Bosnia: Politics and Current Events

[johnMKD]

Yes, Turkey involved on behalf of NATO but i know that most of active force in the warfield was Turkish soldiers and pilots. Other NATO member soldiers was at backfield doing only humanitarian stuff and dealing with security. We preferred to be at the frontline and already other NATO countries wasn't that fancy to be in combat actively unlike Turkey.

I don't know how many Bosnians are pro-Turk or pro-Serb but Turkey gone there to save people and also 100.000s of our citizens had close relatives in Bosnia who stuck in the middle of warfield then. It`s true that there is a quite strange situation in there like some other Balkan countries. It`s a mess and full of problems.

That's right; it's full of never-ending problems. Somebody told me recently that the Serbs of Srpska Republica of Bosnia dream of reunification with Serbia. Just imagine, neighbour, what this could create in the already troubled area of Balkans.

[Onur]

Onur, I was referring to the US/NATO bombardment in Serbia. I didn't know Turkey was also involved in this. Was it because of NATO membership?

However, the Serbs are brothers to Greece I guess due to Orthodoxy and due to the fact that they were allied during Balkan wars (back then at the expense of Macedonia).

Nevertheless, not all Bosnians are pro-Turk, as far as I know. Half of their country are Serbs, consisting the Srpska Republika. The other half are Muslims. Quite a strange situation they have over there.

Yes, Turkey involved on behalf of NATO but i know that most of active force in the warfield was Turkish soldiers and pilots. Other NATO member soldiers was at backfield doing only humanitarian stuff and dealing with security. We preferred to be at the frontline and already other NATO countries wasn't that fancy to be in combat actively unlike Turkey.

I don't know how many Bosnians are pro-Turk or pro-Serb but Turkey gone there to save people and also 100.000s of our citizens had close relatives in Bosnia who stuck in the middle of warfield then. It`s true that there is a quite strange situation in there like some other Balkan countries. It`s a mess and full of problems.

[Makedonetz]

So true, we have a comedian on board.

Makedonetz you say you are a Doctor, what medicine do you practice?

I graduated from Med school 3 years ago and working in General medicine where i work at the Hospital here in town.

[johnMKD]

On the contrary, the most active force in the warfield at Bosnian side was Turkish soldiers and pilots who bombed Serbian fronts. I remember that there was anti-USA and anti-Europe articles in Turkish newspapers too because they didn't want Turkey to involve at first and they managed to delay our military operation for the first few months.

There was 1000s of people in the streets here, protesting our government for delaying the military operation to Bosnia. Most of the protesters was pre-war Bosnian immigrants from Yugoslavia days.

It was a shame for the world tough because if Turkish soldiers would go there earlier, we could prevent them to realize the genocide since when we started airfield attacks, all Serbian forces eliminated in few days and Serbian forces surrendered immediately.



Btw, there are millions of Bosnians living in turkey today, so we can say that they are our brothers but how come Greeks and Serbs becomes brothers?? What unites you, only the Orthodoxy?

Onur, I was referring to the US/NATO bombardment in Serbia. I didn't know Turkey was also involved in this. Was it because of NATO membership?

However, the Serbs are brothers to Greece I guess due to Orthodoxy and due to the fact that they were allied during Balkan wars (back then at the expense of Macedonia).

Nevertheless, not all Bosnians are pro-Turk, as far as I know. Half of their country are Serbs, consisting the Srpska Republika. The other half are Muslims. Quite a strange situation they have over there.

[Onur]

However, I do agree about this Greek-Serbian "brotherhood" thinking does exist. I was raised believing and saying that "the Serbs are our brothers". In fact, during the 1999 war in Serbia, Greece sent a lot of support (referring to supplies) and I still remember Greek media bombarding with anti-US statements 24/7.

On the contrary, the most active force in the warfield at Bosnian side was Turkish soldiers and pilots who bombed Serbian fronts. I remember that there was anti-USA and anti-Europe articles in Turkish newspapers too because they didn't want Turkey to involve at first and they managed to delay our military operation for the first few months.

There was 1000s of people in the streets here, protesting our government for delaying the military operation to Bosnia. Most of the protesters was pre-war Bosnian immigrants from Yugoslavia days.

It was a shame for the world tough because if Turkish soldiers would go there earlier, we could prevent them to realize the genocide since when we started airfield attacks, all Serbian forces eliminated in few days and Serbian forces surrendered immediately.



