liberation. Not the least of his achievements was the programme which resulted from the Jajce Congress of November 1943. It was not a communist programme, the emphasis being entirely upon the new and national Yugoslavia . One of its avowed aims was to put an end to the persecution and internecine strife that had always been an element of disruption in the country between the two great wars. It had, that is to say, a strong element of reputable nationalism. This was the alternative he offered to his countrymen who, if they wished to play their part in ridding their country of the invader, had either to throw in their lot with him or to join Mihailovic, whose aim was to restore the monarchy, and with it the old dominance of Serbia in the tripartite kingdom.

5. The result was that there rallied to Tito's side many who were fired by the ideal of a united Yugoslavia in which internal strife would cease and all efforts would be bent to increasing the country's prosperity and position in the world. The majority of these did not, and I believe do not care a fig for theoretical communism. Many, indeed, must dislike it, and this, I think, applies in large measure to the, Army where, however, the officers owe their social position to Tito, without whom they would revert to being errand boys and boot blacks. But they also put up with it because they are imbued with the Slav ideal; their thoughts are bent on their country, its expansion end its hegemony in the Balkans, and they believe that this regime has a better chance of achieving these aims than any other. In short, it was not least by his ability to project the one idea which could attract and hold these differing elements that Tito was able to make himself Prime Minister or the first united Yugoslavia in 1945. The rest is soon told. The young communists who had been in and out of prison with him before the war and who had shared with him the perils and difficulties of his campaigns were quickly moved into key positions, and the regime was started on its way. Here it is, and here it looks like staying. Tito's own power has waned while that or his associates has waxed, but his position in the country, end still more with the Army, remains undiminished and continues to be built up.

6. The reason is easy to see. This is a minority government, and it is well aware of the fact. It enjoys complete power, and is determined, come what may, to hold on to it. But to remain in power it is necessary first and foremost to be sure of the Army, in which communists are by no means in the majority. This is where Tito is a godsend to the Government, and it is one of the chief reasons why his prestige must at all costs be maintained. To the Army he is presented not as a communist but as a great military leader by whom his country achieved its freedom. Indeed, in this one respect only Stalin and Russia are pushed into the background. To the army it is nothing but Tito all the time. The marching songs sung by the Yugoslav soldiers as they go about their business have for their sole theme the exploits of the Marshal, his tribulations, his battles and his victories. The nationalist ideas in the Jajce programme are kept constantly before them, and their gaze is directed as much externally to the territorial expansion of Yugoslavia as it is internally to the liquidation of Yugoslav political opponents of the present regime. No effort is, or course, being spared to indoctrinate the rising generation with the communist creed, but some years must pass before there is on Army which can be counted on for certain to be politically reliable. Until this happens Tito as a leader is indispensable and the nationalist sentiments of the army are given full rein and even encouraged in every way. It is worth recording that the Russians have themselves encouraged such sentiments. Marshal Tolbukin stayed a minimum of time in this country and, as far as we can judge, with an eye to the morale of the Yugoslav Army made every effort to withdraw his troops as quickly as possible. The Russians at that time went so far as to put it about that some victories which they themselves gained had been the work of the Partisans. They would obviously go to particular lengths in this direction in the early days when they were anxious to build up the regime. Their policy does not however seem radically to have changed in the intervening period. The Russian military instructors here are kept fairly discreetly in the background and the Yugoslav army certainly could not complain that it does not receive sufficient encouragement and praise from Russian sources.

7. This then is the historical background against which we have to judge the political thought and tendencies of the present government. The relevant points are, I think

(i) The regime built itself without Russian assistance. It would be too much to say that the Russians allowed Tito and his colleagues wide latitude; in their curious ignorance of Balkan affairs during the war they scarcely seemed to have noticed Tito until a fairly, late date. On the, other hand he was himself sufficiently confident of eventual support to take very far reaching decisions on his own authority.

(ii) The regime's strongest appeal in its early days rested upon nationalist sentiment in various forms. Among the population as a whole nationalism is a confused and often parochial feeling. The Slovenes irrespective of party feel very deeply about Trieste . The Macedonians don't, but feel intensely about Salonika . Both of them loathe the Montenegrins. But Yugoslav nationalism, as opposed to regional nationalism, remains a, very potent force in the Communist Party and in the Army upon which the Party depends for its hold on the county.

8. So much for history and now for the present. No one here would think of denying that the present rulers of Yugoslavia are all convinced and many of them fanatical communists. It may seem a platitude to add that they must therefore believe in communism, but I think we sometimes forget the implications of this obvious conclusion. To Tito and his colleagues communism is not simply an intellectual theory and it has not been watered down as it must have been, for example, among many French and Italian communists by other intellectual influences. I suspect in fact that Yugoslav communism keeps at the moment far more closely to the classical principles of Leninism than does the brand of communism now favoured in the Kremlin. Yugoslav communists have a much more recent experience of persecution for their faith than have the Russians. They seem to me to believe in communism as the answer not only to internal economic- problems but also, according to the old Marxist theory, as the answer to all problems of foreign affairs. They believe that whenever another neighbouring country becomes communist it will cease, to harbour imperialist designs against Yugoslav territory; it will run its own internal affairs more efficiently; it will produce more exports for other countries including Yugoslavia; it will raise its own standard of living and will be a better potential market for the goods; which Yugoslavia can now export and for the larger quantity, which she hopes to be able to export after completion of the 5-year plan; finally, being communist it will be more sympathetic and accommodating to Yugoslavia's needs, and relations with it, being conducted by two communist governments, will be immeasurably easier. In short, we must assume that the Yugoslav communists believe that whenever another country becomes communist this process represents a direct and immediate benefit to Yugoslavia .

9. At the same time we are all agreed that the Yugoslav Government is intensely nationalist. It is not merely that they depend for their support upon that strongly nationalist organization, the army. Their own nationalism is perfectly genuine. The first symptom is intense pride in what their country has done during the war and confidence in their plans for the future. The relevant aspect of their nationalism is, however, that they desire:

(a) maximum prosperity at home in the form of a secure agricultural basis to the country's economy and the fulfillment of far-reaching plans far industrialization.

(b) international prestige;

(c) territorial expansion;

10. As I have indicated above the Yugoslav communists must believe that maximum prosperity at home is attainable only when communism has embraced as many countries as possible, when all countries are making the best use of their productive facilities and when having shed the gross prejudices which some Governments still seem to harbour, all countries are ready to trade with Yugoslavia upon the sort of terms which suit the Yugoslav Government's taste.

11. The Yugoslav communists must have just as much reason to believe that their international prestige is also to be attained in the same way. Here indeed I think they are perfectly right. This prestige exists at the moment only among communist parties and fellow travelers and in countries which are governed by communists. The press they get in Italy and Greece is as bad as the press they get in Albania and Bulgaria is good. We all know how long this state of affairs would last if Italy and Greece fell under a communist government. In short, the more communism there is in the world the more prestige for communist Yugoslavia . This must be qualified to the extent that if a major European country became communist Yugoslavia would obviously lose the position which she now seems to hold as the second most influential communist country. But you will find my answer to this qualification in paragraph l5 below.