Btw, there are over a million of Bosnians living in turkey today, so we can say that they are our brothers but how come Greeks and Serbs becomes brothers?? What unites them, only the Orthodoxy? If yes, then Bulgars are your brothers too if religion is the only case.

[johnMKD]

Greece praise Serbes they call them "Serbie Ene Patrioti mou"

translated it means Serbia is our patriotic bros

and second my mother when she left for Romania she had a few girlfriends there that understood Greek and she picked up a few words....i understand a little but not enough to make a sentence. Also im a doctor and have worked in the past with a few colleuges that are greek in my field

Really nice try, Makedonetz, although not entirely correct the sentence. However, I do agree about this Greek-Serbian "brotherhood" thinking does exist. I was raised believing and saying that "the Serbs are our brothers". In fact, during the 1999 war in Serbia, Greece sent a lot of support (referring to supplies) and I still remember Greek media bombarding with anti-US statements 24/7.

[Bratot]

Alternative :wink

[Daskalot]

This couldn't be more funny

So true, we have a comedian on board.

Makedonetz you say you are a Doctor, what medicine do you practice?

[Bratot]

This couldn't be more funny

[Makedonetz]

translated it means Serbia is our patriotic bros

and second my mother when she left for Romania she had a few girlfriends there that understood Greek and she picked up a few words....i understand a little but not enough to make a sentence. Also im a doctor and have worked in the past with a few colleuges that are greek in my field

[Daskalot]

Greece praise Serbes they call them "Serbie Ene Patrioti mou"

Would you care to translate the above? All of our readers are not Greek speakers thus what you have posted will not be understood by them.

On a side note, where have you learned Greek?

[Makedonetz]

Greece praise Serbes they call them "Serbie Ene Patrioti mou"

[Onur]

Takis Michas "Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties"

http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/158544183X/qid=1020761780/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_0_1/026-5717662-4778065

Reviewed by Panayote Dimitras(Greek Helsinki Monitor, Greece; and Central European University, Hungary)

Takis Michas' "Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties" is a "book combining personal observation, exhaustive investigation, humanitarian concerns and political analysis" (Samuel Huntington), "a courageous work" (Roy Gutman), a "devastating critique of Greece's reactive ethnonationalism" (Nicos Mouzelis) that "should be read not only by Balkan specialists but by all those interested in issues of nationalism and human rights" (Adamantia Pollis). This review fully subscribes to these back jacket comments.

Michas' book provides indeed compelling, irrefutable evidence that help explain the frustration of Zoran Mutic, an anti-nationalist Serb intellectual and translator of Greek literature in Serb-Croat. In September 1995, Mutic exclaimed: "When I hear so many Greeks -journalists, academics, politicians, intellectuals- expressing their admiration for Karadzic, what can I say? How can they consider as a hero a criminal, somebody who bombed hospitals, who placed snipers to kill kids on the streets?" Karadzic was honored in an open-air mass meeting in Piraeus, in the summer of 1993, attended or supported by all political parties, trade unions, media and the Orthodox Church: the handful of demonstrators who opposed the meeting were even arrested...

The convincing answers provided by Michas will make this book hard to swallow by the mainstream Greek political, media and intellectual establishment, notorious for its refusal to accept criticism and engage in self-criticism (as former socialist Minister of Justice Professor Michalis Stathopoulos has repeatedly said). It is expected that, if they decided not to ignore it, most of them will find harsher words for it than those of the former conservative foreign minister Michalis Papakonstantinou in the book's odd foreword: "Michas ... wrote the book ... more from the viewpoint of a human rights activist and critic trying to bring justice to the side he supports than that of an objective observer" (p. xi). Because indeed, in Greece, advocating for human rights, civil society, and, in the end, an open democratic society is perceived as a biased enterprise even by the most moderate members of the establishment, like M. Papakonstantinou. It is no accident that the book's author -like a few others with similar views- has more than once lost journalistic jobs for having expressed views that in most traditional democracies would not even be considered radical. Michas indeed starts the book with one such experience: losing his column in a financial daily, yet owned by a typical "globalization" entrepreneur, for having printed in April 1993 the bank account for support to the then hard-hit Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje" (pp. 3-4)...