12. When we turn to Yugoslavia 's territorial ambitions it is harder to determine whether there is a conflict between the claims of communism and nationalism. I do not, however, believe that there is such a conflict. Of the 4 major Yugoslav territorial claims, three are now being prosecuted against non-communist governments and one against a communist government. There has been much speculation whether the prosecution of territorial claims against Italy , Austria and Greece is in the interests of world communism. It is obvious that such claims strengthen the anti-communist feeling in these three countries. It may be that the body which has, replaced the Comintern took account of this, but whether or not it did, one thing seems to me comparatively clear. Yugoslavia's three territorial claims against non-communist Governments ore not going to be disappointed because the Comintern's successor has decided that it' is better tactics to help the Italian, Greek and Austrian Communist Parties. They are going to be disappointed because the, non-communist forces in the world look like being strong enough, at any rate at the moment, to prevent their realization. We here have sometimes thought that the Russians might take pains to avoid embarrassing the Italian Communist Party over the Trieste question. They do not appear to have done so. On the contrary they pressed Yugoslav claims to Trieste , firmly and stubbornly and appear to have relinquished their pressure only when they were certain that it had failed. They and communist parties in other countries are supporting Yugoslavia 's Austrian claims with a similar, disregard for the repercussions which such claims may have upon the success of communism in Austria . Finally, although Russian intentions in Macedonia are obscure they have, to say the least, not discouraged Yugoslav and Bulgarian claims on Greece which must be a great embarrassment to the Greek communist party. In fact, they seem so far definitely to have decided to back the really safe horse of a communist Yugoslav Government and not to trust themselves to the uncertainties, of public opinion in Greece , Austria and Italy where, in the absence of communist Governments, public opinion is still an important factor.

13. We do not, of course, know how Yugoslavia ’s territoria1 claims would fare if Greece , Austria and Italy became communist. It might be that once they secured power the Communalist Governments of those countries would become just as nationalist as the Yugoslav Government and would be unwilling to make any territorial cession. But one thing is quite clear. So long as the Governments in these three countries are not communist and provided that they receive sufficient support from non-communist forces in the West there is no chance whatever of their ceding territory. If we exclude the possibility of a complete economic collapse of the non-communist forces of Europe it is therefore clear that only through the spread of communism and the emergence of further communist Governments will there arise any prospect at all of the satisfaction of Yugoslav territorial claims. Their chance of securing territory from communist Greek, Austrian or Italian governments may be less than they suppose, but at least cannot be as small as their chance of securing such territory under the present dispensation.

14. I think this argument is supported by the manner in which Yugoslav claims have been prosecuted against Bulgaria . These claims have, I think, provoked some press reaction in Sofia but not, as far as I know, the governmental reaction to which all other Yugoslav claims have given rise. I world not base an argument too strongly upon any aspect of the Macedonian question because as I have said, I find Russian intentions in this regard very obscure. But it seems at least possible that the communist Bulgarian Government are ready or have been compelled to promise territory to the communist Yugoslav Government.

15. To sum up it seems to me that the Yugoslav Government believe and have good reason for believing that their national interests as defined in paragraph 9 above are inseparable from the spread of communism over the world. I should be surprised if they made any great distinction between the expansion of communism and the expansion of Russian influence and domination. They believe I think, that if the whole of Europe embraced communism they would find themselves as a senior partner of the Balkan Federation (whether or not the technical procedure of Federation was carried out). This, I think, the answer to the qualification which I made at the end of paragraph 11 above. Yugoslavia would obviously have to cede the second place in the communist hierarchy to, e. g. a communist France , but I think the Yugoslav Government much too hard-headed to nurse unlimited ambitions. As the head of a Balkan Federation in a communist Europe they could enjoy, or at any rate would expect to enjoy, considerably more prestige and influence than their country has possessed for centuries, and they would not, I am sure, hope for more than this. They may from time to time have to put the brake on nationalist exuberance among their supporters. For example, the shooting down of the American aircraft last September, appeared to me to be an outburst of such exuberance on the part of the army which caused considerable embarrassment to the Government. But I believe that the Government are ready to wait a long time for the realization of their hopes. So long, therefore, as communism is an expanding force, and so long as they are not disillusioned in the belief that it is a valid economic theory I do not believe that serious conflict is likely to arise between the claims of international communism and of Yugoslav communist nationalism. I have certainly no person to believe that such a conflict has yet arisen.

16. I believe that a fundamental change of circumstances is required to create conditions in which such a conflict might arise. The best example I can think of is the possibility of a serious failure of the present Soviet 5-year plan, which would, I presume first put the strongest brake upon the present Russian policy of dynamic expansion, and secondly give Russia serious reason to consider plundering all the satellites for her own benefit. Such conditions might well cause both some measure of disillusion among Yugoslav communists, and a direct and serious conflict of interest between Yugoslav nationalism and international communism, of which the latter's first object being presumably to render assistance to Russia . This is, of course, a matter of speculation and I cannot say whether even in such circumstances Belgrade would attempt to refuse any demand which Moscow seriously pressed. I can, in fact, only give you a few general ideas which I think govern every-day relations. The first is that the Yugoslav Government seem to enjoy as much confidence as the Soviet Government are ever likely to give to any organization outside Russia. As I have said above, Tito assumed authority during the war for far- reaching decisions in the confidence that they would later be approved. The Yugoslav Government are still, I believe, trusted by Moscow to take the right course in most fields of administration without too much instruction or advice. At the same time, if and when instructions are received they have some, and probably fairly wide powers of “arguing back”. Their relation to Moscow is indeed probably very similar to that of a senior colonial governor. They are trusted and known to be working in the same direction. They can represent, very strongly at times, that local conditions made certain courses of action desirable and they know that such representations will be considered. In the last resort they will carry out instructions. Secondly, we should remember that Yugoslavia is now very useful to Russia as a source of imports, as a spearhead of the attack in international organizations and as a show piece of communism outside Russia . So far as the Russians consider unselfishly the needs of any Government it must be the Yugoslav Government.

17. These two rules may govern every day relations but would probably break down in the event of a serious clash of interests. But there as a third rule which would, however, obtain even during such a conflict. This is that the Yugoslav Government must depend to a very large extent upon Russian support for its internal position. At the moment there is no need for aggressive Russian support to keep the country held down, but one of the most potent factors which has prevented active opposition is the wide-spread belief that even if the Army could be penetrated or neutralized the Russians would still return and re-impose Tito by force of arms. If the regime were ever to lose Russian support the possibilities of a revolution would be very greatly increased, a fact which the regime could certainly not afford to ignore.

18. After Saying all this I need hardly add that at present I see no chance whatsoever of useful encouragement to national as opposed to international communists. I shall of course bear the matter in mind and let you know If I see any reason to change the conclusions I have now reached.

19. I am sending copies of this letter to Frank Roberts, Ashley Clark, Ward and Nichols.

C.F.A. Warner, Esq., CMG, Foreign Office, London , S.W.l.

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[George S.]

Mk thanks for the post with the toponyms there are so many that the greeks changed.

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Mk thanks for the post with the toponyms there are so many that the greeks changed.

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Russia FM, Macedonia leaders to discuss cooperation prospects

20.04.2011

OCHRID, Macedonia, April 20 (Itar-Tass) - Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov leaves Podgorica, Montenegro, for Ochrid on Wednesday for meetings with the Foreign minister, Premier, and President of Macedonia. Ochrid is an ancient and picturesque city in Macedonia's south-west. It is notable for a multitude of Orthodox churches and therefore is referred to as a "Balkan Jerusalem".

Lavrov's visit to Macedonia is timed to coincide with the 150th anniversary of the opening of the Imperial Consulate -- the first official representative office of Russia in this part of the Balkans, which at that time was part of the Ottoman Empire.

Within the scope of the planned meetings, the sides are to discuss ways to step up trade-and-economic contacts, interaciton in the fuel-and-energy and investment sectors, and exchange views on the situation in the Balkans. Moscow analysts point out, "Relations between the two countries follow an upward trend". The political dialogue "develops dynamically", RF Ministry analysts emphasize,

Expert estimate is that Russia remain one of major trading partners of the republic. Trade turnover between the two countries in 2010 ran at $579 milllion, a 12-percent increase as compared with that in 2009. Investments-related interaction with Macedonia focuses mainly on oil and gas, mining, and electric power sectors. Cumulated Russian investments in the Macedonian economy amount to about $300 million.