Michas substantiates clearly at the outset the second part of the book's title: "what seemed incomprehensible during the Bosnia and Kosovo wars was not so much that Greece sided with Serbia, but that it sided with Serbia's darkest side" (p. 4). Indeed, the book provides a detailed documentation of how Greece sided with Milosevic and scorned the Serbian opposition even through 2000. It helps explain therefore how Greece also sided with Karadzic when the latter disagreed with Milosevic, and with the Pale Serbian-Bosnian self-proclaimed parliament when it rebuffed pleas by Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, Milosevic and Karadzic during the ill-fated effort to settle the Bosnian crisis early on in 1992. He is correct, moreover, to point out that this attitude was not inspired by politicians and/or media but was a bottom-up event. "Media people and politicians simply gave in to this overpowering popular demand" (p. 5). Michas correctly explains this attitude by the weakness of Greek civil society and the prevailing intolerance in the society at large, which is indeed a much worse situation than that of a "merely" intolerant state.

He attributes this characteristic to the prevalence to this very day of a militant and rather primitive form of ethnonationalism in Greece. In the end of the book, he develops this theoretical argument, and also explains the role of the Orthodox Church as a component of Greek nationalism; he looks for the roots of anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism of the left and of the right, a major element in Greek society's "irrational" attitude; and he recalls the consequent and continued persecution of dissident voices and refusal to recognize minorities, that go hand-in-hand with the prevailing intolerance. Many nationalism theorists may disagree with the author, or find some of his arguments rather weak: however, even here, it is the evidence he provides that is essential to the understanding of modern Greece, in this investigative piece that is not a rigorous academic study.

The book comes out at a time when the publication of the Dutch report on the events of Srebrenica has caused serious waves in the Netherlands and beyond. These waves have not reached Greece, though, a country that was rejoicing after the "fall" of Srebrenica in July 1995 at the hands of Bosnian Serbs and their allies, Greek paramilitaries. The latter in fact raised the Greek flag in Srebrenica after its capture: for those who may try to contest this fact, a photo is provided (p. 22), alongside another immortalizing the ensuing award of medals to the paramilitaries by Karadzic (p. 23). The other major indicted war crimes suspect, then General Ratko Mladic, was equally popular in Greece. So, when the Hague Tribunal indicted both of them, two million signatures were reportedly collected by the Greek-Serbian Friendship Association to oppose their prosecution. Another revealing part of the Dutch report on Srebrenica is the reference to the support of the Bosnian Serb army by the Greek (alongside Israeli and Ukrainian) secret services which provided them with arms and ammunition. Michas' book makes this look even more credible when it reveals that NATO military secrets on the August 1995 air strikes were passed on to Mladic on direct orders of then socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou: the author's source is none other than Papandreou's personal intermediary with Karadzic and Milosevic, the -then and now-President of Greek-Serbian Friendship Association, who was carrying out the mission (pp. 38-39).

One would therefore not be surprised that Michas recalls also the refusal in Greece to condemn Serb atrocities in all recent wars and to accept that rapes were used as an ethnic cleansing weapon by Serbs; as well as the eagerness to refute any such allegations, and challenge the credibility of the Hague Tribunal or other international expert commissions, even by Greece's top human rights official. Besides, the book provides information on many business activities involving Greeks and Serbs to break the embargo against Serbia, acquire companies in Kosovo, launder Milosevic money, all that with full state support.

This phenomenon of "fundamental irrationalism," as Salonica-born leading French sociologist Edgar Morin called it, had its culmination in 1999 with the Kosovo bombings. A near unanimity of Greeks opposed them; almost all Greek media reported events along the official Serb government line; and anti-Americanism reached a new high during the same year's US President Bill Clinton state visit, which triggered unparalleled street demonstrations, quite unlike previous or later visits by a long list of communist or other authoritarian leaders.

In the end, Michas recalls how even the supposed pro-European Costas Simitis socialist government, and its foreign minister George Papandreou, tried to help Milosevic when, in October 2000, the Serbian masses and the international community demanded that he recognized his defeat by Vojislav Kostunica and stepped down: Milosevic's insistence that a run-off be held had one supporter, Greece -and personally even its foreign minister.

Another important contribution of the book is the account of the sustained efforts throughout the 1990s by Greek diplomacy to destabilize or at least to prevent the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia at all, or, later on, under its constitutional name. Afraid -correctly- that such a development would only make inevitable the acknowledgment that a Macedonian minority exists in Greece -which it does, but that is Greek society's major taboo-, these efforts included even exchange of views with Milosevic to "swallow up" Macedonia, perhaps within the context of a Greek-Serb Confederation.