In June last year, an intergovernmental agreement on a settlement of the so-called clearing debt (RF indebtedness to Macedonia on settlements connected with trade turnover between the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) amounting to $60.5 million. The funds are to be used for the construction of a gas trunkline section in the republic by Russian companies.

RF Foreign Ministry analysts also draw attention to a high level of bilateral interaction in the fields of science and education. A Days of Russian spiritual culture festival was a great success in Macedonia in September 2010. A similar festival is expected to be held in Russia in autumn this year.

http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=16169522&PageNum=0

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No open issues between Russia and Macedonia, cooperation should be resumed - FM Lavrov

Ohrid, 20 April 2011 (MIA) - Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Macedonia are not at all marred by open political issues. Our duty is only to resume the cooperation, urged Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov after meeting with his Macedonian host and counterpart Antonio Milososki on Wednesday in Ohrid.

"Today's meeting aims at taking advantage of the determination for mutual cooperation, which has been historically existing between our countries for establishment of modern ties in a bid to advance cooperation in the spheres of culture, economy and investments, in line with the agreement made by the presidents of Russia and Macedonia - Dmitry Medvedev and Gjorge Ivanov - at their last year's meeting in Saint Petersburg," Lavrov said.

FMs Milososki and Lavrov discussed the course of the implementation of what was agreed by countries' presidents.

Milososki stated that both countries were sharing joint values, sympathies and cultural connection that could serve as a capital to enhance Macedonian-Russian relations in both political and economic spheres.

"This visit could be a significant push towards opening a fresh chapter for further strengthening of the traditionally good relations between Macedonia and Russia. Today, it marks a historical milestone - 150th anniversary of the first Russian diplomatic presence on the territory of Macedonia with the opening of the Russian consulate in Bitola," Milososki said.

Interlocutors also discussed Macedonia and Russia's cooperation at multilateral level, especially within the United Nations, the Council of Europe and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

"The meeting was a chance to inform my Russian counterpart on the current political and economic developments in Macedonia and on the course of the Macedonian-Greek dialogue involving the name issue," Milososki said, who thanked for Russia's backing since the early days of Macedonia's independence regarding the integrity of the Macedonian state by respecting its sovereign rights.

Considering the economic cooperation, both ministers said Macedonia and Russia were facing unused potentials to improve it in all fields - from energy to tourism.

"We're grateful for supporting Macedonia's inclusion into the South Stream project. The agreement closing the clearing debt between Russia and Macedonia will open a new page in the bilateral business collaboration," FM Milososki said.

"There are no political obstacles Macedonia not to be included into the above-mentioned project," Lavrov stressed.

A bilateral agreement improving cultural collaboration by opening Russian cultural center in Skopje and Macedonian cultural center in Russia's capital is in the works.

The head of the Russian diplomacy, who previously visited Ohrid in 1999, urged to promote Ohrid and Macedonia as a tourist destination upon returning to Russia.

"The orthodox closeness existing between the two nations is an additional factor which makes Ohrid and Macedonia attractive as a tourist destination," said Lavrov calling Ohrid "a heavenly place".

Ministers Lavrov and Milososki at the meeting signed the joint plan of the countries' foreign ministries on regular consultations between 2011 and 2012. They are expected to prompt closer coordination in various fields of the foreign policy.

Moreover, Milososki thanked his Russian counterpart for handing over several documents from the Russian diplomatic archive, which are of crucial importance for the history of the Macedonian nation.

Russian FM Lavrov in Ohrid also held talks with President Gjorhe Ivanov and PM Nikola Gruevski and visited the cultural landmarks of Ohrid.

Sergey Lavrov is in Ohrid as part of his Balkan tour, which also includes trips to Serbia, Montenegro and Slovenia. ba/fd/15:54

http://www.mia.com.mk/default.aspx?vId=83132607&lId=2

[George S.]

if macedonia develops relations with russia like it should & others it doesn't need to join the eu as it's capable of looking after itself.As long as it doesn't have to compromise or capitulate i'm all for free trade amongst countries.
thanks MK for bringing this up.