Michas concludes the investigative part of the book with a related sarcasm: "Surely Milosevic feels sorry that he did not pursue this matter further. Had his plan for a Greek-Serb federation materialized, he might well have won the 2000 election. The majority of Greeks would have voted for him at any rate" (p. 106). How can one contest it, when his popularity rating in Greece, to the very end of his rule, was many times higher than that of all Western leaders and even than his popularity among Serbs? Or when a few hours after his extradition to the Hague, in June 2001, 79 of the some 100 Greek deputies present in Athens signed a petition opposing it and all other extraditions of Serbs to the Hague Tribunal?

http://www.alb-net.com/aki/bookreview/br02.htm

P. S: I cant see any difference between Al-Qaida militants and these Serbian-Greek Orthodox Jihadists. They are virtually the same shitheads and radicals in my eyes but I cant comprehend that how come these people can be as sick minded as this. They willingly join the efforts of eradicating Bosnians by doing massacres and then, they do plans to create Serbian-Greek Confederation to swallow and destroy ROM.

I wonder how dare they can think about realizing an evil plan like this? Who gives them courage to even think about that as a whole? We are not talking about a bunch of 20s years old brainwashed skinheads here. It`s the Greek politicians, media and masses who seriously thinks about that.

[Risto the Great]

In his opening statement last October, prosecutor Alan Tieger said Mr Karadzic "harnessed the forces of nationalism, hatred and fear to pursue his vision of an ethnically segregated Bosnia".

In the meanwhile an ethnically segregated Macedonia is being promoted by everyone except Macedonians.

[Risto the Great]

Karadzic defends Bosnian Serb 'holy' cause at trial

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8542297.stm

Former leader Radovan Karadzic has said the Serb cause in the Bosnian war was "just and holy" as he began his defence at his genocide trial at The Hague.

Mr Karadzic, who led the Bosnian Serbs during the war in the 1990s, said there was a core group of Muslims in Bosnia - then and now - who wanted 100% power.

He said the Serbs acted in self-defence after their peace plans were rejected.

He insists he is innocent of all 11 charges from the 1992-95 Bosnian war, including genocide and war crimes.

The trial had been adjourned since November and the judge rejected a new request for a further postponement.

'Mere mortal'

Mr Karadzic, 64, suspended his boycott and appeared in court along with his lawyer on Monday as the trial resumed.

"I will defend that nation of ours and their cause that is just and holy," Mr Karadzic said in translated comments at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

"I stand here before you not to defend the mere mortal that I am, but to defend the greatness of a small nation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which for 500 years has had to suffer," he told the court. "We have a good case. We have good evidence and proof."

After his initial remarks, Mr Karadzic began laying out a detailed account of the events that led up to the outbreak of the war.

The wartime leader is trying to show that there was no joint criminal enterprise - no plan or plot - to carry out the genocide or "ethnic cleansing", but that Serbs were only defending themselves from perceived Muslim aggression, says the BBC's Dominic Hughes at the trial.

"Their conduct gave rise to our conduct, and that is 100% true," Mr Karadzic told the court.

'War trick'

He pointed to one defining event of the 44-month siege of Sarajevo - the 1994 attack on a market in which nearly 70 people died - saying it was a stage-managed "trick" for which Serbian forces were falsely blamed.

Mr Karadzic showed the court pictures of an empty marketplace, claiming it was the scene shortly before, as he put it, hundreds appeared and the attack was reported.

He is expected to present a two-day opening statement before prosecutors present their first witness on Wednesday.

The trial has drawn strong reactions from survivors of the Sarajevo siege.

"I don't believe The Hague can punish him enough. They should send him back to us here in Sarajevo so we can hang him here in the middle of the city," Muhamed Dizdar, a merchant in Markale market told the AP news agency.

Bloody campaign

Mr Karadzic faces two charges of genocide - including the killing in Srebrenica of more than 7,000 men and boys - as well as nine other counts including murder, extermination, persecution and forced deportation.

Prosecutors say he orchestrated a campaign of "ethnic cleansing" against Muslims and Croats in eastern Bosnia to create an ethnically pure Serbian state.

In his opening statement last October, prosecutor Alan Tieger said Mr Karadzic "harnessed the forces of nationalism, hatred and fear to pursue his vision of an ethnically segregated Bosnia".

Mr Karadzic had boycotted the proceedings, insisting on more time to prepare his case.

In November, the court appointed British lawyer Richard Harvey to take over the defence if he continued his boycott.

Mr Karadzic was arrested in Belgrade in 2008 after nearly 13 years on the run.

During his time in power, he was president of the self-styled Bosnian Serb Republic and commander of its army during the Bosnian conflict which left more than 100,000 people dead.

He is the most significant figure to face justice at this tribunal since the former Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, who died of a heart attack in 2006 before his own trial was concluded.